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ON PERFORMANCES. THE CONTRIBUTION OF DRAMATURGICAL SOCIOLOGY. TOWARDS A CHRISTIAN ETHNO-METHODOLOGY *

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Every culture possesses a certain "expressive coherence", namely the capacity to maintain the coherence of gestures, manifestations, appearances, in conformity with the "projected definitions" for the situations that entail such gestures, manners, appearances. On the other hand, in every culture "minor accidents", "unintentional gestures" etc. occur, which contradict the impression we want to leave to the others and the suitable definition for the interactive situation we are in. These are "discrepancies", "dysrhythmies", "breaks" or "fractures" that are symbolical, definitional, of the frame etc., in relation with a certain degree of "expressive coherence" of the respective society. We are dealing in our paper with such a problem like the one regarding the "frames breaking off" and their effects on the equillibrium of societies.

1."Hombre Secreto" or the "Natural Conspiracy".

We will attempt, in what follows, to examine the *field of social performances* taking into account the contribution of dramartugical sociology on this topic. With this we pass on from the latent plan to the manifest one of society. We will have in this way the opportunity of remarking the risk of general degradation of the world from the perspective of the spiritual deficit in human performances. This type of approach allows the possibility of verifying even more systematically the hypothesis that between the plan of *bestowal (gifts)* of our existence and the plan of the *given* of our performances there arise such serious discrepancies that they menace the very balance of both social and individual life. As with the other frames of the interpretations, in the case of performances also, the referential system is that of the intensity of the experiential processes, that is, of the degree of spiritualization of performances. The matter sends us directly to the relation between the appearance of "things", of phenomena, and their spiritual substance, that is to say, between content and expressiveness. The first reality that we encounter when we examine the world is that of its *expressiveness,* that to know society is, up to a great extent, the same as pinpointing the "real" sociological "scenery" of our world. Human being as an "expressive being" and as "interpretative agent" becomes thus the object of study of sociology. Such a sociological approach has been established by dramaturgical sociology through one of its initiators, E. Goffman.

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We will pursue our interpretations within a frame of dialogue precisely with this perspective of man's performance on the life scene.

The individual's expressiveness implies, as E. Goffman, the most renowned personality in dramaturgical sociology warns, two types of "signaling activities": "the expression intended by the individual", which is deliberate, and "the involuntary expression", that his conduct inspires involuntarily (or, in Goffman's words: "the expression that he gives, and the expression that he gives off"[1]). The former refers to "verbal symbols and their substitutes that are used to transmit the particular information contained in these symbols" (Goffman, E.). The latter refers to those actions that a random observer considers "symptomatic for the actor", that is, he perceives them as involuntarily sending a significant piece of information ("The expectation being that the action was performed for other reasons than the information conveyed in his way"[2]). Even the "misinformation" transmitted through both vehicles is differentiated, the former involving *deceit or trickery*, the latter, *dissimulation, duplicity* and *feigning*.

Under these circumstances, we live in front of the *individual* not in a "scientific" way, but in an inferential way, as Thomas says: "We live by inference. I am, let us say, your guest. You do not know, you cannot determine scientifically, that I will not steal your money or your spoons. But inferentially I will not, and inferentially you have me as a guest".[3]

Taking into consideration the *intended* or *nourished expressions* and the *inferred* ones, we may affirm that any individual will act "in a thoroughly calculating manner, expressing himself in a given way solely in order to give the kind of impression to others that is likely to evoke from them a specific response he is concerned to obtain."[4] In order to illustrate this idea, Goffman presents a long excerpt from an English novel, which refers to the way in which an English tourist makes his entrance (appears) on a beach from a hotel in Spain. "But in any case he took care to avoid catching anyone's eye. First of all, he had to make it clear to those potential companions of his holiday that they were of no concern to him whatsoever. He stared through them, round them, over them- eyes lost in space. The beach might have been empty. If by chance a ball was thrown his way, he looked surprised; then let a smile of amusement lighten his face (Kindly Preedy), looked round dazed to see that there were people on the beach, tossed it back with a smile to himself and not a smile at the people, and then resumed carelessly his nonchalant survey of space. But it was time to institute a little parade, the parade of the Ideal Preedy. By devious handlings he gave any who wanted to look a chance to see the title of his book-

[1] Goffman, „The Presentation of Self in Everyday life", (1959), New York, Penguin Books, 14.
[2] Idem
[3] Ibid. 15
[4] Ibid. 17

a Spanish translation of Homer, classic thus, but not daring, cosmopolitan too – and then gathered…" etc., etc.[5] We may therefore speak of a "game of informing". "When we allow that the individual projects a definition of the situation when he appears before others, we must also see that others, however passive their role may seem to be, will themselves project a definition of the situation by virtue of their response to the respective individual…"[6]. These "definitions of the situations" that are projected by different actors, "are sufficiently attuned to one another, so that open contradiction will not occur".[7] This harmony is rather of an ideal nature. In fact things happen so that "each participant is expected to suppress his immediate heartfelt feelings, conveying a view of the situation which he feels the others will be able to find at least temporarily acceptable."[8] "The maintenance of this surface of agreement (…) is facilitated by each participant concealing his own wants behind the statements which everyone present feels obliged to give lip service."[9]

Goffman believes that things happen according to the rule of a "relative division of definitional labor", in the sense that each "participant" "is allowed to establish" a sort of "rule" on those matters that "are vital to him, but that are not vital to the others. (…) In exchange for this courtesy he remains silent or non-commital on matters important to others but not immediately important to him".[10]

In Goffman's vision, therefore, the *"natural"* or ordinary *man*, that is, the "individual", a common man, who is on the life stage, is not the same as the *"simple man"*. He resembles, rather, that *"hombre secreto"* of Balthasar Gracian, as he makes sure to "stage" in his own conduct and *performances* a continuous *game of plans*, in which tacitly and universally accepted *deceit* and *feigning* combine. The *ordinary man*, therefore, is neither *simple*, nor *natural*, but somewhat "conspirational", in the sense that he is spontaneous in handling an art of "the hidden", as if, together with the others, he accepted a "minimal conspiracy". This *modus vivendi* of interaction, towards which all those who incidentally participate in an ordinary interaction (a conversation, for example) evolve, is based on the fact that they all tacitly agree not to be radical and hence "indiscreet" about the "matter that seems important" to the other, so that I concede to that one "one instance of silence". The oddity about Goffman's analysis is not to take notice of the fact that this *concessive predisposition*, this *innocent "conspiracy"* is nothing else than the *unanimous effort of being good* overlapped with that strange and apparently spontaneous complication in everyone's way of being whenever they *mean* to be concessive, that is, good.

[5] Ibid. 16
[6] Ibid. 20
[7] Idem
[8] Idem
[9] Ibid. 20-21
[10] Idem

Let us remember anyway this interesting distinction between the *simple man* and the *ordinary man*, as it warns us of a deeper one, between the *good man* and the *man who is striving to be good* in an anonymous world, in which the most natural thing possible, the relationship with the one who is next to you, seems to be mimicry, as if the other were in fact an actor to some extent, which he really is, *but not because he was trying to hide, but because he has forgotten to give himself in a simple way and in all circumstances*. This oblivion of the modern man and especially post-modern man on which the triumph of dramaturgical sociology is based! *The recessivity of moral communities, based on the natural consensus in the decision of being good, explains the ascension of the "stage", of man as an actor, of society as a life stage, of life as a theatre, of social knowledge as dramaturgical sociology. It is when the good and religious man weakens that the actor appears on stage.*

2. The Breaking Up of Reference Frame.

This *"passing by in silence"* is the *natural* root of any conspiracy and it relies on a pertinent-enough argument that in any group there is a natural, *spontaneous "conspiracy"*, that all those who gather together are predestined, by this very fact of being together, to pass something by in silence, that is, to "conspire". *What does the regular man actually want? He wants to be kind with the others and to be the beneficiary of their kindness. If he were kind by nature, he would be as innocent as a dove and as babies, but, strangely, he seems to be uncomfortable to reveal his kindness and then he resorts to all the props of dramaturgy, he becomes deceitful, and sometimes deceitful as a snake.* But there is another type of energy that demands the individual to act like an actor besides *kindness*, namely *interest* for example. In Goffman's vision, therefore, the individual is, necessarily, a "conspirator", so that the *art of conspiracy* appears as part of the *nature* and the *specificity of human interaction.* It is precisely this latent secret nature of any social interaction that makes possible the "breaking up" (of reference frame), that is, "de-conspiracies" at the level of human interaction.

"Given the fact that the individual effectively projects a definition of the situation when he enters the presence of others, we can assume that events may occur within the interaction which contradict, discredit or otherwise throw doubt upon his projection. When these disruptive events occur, the interaction itself may come to a confused and embarrassed halt."[11] It is as if the "actor" suddenly finds that he is disclosed as the naked emperor from Andersen's story. For as long as the courtiers have competed in complimenting the emperor on his garment, while the emperor was in fact naked, everything was being kept within

[11] Ibid. 23

the bearers of "naturalness", namely of that tacit public conspiracy around the emperor's "nakedness". That until something came up and someone unveiled this "interactive conspiracy" that had formed the nucleus of previous interactions. From that moment on everything collapsed, the interactions were broken and the very legitimacy of order collapsed.

This phenomenon of genuine "explosion" of the "conspirative nucleus" of the interaction causes, as you can see, the "breaking up of reference frame" and probably even the suspension of the interaction. And this because the "assumption upon which the responses of the participants had been predicated become untenable, and the participants find themselves lodged in an interaction for which the situation has been wrongly defined and is no longer defined."[12] There appear feelings of embarrassment, hostility, discomfort.

The preliminary notions with which the new sociological paradigm (having Goffman at the top) operates are: *interaction, encounter, performance, audience, observers, co-participants, part, routine, social part, front, backstage, stage, dramatic performance* etc.

We shall present them one by one, in the attempt to render intelligible the manner in which man comes to lose his simplicity and innocence in the process of becoming a complex actor on the life stage, among other actors who are trying *to act*, not *to live*. The greatest challenge launched to noological sociology is, therefore, dramaturgical sociology, as the latter *seems to overlook the one who really lives, the living (trăitor) man, replacing him with the condition of the actor, of the one who does not live but plays parts.* With the help of ethno-methodology and of dramaturgical sociology we will try *to re-examine the notion of living (trăire) and the condition of man on the life stage in a world that is decaying.*

3. The Manifestation.

"When an individual plays a part he implicitly requests his observers to take seriously the impression that is fostered before them. They are asked to believe that the character they see actually possesses the attributes he appears to possess, that the task he performs will have the consequences that are implicitly claimed for it, and that, in general, matters are what they appear to be."[13]

Consequently, an individual is, as Petras and Meltzer have noticed, as Goffman himself puts it, the *manager of the impressions* he wants to give to the ones around him. In this respect he may be compared to an actor. "In line with this there is the popular view that the individual offers his performance and puts on his show 'for the benefit of other people."[14] However, at this very point

[12] Idem
[13] Ibid. 28
[14] Idem

lies a very dangerous temptation for the human being, that of separating *appearance*, i.e. the *front*, from the *soul*, and even of proceeding to the *management of the front*, of appearance, which is an act below the affairs of the soul.

Dramaturgical sociology begins, therefore, with the study of this first reality that consists in the "performances (shows) of the individual" who performs on the stage of normal, daily life. The first step for living in a collectivity is given precisely by these "performances".[15] Man's image as a social being is, that of a *perpetual actor*, in a spectacle, and therefore evolving on the life stage not so much for living for himself as for *convincing the others* of the verisimilitude of the "reality" he composes in his game, from the point of view of the performance. He is condemned to be an interpreter and to attract the others, through the mastery of his "performances", within a "reality" that is no more than the sum of these performances. His greatest efforts aim at persuading them of the fact that the "reality of the act" is the "real reality" and then he is transformed into an individual who is always bent on checking, searching and acting. He necessarily becomes a "conspirative man", he constantly performs the management of impressions, he *fabricates a reality*, and he does it ceaselessly. At one pole lie all those who really believe in this "fabricated" reality, so that they lose the possibility of realizing their condition of players and it is only the "sociologist", who is, indeed, the *man in the shadow*, that may have "doubts" and may therefore elude this continuous "fabrication" of images and dramaturgical "realities". In this view of Goffman, he appears as the most conspirative of all, as, although he appears to everyone as being just like them, as resembling them all, he differs from them, because he supposedly knows more than all of them, he knows that they are all actors without exception, endowed with the mastery of the play to various degrees, and that their only truth is that they will strain themselves to the best of their abilities to convince the others that their act is truly real, while, in fact, everything is act and performance, show and management of impressions. At the other pole, the "interpreter might not be totally absorbed by his own routine" (his daily performances, therefore, become a routine, the routine of life). Consequently, we have at one pole the "innocent", the one who believes in the "routine" of his conduct, mistaking his *reality* for the *routine* of his performances. At the other pole, nevertheless, there appears the one who does not allow oneself be fooled by this routine. "When the individual does not believe in his own act and has no ultimate concern with the beliefs of his audience, we may call him *cynical*,

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[15] Ibid. At one extreme, the "social performer" may find himself completely "absorbed in the act of his performance; he may be sincerely convinced that the simulacrum of reality he is creating on stage is the real reality. When the audience are themselves persuaded by his performance – and this seems to be the typical case – then, at least for the moment, only the sociologist may be having some doubts about the «realness» of what is being performed".

reserving the term «sincere» for individuals who believe in the impression fostered by their own performance."[16]

Dramaturgical sociology offers us,therefore, a strange, somehow paradoxical anthropological vision. We deduce that the "honest man" can never be authentic, in the views of this sociology, he is condemned to mistake *reality* for *routine*, whereas the authentic man is, in his turn, in the same views, condemned to be a *cynic*, he never has access to *moral* evolution. Between *innocence* and *authenticity* there is no longer any connection. When man has become "authentic", that is, when he has access to the *more profound truth*, which shows him that between the routine of conduct and the *truth about the person* there may be a dramatic (and scandalous) divorce, he has lost his innocence, that is he has become realistic towards that detachment that we associate with cynicism. Social reality ranges in between these two poles: that of the innocent man and that of the cynical-realistic man, that of the involuntary conspirator and that of the one who conspires using all the art through which reality, the sum of the relations with the others is woven. Another paradoxical aspect that this dramaturgical anthropology unveils to us through its vision, is that the *innocent man* cannot live up to the measure of this reality unless he resorts to deceit and *trickery*, while the type of the realistic-cynical man can do it through *duplicity* and *dissimulation*. And the reversal at which Goffman's dramaturgical sociology arrives is: *the more deceit and duplicity the more reality*. Or we know from the Greeks and the Christians that the anthropological truth is exactly the opposite: the more innocence, i.e. purity, and spirituality, i.e. authenticity and truth (*aletheia*), the more reality. Plato's conception of the "puppet man", that is, the one who is the slave of appearances and desires, stands in opposition to Goffman's dramaturgical anthropology. Not to mention the Christian man. We will dwell upon the possibility of a Christian ethno-methodology later on. *Let us remember, for now, that dramaturgical sociology is the sociology of the man who has lost his interiority, who is the man of the front, of pure exteriority, of the mask, who destroys his inner essence and who sets fine to his soul with the sterile flame of deceit and vanity.*

"It should be understood that the cynic, with all his professional disinvolvement, may obtain unprofessional pleasures from his masquerade, experiencing a kind of gleeful spiritual aggression from the fact that he can toy at will with something his audience must take seriously."[17] The real "delinquency" may not be the fact that somebody steals his victims' money, but that that somebody whom we deem as "trustworthy" "steals everyone's trust (makes us believe) that the manners and the appearance of the *middle class* can be kept up only by those who are part of the middle class". In a way, the victim searches for its. "A cynical individual may delude his audience from what he

[16] Idem

[17] Ibid. 28-29

considers to be their own good, or for the good of community."[18] Goffman shows that the doctors who use the placebo effect are an example in this respect. The same with, the attitude of the inferior towards his superior etc. The individual who "starts out from the position of lack of inward belief in his role" may evolve in conformity with the pattern described by Park and quoted by Goffman: "It is probably no mere historical accident that the word *person*, in its first meaning, is a *mask*. It is rather a recognition of the fact that everyone is always and everywhere, more or less consciously, playing a role…It is in these roles that we may know each other; it is in these roles that we know ourselves."[19] "In a sense, and in so far as this mask represents the conception we have formed of ourselves – the role we are striving to live up to - this mask is our truer self, the self we would want to be. In the end, our conception of our role becomes *second nature* and an integral part of our personality. We come into the world as *individuals*, *achieve character*, and become *persons*." [20]

It is to this point that the great achievement of this vision materializes, because, obviously, our attention is being drawn on the true perspective on the human being, as being *the one on the stairway*, the one who has to climb all the way from the condition of the poor individual who is thrown into the world, as this is what *man* is, to the state of the one who affirms himself as a *character*, that is, as a subject and object of his destiny, and hereby to the condition of his full accomplishment as a *person*. This condition is truly the greatest gift bestowed upon man, as it is through this condition that man eludes the danger of simply being thrown into the world, as in Pascal's view, or, even worse, as in the truly terrible, bent to anarchic nihilism view of the post-modernists. Hence the chance of a Christian ethno-methodology arises, as the possibility of integrating the sociological initiative on the mysterious phenomenon of the synthesis of the person who is *the face of man unified with his real, transcendental spirit, God, the only One who saves him from death and from eternal death appears*. Dramaturgical sociology warns us that any individual who is placed in a new situation enters the same cycle of movement forwards and backwards, *in between cynicism and honesty, from lack of faith to faith*.

4. The Front. Front Behavior.

The relation between *intimacy* and *anonymity* from the phenomenological sociology (especially that of Schutz's) is restated as the relation between the backstage and the *frontstage* in E. Goffman's dramaturgical sociology. We may say that in the light of noological sociology man's social problem is how to turn an anonymous world into an intimate one, that is, a personal or personalized

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[18] Ibid. 29
[19] Park, Robert Ezra. Race and Culture. Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1950. 249, quoted in Ibid. 30
[20] Ibid. 250

world and this process was partly revealed to us by phenomenological sociology, which can be divided, as we have already seen, in two great sections: *the intimacy of the world or the lived world of the human persona and the anonymous world as a synthesized world in the human persona.* The problem of phenomenological sociology may be discussed in terms of the two great sections of noological sociology, in and through which the foundations of a new Christian ethno-methodology are also being laid: "the world stage or the human face" and "altar or backstage, or on the spiritual core of the human being". Intimacy, as emotional value and pure directness, is almost absent in the world, the way the world appears in the views of dramaturgical sociology, because, in conformity with these views, the most intimate of situations still preserves the effort of the "partner", of the one who is in your presence, of performing the management of impressions, of persuading you of the fact that the impression he is conveying, as far as he is concerned, is the same as the *reality* of his persona, so much so that the game, the mask, that is to say, the essence of persuasion are more important than the *truth of the persona.*

This relation between the *mask*, namely what an individual *displays* through his performances, and what that individual really is, renders the *reality of interaction* uncertain, insecure. Who is the one standing in front of me? – you could ask yourself. And intuiting (anticipating) your question, he will try his best to convince you that he is the way he *seems* to be, the way he appears to be, the way he reveals himself. *The face-disclosure, instead of being discreet and profoundly humble, becomes a show, a well performed or lousily performed comedy, in which trickery combines with dissimulation, sincerity with cynicism, suspicion with trust etc.* Let us remember, therefore, that in the new dramaturgical sociology man is a character who *interprets* a part in order to convince you of the truth of his act or *appearance*. The notions of *performances* (manifestation, interpretation), *character*, *persona*, *front*, *stage*, with its derivatives: *frontstage* and *backstage* etc., acquire a central position in the new discourse. "I have been using the term *'performances'* to refer to all the activity of an individual which occurs during a period marked by his continuous presence before a particular set of observers. It will be convenient to label as *'front'* that *part* of an individual's performance which regularly functions in a general and fixed fashion to define the situation for those who observe the performance. Front, then, is the expressive equipment of a standard kind, intentionally or unwittingly employed by the individual during his performance".[21] Therefore, we unexpectedly encounter the theory of form without substance, extensively adopted by the intellectual movement in the modern period of Romanian culture. Switching the emphasis from substance to form, from the moral essence to the front of the amorality of the post-modernists, in public life or group life as well as in individual life, is, thus, the

[21] Ibid. 32

point of intersection of the theory of forms without substance with Goffman's theory of the front of interactive, social game. The only difference is that Maiorescu, for example, connects the form without substance with those historical moments that were marked by a terrible time gap between the level of public performances, that were made apparent, and the level of the real, that were not made apparent, or of the real background experiences (*trăiri*), whereas Goffman extends this idea to human nature, to the essence of man as social being, which evidently strikes us as too much.

Let us remember at this point that, in the light of dramaturgical sociology, one can distinguish in any performance the so-called *setting* proper by, involving "furniture, scenery, and the other elements in the setting that compose the stage". Generally, the setting is fixed, so that the performers (interpreters) can only "play" their part in a *location* that is specially arranged to this purpose. "It is only in exceptional circumstances that the setting follows along with the performers; we see this in the funeral cortege, the civic parade, and the dream-like processions that kings and queens are made of." [22]

In these cases, the protection of the performers is ensured by sacredness, i.e. by being or becoming "sacred". This protection of "sacred-rendered" persons distinguishes these from the "performers" of "pedlar classes". While talking about the stage aspects of the "front" we have not granted enough attention to the "assemblages of sign-equipments which large numbers of performers can call their own for short periods of time".[23] "It is a characteristic of Western European countries, and no doubt a source of stability for them, that a large number of luxurious settings are available for hire to anyone of the right kind who can afford them."[24] Goffman quotes an example from Great Britain: "the question of how far the man who rises the top in the Civil Service take on the 'tone' or 'color' of a class other than that to which they belong by birth is delicate and difficult. The only definite information bearing on the question is that of the figures relating to the membership of the great London clubs. More than three-quarters of our high administrative officials belong to one or more clubs of high status and considerable luxury, where the entrance fee might be twenty guineas or more, and the annual subscription from twelve to twenty guineas. These institutions are of the upper class (not even of the upper-middle) in their premises, their equipment, the style of living practiced there, their whole atmosphere..."[25] Therefore, the problem of the "sign-equipment" opens the perspective of the sociology of the "public persons" or, more accurately, of that region of society, that by being private, not public, does not lose its *intimacy*,

[22] Ibid. 33
[23] Idem
[24] Idem
[25] Dale, H. E. The Higher Civil Service of Great Britain. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1941. 50, quoted in Goffman, op. cit. 33-34

but, on the contrary, redistributes the expressive values of intimacy according to a stage management of the show, of the front. *Being present* does no longer mean being direct and intimate or spontaneous and *face-to-face*, but to appear. *It is the most terrible test of the social human being, that of losing or disfiguring one's image, by entirely taking refuge in the strategies of imagining, of appearance, or with Goffman's term impersonation.*

The dramaturgical sociology of the front is a sociology of a person's "appearance". The Christian theme of the "transfiguration" acquires new meanings here, that show how much *degradation* and *decay* there are to be found in the conventional morals of high classes, which are excessively preoccupied with this "sign-equipment" so that they could *appear*, could *show* themselves to the others.

The *image* is taken for the *front*. And the *front* contains the elements of the *physical-spatial scenery* (what we call *setting*), as well as those of the "personal scenery" or "personal front", as Goffman names it. The degradation of the image through the emphasis on appearance becomes an intelligible phenomenon only from the perspective of a Christian ethno-methodology of the image, that is, from the culminative theology of the great mystery of light from Mount Tabor; this matter is in principle accessible from the perspective of a Christian sociology. The transfiguration is a sacrament that is accomplished within the setting of a moment of complete disclosure of the persona in the light of its truth, that is, of the gift that it carries for the others, not for itself, whereas appearance is a phenomenon connected to vanity, a mask, namely a form without substance, a face emptied of spiritual light, a poor specter that can barely hide its masked unreality. This is precisely how the miracle of the transfiguration on the Mountain is achieved, as a stage of light, as a revelation of the inner image in the light of His godliness. Transfiguration makes way for the light of the revealed image.

"If we take the term «setting» to refer to the *scenic parts* of expressive equipment, one may take the term «personal front» to refer to other items of expressive equipment, the items that we most intimately identify with the performer himself and that we naturally expect will follow the performer wherever he goes. As part of «personal front» we may include: insignia of office or rank, clothing; sex, age, and racial characteristics, size and looks; posture; speech patterns; facial expressions, bodily gestures; and like this."[26]

Some of these signs are "permanent" (racial characteristics), others, on the contrary, are "relatively mobile or transitory, such as facial expression, and can vary during a *performance* from one moment to the next."[27]

Goffman divides these stimuli (signs) of the "appearance" and "manners", in conformity with "the function that is accomplished by the piece

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[26] Ibid. 34
[27] Idem

of information that these stimuli-signs convey".[28] We may use appearance in order to refer to those stimuli that function in order "to inform us on the social status of the performer". "These stimuli also tell us of the individual's temporary ritual state: that is, whether he is engaging in the formal social activity, work, or informal recreation; whether or not he is celebrating a new phase in the season cycle or in his life-cycle." [29]

In its turn, we may use the concept of *manners*, as Goffman stipulates, in order to refer to "those stimuli which function at the time to warn us on the interaction role the performer will expect to play in the oncoming situation." [30]

For instance, an *"apologetic manner"* may give the impression that the performer is willing to follow the others' command etc.[31]

Certain "congruence between appearance and *manner* is to be expected". And this congruence is sometimes achieved to a greater extent, as it is the case of "the procession of a mandarin" in a Chinese town.[32] Some other times, however, the two sides of the "personal front" tend to contradict each other, "as when a performer who appears to be of higher state than his audience acts in a manner that is unexpectedly equalitarian, or intimate, or apologetic, or when a performer dressed in the garments of a high position presents himself to an individual of even higher status. In addition to the expected consistency between appearance and manner, we expect, of course, some coherence among *setting*, *appearance*, and *manner*."[33]

Goffman warns us that this congruence is an *ideal type* that helps us become sensitive to exceptions (Goffman presents the case of Rosen Stevens, the real estate agent who concerned himself with the management of the sale of Empire State Building, he himself living in a small house, having an obscure and poorly furnished office etc.).

One of the properties of *social front* is, in the light of Goffman's dramaturgical sociology, that of *inducing to other people the routines* that are associated with a given situation and of transferring them to other situations. The front is, therefore, inductive, it stimulates *imitation behavior*. Although the "abstract standards" that compose the *social front* of a *routine* (a way of acting that is repetitive) vary from one situation to the other, individuals tend to imitate them. Hence, the tendency that a routine, a conduct be presented through its "social fronts", namely through a category of "abstract standards" that the "performers" mean to suggest (induce) to the others appears. "Thus in London the current tendencies for chimney sweeps and perfume clerks to wear white labs coats tends to provide the client with an understanding that the delicate

[28] Idem
[29] Idem
[30] Ibid. 35
[31] Idem
[32] Idem
[33] Burke, Kenneth. A Grammar of Motives. New York, 1945. 6-9, regarding the "scene-act-agent" proportionality

tasks performed by these persons will be performed in what has become a standardized, clinical, confidential manner."[34]

"There are grounds for believing that the tendency for a large number of different acts to be presented from behind a small number of fronts is a natural development in social organization."[35]

The matter presents great importance to dramaturgical sociology and we will dwell upon it. Let us remember, therefore that, in the view of these new approaches, any act holds an area of *shadow*, a *hidden side* of its own, and, hence, a *number of fronts*, so that what is *"in the back"* does not coincide with what is in the front, the *backstage*, what is in the shadow, the side scenes, does not coincide with the *front*, with what is on stage. The front appears in conformity with the *abstract standards* of that particular *act*, not with the concrete aspects, with the chiaroscuro and unembellished particularities (that are not made abstract) of that particular act. The *actor's* (performer's) tendency of *presenting* oneself in conformity with the *category features* (the ideal pattern) of their activity (performance) is, thus, a general law of behavior. Man is not in search of those *appearances* that individualize and particularize him in a natural way, but of those other appearances that categorize him, therefore, that bring him closer to the *genus proximus*, not to the specific difference. He does not mean to *resemble* somebody, but the *generic* category of his acts (of his activity of one type or another). All those that are part of a category are compelled to keep up "the same social front" in certain situations. The risk that the one behind the category be no more than an abstract individual is, to the man of the fronts, absolute. The man of the front is more than a poor individual who belongs to the social space that has been made abstract by social routines, but he is definitely less than the category individual, who is luminous and predictable. The man of the front possesses polish, or, more precisely, luster, but has no inner light. The category man has the light of the category, although he does not have the polish of appearance, the luster of the face without an image, of the front without the soul.

5. Western Idiom and Balkan Bourgeoisie. The Sociological Law of Disparity between the Frontstage and the Backstage.

However, the problem of "appearances", of multiple faces, affects entire societies, that can also be affected by a "divorce" between substance and "social façade". Knowing them exclusively through their social façade, or the "front" of society with Goffman's term, would be the same as not knowing them at all. Suffice it if we think about, for instance, the facade of a Western type of the

[34] Ibid. 36-37
[35] Ibid. 37

societies from the East of Europe, which is too often a form without substance, emptied of its substance. For one to think that one has gained knowledge of those societies solely by examining their forms would be an error. Moreover, to infer something in connection with their spiritual "substance" starting from the lack of substance of forms, would be an even more severe error. *A form without substance does not mean a "society" that is deprived of its particular substance, but a society that is forced, through the life style of its elite, to adopt forms that are alien to its spiritual substance, which determines it to live in and through those "empty forms", that often go against its organic substance.* So that the life of that society will be affected by the sad and absurd denouement of living in and according to oppressive formulae, namely formulae that are entirely alien to its real spiritual substance, precisely because the new superposed social layer imposes them. *The spirit of this society crouches in the obscure corners of its innermost being and what stands to be seen is the form, patched up with a speckled mixture of all sorts of borrowings, with elements taken from everywhere, except native ones. Everything is being deformed. Patriotism becomes jingoistic phrase deprived of any warm sentiment, faith becomes for many members of the local elite a Sunday paper, an aggressive Pharisaic expression, richness a pretext for self-praise as in Oriental idolatries, culture a simple decoration meant to give certain luster emptied of inner light to the status of the rich etc.* Everything is a painted appearance, a mask upon the face, disfigurement and aggressive delusion. The problem is not looked into by Goffman, but it has been examined by the Romanian theorists of the forms without substance. We could say that these have seized the condition of a society that is forced to have one image in the *side scenes* (*"backstage"*, as Goffman would put it) and another one on *stage* (*frontstage*, with Goffman's term), where it obeys the performed cues of the agents of influence and of the *borrowed form, be these Eastern or Western. Yesterday they were Russian-Soviet, today they are Western.* Those performed cues do not hold even by far the *generality* and the quality of legitimate *laws*, that Western Europe possesses. These performed cues hold no meaning to the majority of people, not even when they are summoned to put them into practice. This is the way in which the obedient style, servility is born, combined in one and the same person with insolence, cynicism and aggressiveness. *These societies, foremost of whom their elite, become particularly aggressive with their own inner being, that is, precisely with their spiritual being, which reminds them of their real image, the human one, that is disfigured up to a mere mask. This is the way the new bourgeoisie appears today, as de-spirited,with its image disfigured by the dissimilarity with the mask. In the societies of the form without substance, richness frequently disfigures the human being.*

Instead of proceeding to the correction of these monstrous tendencies, the state becomes, through the people of these influences and of these performed

cues, a "director" who takes care that these stage management requirements which derive from that borrowed idiom be observed. Actually, most of the times these people do not believe in that Western institutional *idiom* themselves. Referring to their profile, at the end of the past century, Eminescu wrote about them: "As they have no tradition, no homeland, no clearly-defined nationality, we see them putting themselves at the mercy of strangers and voting sometimes king Stroussberg, some other times compensation. (...) The Phanariot rule and the constant arrival of (...) bankrupts in the plains of the Romanian country lasted for 121 years". These elements that composed the predominant segments of speculative capitalism distinguished themselves through their "instinctive hatred for all historical and autochthonous elements of this country" and through their efforts "to insinuate foreign laws in all branches, laws that suited neither its interests, nor its nature."[36] The only novelty that the end of the century and of the millennium brought about regarding the profile of this class created by imitation refers to its ethnological profile, as, in fact, the new superposed layer no longer has the excuse of being foreign. It is purely autochthonous, but just as alien and estranged from the natives as the occupation elite who would not even know the local idiom, not to mention their spirit or traditions.

The proportion of these manipulators of the "Western idiom" or of the Eastern one, of nowadays and of past days is reduced. As Eminescu has said and in another temporal horizon C. R. Motru has emphasized, their unexpected and unpredictable power through their number can be explained by the connections that support them and that are all *"abroad"*, located in the external powers that support them: "although the Romanians are a numerous nation, its fight is disproportionately tough, since these people have found support in foreign allies. *Since they have been brought into power by Russia*, and are supported today by the Austro-Hungarian alliance, we can see the outside connections that help them rise, whereas inside all we have is our own people, inhumanly exploited, impoverished, whose population decreases, whose consciousness is confuse about the course of action that we should take."[37] The problem of the discrepancies between "appearance" (front) and substance, that is, the "actual reality", is examined in detail by Goffman through the *six discrepancies*, upon which we shall return further on. Hiding the discrepancies entails the resort to front "decorations" which are, in this case, the *acknowledgements* and the *institutions of the metropolis*. This operation is called by Goffman "idealization". In Romania, it has been the object of the analyses of Maiorescu, Eminescu, Motru, Caragiale. Under certain

[36] Eminescu, M. "Pătura superpusă" ("The Superposed Class') in Complete Works. Vol. IV. Bucharest: *Cultura Românească*, 1938. 183
[37] Ibid. 184

circumstances, this regime of the discrepancies between the front and the backstage is explicitly supported, protected by the "great powers".

The theory of the protection of people of Western front by the powers of the metropolis was expanded by C. C. Giurăscu* in the context of the analysis of the phenomenon of the "Soudetes" after the treaty of Kuciuk-Kainargi (1774). "The problem of the Southerners was a consequence of the treaty of Kuciuk-Kainargi, which enabled foreign powers to set up consulates in other urban areas *in order to protect their subjects*."[38]

This treaty opened in the Principalities the series of historical processes of introduction of the "Western front", namely of introduction on the Romanian frontstage of the *people who were of a Western front orientation*, but of a spiritual substance that was marked by the comprador orientation, the plundering inclination of behavior, speculation with money and with influence, the moral one included, as their spontaneous inclination towards sophism and demagogy, and their contempt towards the native show us.

"*A fortiori* this hypostasis (of a Soudete) is adopted by foreign elements, who come from abroad, such as the Southern Slavs, immigrants in our countries after the Russian-Turkish wars, the Jews who had come in increasingly great numbers from the former Poland, the Greeks from the urban areas of the Balkan Peninsula etc. Up to 1800, the phenomenon does not have a great intensity, after 1800, nevertheless, it reaches alarming proportions."[39]

Little by little, the condition of a Soudete will be adopted by the natives, after these have become convinced of the advantage of this "social formula". Consequently, sociologically speaking, *the Soudete is the man of foreign façade, a man of the frontstage, who receives the protection of the great power, of the metropolis, in exchange for the adoption of the "idiom" commanded by the metropolis, and for its application within the composition of the social "scenery" of conduct.* This situation is clearly depicted by the historicist C. C. Giurăscu, when he notices "the tendency of the Soudetes to construct a sort of «state within a state», to elude the ordinary law of the country (...), to avoid being subjects to imposition (taxation, note added) the same as the autochthons", which triggered a reaction from the latter. The most numerous Soudetes, Giurescu also remarks, were Austrian Soudetes".[40] The number of these people, who used the *Western front*, was fairly large (there were 1795 Soudetes in Bucharest only, as C. C. Giurescu remarks, out of whom 1226 were Austrian subjects). We realize who *ruled* in fact in the Principalities and, at the same time, we understand that the instrument of domination was simply the

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* C.C. Giurăscu; Romanian historian, he wrote a monumental history of Romania.

[38] Giurescu, C. C. *Contribuții la studiul originilor și dezvoltării burgheziei românești până la 1848* (Contributions to the Study on the Origins and Development of Romanian Bourgeoisie Up to 1848). Bucharest: Editura Științifică , 1972. 203

[39] Idem

[40] Idem

apparatus of the frontstage, that *front equipment*, as Goffman would say. *Consequently, it is not the* ***ethnic condition*** *that is to blame, within such a system and the categories that support it, but the* ***condition of the Soudete****, that is of the agent who draws his powers not from his own spiritual or inherited potential, but from his condition of a Soudete, of somebody's protégé, be that somebody a foreign power or a local power estranged from the interests of the local society.*

Therefore, the Western commercial penetration takes this cover, and may be explained from a sociological point of view, precisely with the law of "social façade". "Consulates were a sort of «apparatuses of protection», bearing at the same time a hidden function, that of «foreign agencies» (a sort of «establishments» of the commercial and usurious capital)".[41]

Many of the fortunes that were thus gathered were used to foster the Western front: "unlike the English gentleman-pirate, the Italian corsair and the French ship owners, who drained their treasures towards their country and contributed in this way to the launching of that brilliant human project (the Industrial Revolution), [the pseudo-elites from Romania] used the accumulated treasures in usury, commerce and prebend, for consumption or for the speculations of the regime", that is to say, for the arrangement of the scenery, for fostering the front (access to power guaranteed access to the protection of the social façade).[42] The phenomenon of this disparity between the apparatus of the façade, of the Western "scenery", and the organic substance was extensively examined, investigated in all the profundity of its consequences, by M. Eminescu: "It is well known, above everything, that the true nation, four of the five portions of our people, do not get *involved in public life*, whose requirements lie more heavily on their shoulders than on anyone else's. These four portions out of all five are the countrymen..." who "share *nothing in common, not even their origins, not to mention their interests or anything else* with the «superposed layer» (...). Above this numerous and more unhappy than ever segment, there is the *legal country*, or what the «Romanian» calls by the name of «nation», and in parallel with the *legal country* there are the parasitic elements who have *turned politics into a very lucrative profession...*".[43] It is clear therefore that this "layer" has transformed politics, that is, the "manipulation" of the *social front* into a profession that, besides providing considerable financial gain, enables them to *hide* their "dirty work" (the parasitic act). S. Zeletin will go as far as considering that the disparity between the frontstage and the backstage will create "two superposed *layers*, at terrible enmity: a modern social economic structure and a medieval spirit manifesting itself in a series of reactionary cultural currents. These are two series of

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[41] Bădescu, I. *Sincronism european şi cultura critici românească* (European Synchronicity and Romanian Critical Culture). Bucharest: Editura Ştiinţifică şi Enciclopedică, 1984. 105

[42] Idem

[43] Eminescu, M. "*Ţara legală*" ("The Legal Country") in op. cit., Vol. III. 38-39

evolution…".[44] However, Zeletin himself had accepted that "our modern society is reduced to the adoption of «forms without substance» from the West".[45] The difference between Zeletin and other sociologists of the "social façade", or front with Goffman's term stands in the fact that, in his view, the front is not the result of the action of the bourgeoisie (who, in his opinion, has created the "apparatus of circulation and exchange, although it has also created the parasitic bureaucracy by force of circumstances at the beginning"), but of the action of reactionary culture: he considers that "the culture and the method of the Junimists" represent a "simple formalism" borrowed along the line of "Western reactionary culture" in order to oppose it to capitalist transformations. Nevertheless, the real *great* theorist of the *"façade apparatus"* and of its *damaging* effects on substance is C. Rãdulescu-Motru, and his research, with which "dramaturgical sociology" will come out on a European scale dates from 1904, i.e. the year when he published his book *Romanian Culture and Petty Politics (Cultura română şi politicianismul).* All the concepts of the new paradigm are established here: "stage" and "backstage", "front" and "front personality", "dirty work" and "scenery", "idealization" and its sociological truth, the relation between "Western idiom" and the "dirty" effects of its adoption at the "periphery" etc.

[44] Zeletin, St. *Burghezia românească* (Romanian Bourgeoisie). Bucharest: Editura Cultura Naţională, 1925. 244
[45] Ibid. 222

ROMANIA IN THE THIRD WAVE OF DEMOCRATIZATION

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Following the process of democratization at the end of the World War II and after the rising of new democracies in Southern Europe (Greece, Portugal, Spain) and Latin America, "the third wave of democratization" has risen considerably the interest of researchers in understanding the new political processes developing in Central and Eastern Europe. The main question asked was related to the capacity of the new democracies to consolidate in time and attract support from their citizens. More than eleven years after the fall of communism the question still remains essential and the present paper tries to deal with several aspects of the state of democracy in Romania and its foreseeable future. The main conclusion of this endeavour is that economic difficulties do not favour democracy, but neither prevents, in an absolute manner, its edification. On the other hand, the democrat regime has certain weaknesses that make it vulnerable any time, even in the countries with developed economies. Hence the need for a continuous study of the function of democratic institutions and of the measures required to improve their performance.

Introduction

In Romania, **post-communist transition** was strongly influenced in its early period by the manner in which the political regime was changed. As it is known, the communist regime was turned out by a revolution. It started as a popular protest and protestors' repression (1,050 death) created an explosive situation all over the country, which, in a matter of days, caused the disintegration of the communist regime and of the main state institutions in the end of December 1989.

Under the conditions of the sudden removal of the former regime and of the non-existence of an organised political opposition, provisory revolutionary leading was established: the Council of the Front of National Salvation, which assumed power in the state.

The process of democracy construction and consolidation went through several significant stages (Mărginean, 1997). The first stage (1990-1991) of the state of right institution edification was more tensed. The social and political debates have degenerated into violence. This stage, however, introduced essential measures for democratisation and free elections were organised. It ended with the adoption of a new constitution by the December 1991 referendum. The shift to governing came rather late, on the third round of

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elections, in 1996 (after the 1990 and 1992 elections), which maintained a certain suspicion regarding the democratic character of government. Although later, the shift in power came through free elections organised regularly (at the constitutional term of 4 years). In December 2000, another shift in power took place. Romania had a social democrat governing (1990-1996), a centre-right one (1996-2000) and again a social democrat governing since November 2000.

Attempting a general characterisation we may say that eleven years after the first free elections (May 1990), democracy is a political regime with a wide popular legitimacy, consolidated by two shifts in power, with elections held at the right terms. On the other hand, we must note that the institutions of the state of right did not function as expected. Several negative phenomena such as excessive bureaucracy and corruption became reasons of concern and dissatisfaction. The economic difficulties, the stressed process of social polarisation and poverty deepening are factors feeding the discontent of population and the mistrust in the political institutions.

The **socio-economic changes** in Romania were radical related to the inherited legacy. No high rates of changes were yet observed, much less than some countries in the top of post communist transition. Transformation assessment is done in relation to the inherited legacy. Romania had a hyper centralised economy with generalised socialist structures of economy organisation, agriculture included. On the other hand, industry was strongly concentrated in large units directed mainly towards energy consuming sectors, with high consumption of materials and low efficiency, with masked unemployment by overstaffing. On a completely unprepared field, the economic reform started late (October 1990) by price liberalisation. During early 1990, priority was given to compensatory measures, of improving population's standard of living, which eroded massively during the last 10 years of communist regime by the accelerated pay out of the foreign debt (some 20 billion USD), a high rate of accumulation, the poor economic efficiency and the restrictive policy.

When the economic reform started, Romania had no foreign debt and no relations for international financing, the former socialist enterprises turned into commercial units, were de-capitalised. The economic actions were often hesitating, with a long period of establishment of the market economy and privatisation institutions, with high social costs. During 1990-1998, GDP decreased annually with an average 2.7%, the average inflation rate increased with an annual average of 101.7% (from 5% in 1990 to 256% in 1993, 32% in 1995, 154% in 1997 and about 40% during the recent years). The proportion of poor is close to 40% of the total population.

Currently, the private sector provides about 60% of GDP. It was generalised in agriculture but is still at a low level in industry. Starting with the year 2000, signs of decline stopping and economic revival were noticed, which

are expected to enhance during the next period, accompanied by the accelerated privatisation of the new industrial enterprises.

These will create favorable factors for Romania's joining EU, strategic objective with a wide popular support (In the last years, a constant rate of about 70% of Romanians consider that Romania's national goals would be better served by joining the EU - as indicated by Public Opinion Barometer – Open Society Foundation Romania, November 2000).

This study is part of a larger research project, "Value Systems of the Citizens and Socio-Economic Conditions – Challenges from democratization for the EU-Enlargement", co-ordinated by Prof. Dr. Detlef Pollack from Viadrina University – Frankfurt-Oder, Germany and integrated in the 5th EU Framework Programe. The international comparative research project is carried out by a team of sociologists, psychologists, political scientists and statisticians from the 13 countries included in the study: Albania, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Russia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain.

The survey data we are analysing subsequently were collected in June 2000. For Romania, this period coincided with the end of the election cycle, under the conditions in which the government and the parties of the coalition in power had very low rates of popularity. Otherwise, the main party of the coalition (NPCDP - National Peasant Christian-Democrat Party) did not obtain afterwards the 5% threshold required to join the Parliament and other two parties (NLP- National Liberal Party and DP – Democrat Party) had very low rates, the votes going towards PSDR - Party of Social Democracy from Romania and GRP – Greater Romania Party.

Attitudes toward the political system

The general theoretical model adopted is a systemic model similar to the one elaborated by Almond and Powell (1996) which helps us to identify and analyze the components of the political system.



The political system is considered a set of institutions concerned with formulating and implementing the collective goals of a society or of groups within it. Political systems have institutions, agencies, or structures, such as political parties, parliaments, bureaucracies, and courts, which carry on specific activities, or perform functions, which in turn enable the political system to formulate and enforce its policies.

People's attitudes affect what they will do. The collective political attitudes, values, feelings, information and skills of the people in a society affect the way politics works in that society. To understand the propensities for present and future behavior of the citizens, we must begin with the distribution of political attitudes (their political culture).

Political culture does not explain everything about politics, but if we do not take it into account, our understanding will be seriously distorted.

The attitudes of citizens to the democracy in their country can be differentiated on two dimensions: the attitude toward democracy as legally defined (type of democracy), and the attitude to it as it actually operates (performance of democracy). This addresses the well-known distinction between constitutional norm and constitutional reality.

Having roots in Parsons' theory of social systems this kind of model has been used extensively by Almond and Verba to illustrate their theory of political culture. It is also specific to the work of Barnes and Kaase (1979) about the first wave of democratisation and to the most of the studies carried out on the second wave.

The analysis will follow this scheme in the attempt to point out specific aspects that democracy has in Romania.

Idea of democracy/socialism

The studies undertaken in Romania have shown a large social support for democracy as a political system (Marginean 1999). The representation toward democracy developed from an undifferentiated one ("democracy can solve every problem in society") to a more realistic one, closer to its political nature.

Despite the massive support for democracy as a value, the evaluations of the current political system are usually less positive. For this situation can account the fact that these evaluations take into consideration the current state of the system as well as the expectations that people develop toward it.

Table 1. Democracy as a value/socialism as a value

(%)

	Strongly agree	Agree somewhat	Disagree somewhat	Disagree strongly	DK/ NA
The idea of democracy is always good	36.4	38.9	13.6	4.5	6.6
Democracy is appropriate as the general form of government	39.5	40.9	9.1	3.4	7.2
The idea of socialism is always good	7.4	18.2	31.2	33.6	9.7
Socialism is appropriate as the general form of government	6.8	15.8	22.6	42.5	12.3
Satisfied with the way socialism worked	12.9	25.4	27.2	27.3	7.1

A noticeable attitude among Romanian respondents is the wide attachment to the democratic type of social organization – as a value: three quarters (75.3%) of the respondents agree ("strongly" or "somewhat") that "the idea of democracy is always good". An even wider support exists for democracy as a principle of government: 80.4% of the subjects.

The disagreement to the idea of socialism is spread among 64.8% of total respondents.

The socialism as a form of government appears to be considered appropriate by only 22.6% of the interviewed persons.

Those satisfied with the way socialism worked is pretty high (38.3%).

We can notice that commitment to the value of democracy is high as opposed to the one of socialism.

Political performance

Table 2. Evaluations of the current political system / socialist system

%

Evaluations	Positive	Neutral	Negative	NA	Mean
Current political system	31.1	14.9	36.6	17.3	- 8.66
Socialist system	41.2	11.9	25.2	21.7	+8.40
Current political system in 5 years' time	41.4	11.4	15.3	32.2	+14.97

We can notice that a big share of respondents (17.3%) did not answer the question, along with 14.9% undecided. Only two thirds of the population actually expressed a certain opinion, which can be sure interpreted.

The performance of the current political system is evaluated overall poorly.

This could be explained by the fact that the post-communist transformations led to the growth of expectations in the population and the functioning of the new political system actually disappointed many people. We consider that would be wrong to conclude that these evaluations imply that the system is void from public support. On the contrary, hopes of benefits from the system in the future are associated with the present sentiment of disappointment.

Alternatives to the political system[1]



Figure 1. Percentage of respondents agreeing with the alternative

(Legend:

Government of experts: "The most important decisions about the development of our country should be made by experts, and not the government and parliament"

Strong leader: "Best to get rid of parliament and have a strong leader who can decide things quickly"

Single party system: "A multi-party system is designed to create chaos. All we need is a single party"

Dictatorship: "Under certain circumstances dictatorship is the best form of government"

[1] We have to draw attention on the high level of ambiguity of the pre-formulated answer categories.

Today's government: "Our country should be governed the way it is governed today"

Return to communism: "We should return to communist rule"

Army rule: "The army should govern the country"

Monarchy: "A return to monarchy would be better")

These indicators come in to reinforce the ideas we expressed so far.

The most desirable alternative to the current political system is that of a government of experts (62.3 per cent).

At the level of political structures, the preference for a technocratic government can be seen as a perception of the political elite as being characterised by a low level of competencies and especially an incapacity to cope with the transition's economic and political challenges.

The support for other forms of government, besides technocracy, ranges from one in ten (for monarchy) to almost a third (for "strong leader").

Is worth to notice that 4 possibilities (out of 8) are agreed more than "today's government": technocracy ("government of experts"), "strong leader", "single party system" and "dictatorship". An explanation resides with the fact that the survey was carried out at the end of an electoral cycle (1996 – 2000) characterized by a very low level of government accomplishments (by comparison to the high expectations people put in the center-right coalition in power).

The task of government was excessively politicized (this could explain the fact that people turn their preferences to technocrats). The image of a weak government (due to the slow decision process) could be taken as accountable for the preference of more authoritarian regimes. In explaining the preference for a "single party system" we have to note the existence of a negative image of many political forces competing each other (even they were supposed to collaborate) and failing to act as a consistent political power.

As survey data show, the idea of monarchy as a form of government in Romania is not popular. For this can account the fact that the former king Michael is not involved in political life. Recently, he got back some of the royal assets, in the process of restitution of the possessions abusively confiscated by the communist regime.

Interest in politics

Table 3. How interested are you in politics?

(%)

Not at all interested	A little interested	Fairly interested	Very interested	Hard to say/NA	Mean
26.0	41.6	20.9	5.7	5.8	2.07

Only 26.6% of respondents declare themselves as being fairly and very interested in politics, the degree of interest in politics, as a mean, ranging value 2.07 on a scale from 1 to 4. The interest in politics is rather low at the end of a decade of restored democracy because the political system failed to meet people's expectations.

Trust in political institutions

Table 4. Trust in political institutions

(%)

	No confidence	Little confidence	Some confidence	Great deal of confidence	Hard to say/NA
Political parties	45.9	30.9	12.2	1.5	5.9
Politicians	50.8	28.4	12.1	0.7	8.1
Parliament	46.8	28.8	14.8	2.4	7.3
Government	43.0	28.3	16.2	4.8	7.7
Prime minister	42.9	27.2	13.9	8.1	8.0
President	20.3	18.5	29.5	23.5	8.1

The level of trust in political institutions appears to be very low, except the case of the President. This great level of trust in the President (53 %) can be explained by a specific situation: presented as a political self-sacrifice, the President in office at the time survey was carried out announced that he will not compete for a new mandate nor for any other official position.

In Romania, the lack of confidence in main political institutions reaches a high proportion of the representative sample (around three quarters). A low level of trust in political institutions represents one of the characteristics of even the western well-established democracies (see: Dogan 1999: 325).

The literature mentions a generalized crises of trust in institutions, which can be understood as a collective aspiration towards more democracy and not as a loosing of faith in democracy's fundamental values. "The erosion of trust is considered as a sign of political maturity". (Dogan 1999: 344)

Political rights

Political rights are part of the sphere concerned with democratic values. The basic rights that compose the definition of democracy are all evaluated as entirely guaranteed (the calculated mean for every aspect of a democratic life has a position on the positive side of a scale ranging from 1-"not guaranteed at all" to 7-"fully guaranteed"). The freedom of the religious belief and the right of founding a political party appear as being fully respected. Data show a consensus regarding the respect of the authorities for: minorities rights, free media, free elections, free opinion and speech, considered as achievements of the renewed Romanian democratic regime.



Figure 2. The degree to which political rights are guaranteed (mean scores)

The majority of the respondents agree that military has no influence on political processes (as a matter of fact, the activity of Romanian army forces was and is controlled by a civilian minister). The power of political opposition to check on the government is also positively rated.

Political efficacy, attitudes toward politicians/parties

Table 5. Attitudes toward politicians

(%)

	Agree strongly	Agree somewhat	Neither agree nor disagree	Disagree somewhat	Disagree strongly	DK /NA
Politicians don't care about what the common man thinks	63.9	20.2	9.9	2.1	1.1	2.7
Politicians keep promises	4.3	8.2	20.0	25.6	37.7	4.2
Without professional politicians our country would be worse off	23.6	21.9	24.0	9.5	6.6	14.4
Most politicians are corrupt	58.3	24.1	8.8	2.3	0.8	5.7

Attitudes of the population about politicians indicate the presence of a real gap that separates political sphere from the rest of the society, together with the

absence of efficient communication channels between those who govern and those who are governed (84.1% agree that "politicians don't care about what the common man thinks").

After several general elections and after the successive coming in power of all important political parties, the political performance remains relatively modest, without much desirable impact on people's lives, - and this could be the reason for which citizens became unreceptive to politicians' promises (only 12.5% of the sample consider that politicians keep their promises).

The results of this survey point out also the perceived need for a more professional way of doing politics.

The very strong adherence (82.4%) to the statement "most politicians are corrupt" demonstrates that the problem of corruption among public officials could be considered as an important barrier of democratic consolidation.

On the other hand, the improvement of the critical attitude of the people can be considered as a useful democratic practice.

Table 6. Attitudes toward political parties

(%)

	Agree strongly	Agree somewhat	Neither agree nor disagree	Disagree somewhat	Disagree strongly	DK/ NA
Different parties have different aims and programs and a citizen has a choice between alternatives	28.5	28.9	18.7	7.0	6.6	10.3
Every political party should have the chance to rule this country	18.5	14.5	19.8	16.9	17.7	12.6
Parties have too much influence in our society	33.0	29.0	19.5	5.3	1.7	11.5
Parties see the state as their private property	46.9	27.2	12.5	4.1	2.6	6.8

An important percentage of the representative sample (57.4 %) agree that diversity is preserved among the political forces, stating the existence of different political strategies and solutions to the problems that Romanian society encounters. In this way, the pluralism as a basic condition for the existence of a

democracy is considered an already accomplished feature of Romanian political reality.

The insufficient links between political parties and their supposed electoral base is indicated again by the strong agreement (74.1 %) on the opinion that "parties see the state as their private property". With 62.0 % agreeing that political parties have too much influence in Romanian society, we can draw the conclusion that many citizens do not see themselves as being represented in an appropriate manner through the activity of political forces.

Table 7. Political efficacy

(%)

	Agree strongly	Agree somewhat	Neither agree nor disagree	Disagree somewhat	Disagree strongly	DK/ NA
I feel that I have a good understanding of the political issues	20.9	33.3	22.7	8.5	3.9	10.7
The average citizen has considerable influence in politics	10.9	11.9	19.9	23.3	24.6	9.5
Even the best politician cannot have much impact because of the way government works	34.1	24.2	17.5	7.9	3.0	12.2
People like me don't have any say about what the government works	50.0	17.8	14.1	6.9	4.5	6.6

More than half of the population (54.2 %) declares that they have a good understanding of the political issues.

The proportion of citizens considering themselves as having the power to give a significant input in political processes does not exceed a quarter of the total population.

Individual social and economic situation of the people

Economic situation of the household

The general economic decline of the countries in Central and Eastern Europe is well known and Romania makes no exception. This situation was reflected at the household and individual level by a deterioration of the standard of living.

Compared to the early 90's when the economic reform first started and took shape, the majority of the population (60.1%) considers that the economic situation got worse and only 20.7% of the respondents think that situation got better.



Figure 3. Economic situation of the household - comparison to the early 90's (%)

Present economic situation of the household

The analyses undertaken in Romania on poverty show a process of social polarization characterize by a big portion of the population living in poverty and another small part of population as rich.

The subjective data reflects partially this process. A share of 20.2% of the respondents considers the present economic situation as very bad and 35.2% as fairly bad. Only 1% of the subject considers the household economic situation as very good.



Figure 4. Present economic situation of the household

Satisfaction with life



Figure 5. Satisfaction with life (%)

	Mean
Satisfaction with life	4.33

Considered in the literature as an output indicator of all the conditions in the society as well as of the person's values and expectations, satisfaction with life expresses synthetically a global situation filtered by personal values.

A significantly high proportion of subjects considers themselves totally dissatisfied with life (11.5%) in comparison to those who are totally satisfied (3.1%).

The mean ranges 4.33 on an 11 points scale which suggest a trend of general dissatisfaction with life.



Figure 6. Satisfaction with life now comparatively to 1989

Comparatively to 1989, a vast majority of the subjects (65.7%) are less satisfied with life.

Social position in society



Figure 7. Social position in society (%)

The indicator "social position in society" reflects only partially the objective situation of social polarisation. A small part of population considers as having the highest social position (1.5%) and a significant bigger share of respondents thinks it occupies the lowest position (11.4%). The general trend noticeable is characterised by the placing of the majority on a low social position (52.9%) and situation of another important part of respondents (25.4%) on a middle position, even though the formation of a middle class in Romania is an undergoing process with less visible results.

To note that the subjective data follows their own logic with partial respect to the objective conditions.

Attitudes toward social inequality/justice



Figure 8. Compared to what others live, you get what you deserve, little more, a lot more, a little less or a lot less then you deserve? (%)

Data show an acceptance of the effects produced by the social differentiation process on the basis of personal capabilities (51.1 %).

A significant share of the respondents (40.3 %) reject the idea of imposing a political mechanism in order to regulate the big inter-individual differences in earnings.

Principles of justice



Figure 9. Social differences between people are justified because they express what one has made of a given chances of life (%)



Figure 10. There should be a mechanism in our country which regulates income in a way that no one earns much more than others (%)

Data show an acceptance of the effects produced by the social differentiation process on the basis of personal capabilities (51.1 %).

40.3 % of the respondents reject the idea of imposing a political mechanism in order to regulate the big interpersonal differences in earnings, even the great majority (92.7%) of the population appreciates differences in income as being too large.

Evaluation of justice in society: now and in socialism

Table 8. Opinions on justice in society

	Very just	Rather just	Neither just or unjust	Rather unjust	Very unjust	DK/ NA	Mean
Justice in society nowadays	1.0	9.2	28.9	38.4	18.8	4.6	3.69
Justice in socialist society	6.7	27.2	25.1	21.8	13.3	6.0	3.08

57.2 % perceive the actual society as unjust, comparing to 35.1 % of the sample that consider the socialist society as unjust.

Differences in incomes

The great majority (92.7 %) of the population appreciates differences in incomes as being too large.



Figure 11

Attitudes toward the economy

Evaluations of economic performance

Table 9. Evaluation of socialist economy/current economic system

	Negative ranks	Neutral	Positive ranks	NA / DK
The socialist economy before '89	18.3 %	9.7 %	53.5 %	18.5 %
Current economic system	55.0 %	14.1 %	15.1 %	15.8 %

The data indicate a very low level of satisfaction with the present economic system, together with a rather positive evaluation of the former socialist economy.

Besides the cultural change, the economic development is also a basic factor underlying democracy. However, implementing and consolidating democracy does not result from economic development by itself (Welzel & Inglehart 1999: 5).

On a long term, though, a poor economic performance could prove as a serious threat to the stability of a democratic regime. Democracy implies a sort of moderation in the political attitudes of the citizens and a bad economic situation could lead to the pre-eminence of extremist attitudes.

Economic situation of the country compared to the early '90s

The great difficulties of the Romanian economy are shown not only by objective indicators, but by subjective perceptions as well: 81.7 % of the population think that the economic situation got worse.



Figura 12

Expected development of the economic situation

The majority of the people consider that the economic recovery will take 5 years or more (70.1 %)



Figure 13. Expected development of the economic situation (%)

Evaluation of market economy

An evaluation of free market economy could not be unaware of the current economic situation of the country. Considering this, we can notice that the free market economy is perceived as rather chaotic one ("no care about rules means success" consider 71.2 % of the representative sample).

Here is again indicated the trend of social polarisation, 79.4 % of the people considering the gap between rich and poor people as getting deeper.

On the other side, an important percentage (64.8 %) of the citizens agrees that the market economy provide more opportunities to choose from than the command economy of a socialist regime.



Figure 14. Evaluations of market economy

Directions of economic development

A mixed model of Western European "know-how" and new solutions adapted to a specific reality is taken into consideration by 44.2 % of the population. Reforms that have been made in economy under the label "following the western model" have not produced yet positive effects on people's lives. An insufficient adaptation of this model to the particular conditions of the Romanian economy is probably taken accountable for this failure.



Figure 15. Directions of economic development

Privatisation

Table 10. Opinions on privatization

	Only privately run	Mainly privately run	Mixed	Mainly run by state	Only state run	DK/ NA
Banks	14.9	10.0	22.9	20.7	25.8	5.6
Big companies and factories	15.2	15.0	27.4	16.9	21.6	3.7
Water and electricity	7.2	5.5	18.5	25.2	39.3	4.4
Railway	6.1	5.5	15.1	27.6	41.2	4.4
Media	28.1	18.6	24.6	8.0	14.8	5.8

The most favorable opinion is for a private run of the media (46.7%), followed by big companies and factories (30.0%), and banks (24.9%).

The ownership only or mainly by the state is seen as a good solution for railway (68.8%) and for water and electricity (64.5%).

Outlook

If in the political area Romania reached a level allowing us a favourable assessment of democracy, transition proved to be more difficult, longer and with higher social costs than foreseen by specialists and, particularly, by populations' expectations.

The lack, previously to the fall of communism, of measures for market economy introduction, the low economic standard of the population and the strong dependence on the owner state, ignoring the adoption as quickly as possible of changes in economy, the lack of capital investments and the low financing of restructuration process formed a complex of unfavourable factors of evolution in the Romanian society. Other adverse factors joined, concerning the manner of action and management of the problems during transition. The singular accent on macroeconomic stabilisation did not yield the expected results.

At the same time, it must be noted that after two early years that were more turbulent, a rather high level of social stability was reached. Despite several critical moments, the relations between the majority Romanian population (89% Romanians at the 1992 census) and various ethnic groups do not raise special conflicting problems. A difficult social situation concerns the Roma population, characterised by families with many children, poor social and economic integration due to a low level of education, lack of professional training, very low occupational level.

Solving these problems takes time and considerably material resources. It requires an overall approach by policies of family support, of access to education, of poverty control and job creation for the population in difficulty. Traditionally, a restrictive social policy was enforced in Romania, with low levels of social expenditure (16-20% of GDP). The pressure of social problems require the change of priority in spending the public money, by increasing the degree of coverage of the social programs, the amount of benefits and the social work network.

Another aspect is also particularly important for the consolidation of democracy. It concerns the inconsistency of analysis establishing a strict dependence between the current chances of democracy and several historical factors or cultural characteristics in a given country. We refer particularly to the attempts of establishing a hierarchy of the level of consolidation of the democracy according to GDP level, indicator designed to measure the economic development. The evolution of post-communist countries, and we refer mainly to Romania, invalidate such connections. Under the conditions in which GDP decreased by one quarter, between 1991-2000 the democrat regime and democratisation were consolidated. No doubt, the economic difficulties do not favour democracy, but neither prevents, in an absolute manner, its edification.

On the other hand, the democrat regime has certain weaknesses that make it vulnerable any time, even in the countries with developed economies. Hence the need for a continuous study of the function of democratic institutions and of the measures required to improve their performance.

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GENDER VALUES DYNAMICS: TOWARDS A COMMON EUROPEAN PATTERN?

Mălina Voicu[1] *and* **Bogdan Voicu** - I.C.C.V.

The paper aims to analyze the dynamics of gender values during the nineties in the European countries. In the context of the changing economic, social, political, and cultural contexts, the gender values are shifting from the traditionalist ones to modern and postmodern ones. The paper tries to explore how the gender values have evolved during the last decade in the Western and Eastern Europe under the influences cultural, economic, political, and socio-demographic of factors. I employ longitudinal analysis performed on the data provided by two waves of European Values Survey (1990 and 1999). The EVS data indicates that Europe tends to a common model of gender equality. In the Western countries, the changes produced by the shift from the industrial to post-industrial society are simultaneous with a cultural move from modern to post-modern culture. The Eastern Europe knows a similar trend under the impact of the globalization and the 'Europeanization'. The latent pattern of the new European society supports the equal involvement for women and men in the paid labour and a new division of gender roles within the household.

The paper aims to analyze the dynamics of gender values during the nineties in the European countries. In the context of the changing economic, social, political, and cultural contexts, the gender values are shifting from the traditionalist ones to modern and postmodern ones. The shifting of gender values on the axis traditionalism – modernism – postmodernism is linked, on the one hand, with the cultural shift that occurred during the last decades, and with the socioeconomic transformation, on the other hand. As Inglehart (1997) points out, the relation between the cultural and socioeconomic changes is a reciprocal one, because the "major socioeconomic changes reshape the culture" and "through processes of random mutation and natural selection, culture adapts to a given environment" (p. 59). Therefore, the changing of the gender values process has multiple determinats, being influenced by cultural, economic, political, and socio-demographic factors. The paper tries to explore how the gender values have evolved during the last decade in the Western and Eastern Europe under the influences of these various factors. I employ longitudinal analysis performed on the data provided by two waves of EVS (1990 and 1999).

The first part of the paper summarizes the main approaches that I used. The second part is dedicated to the data analysis. The last part contains comments regarding the findings and conclusions.

[1] The authors wish to thanks to their colleagues form RIQL (Adrian Dan, Monica Constantinescu, Ana Bleahu, Dana Nițulescu and Simona Vonica) for the valuable comments and suggestions

Modernization, postmodernization and gender values

The transformation of the gender values is a part of a broader pattern of culture shift for the Traditional culture to the Modern and Postmodern culture. The Traditional cultural pattern has emphasized the values of the religious authority and the belonging to the local community and to the family. The traditional culture has encouraged different roles for men and women and the inequality between the members of the family: woman, the housewife, has fewer rights and was depending to the male breadwinner. The more insecure pre-industrial society imposed the family as mandatory for the children survival, and therefore it has emphasized the childbearing and the childrearing as central goals for women (Inglehart, Norris, 2003).

The social modernization came together with the industrialization, urbanization and with the decreasing of the role of the religious authority at the society level. The traditional authority was replaced by the legal – rational authority. The industrialization brought an increased need for labour force and therefore a higher women involvement on the labour market. This determined a change of the gender roles and consequently a redistribution of the roles within the household. On the other hand, the institutions of the Welfare State have partially freed the women from the burden of caring for children and elderly. As a result, the industrial society is quite different form the preindustrial one with the regard of the gender roles and the gender values.

Easter, Halman and de Moor (1993) indicate that 'the modernization processes offer opportunities to develop new societal values such as personal freedom, self-development, self-expression, creativity, equality and democracy' (pp. 8). On the other hand, the cultural modernization does not offer only the opportunity to develop new kinds of values, but it also generates new processes in the construction of the individual value systems. Among these processes one can mention the fragmentation of the value systems and their individualization. According to Easter, Halman and de Moor (1993), individualization represents 'the process in which values, beliefs, attitudes and behaviour are increasingly based on personal choice and are less dependent on tradition and on social institution' (p. 7). Consequently, the values involved in gender relations become more equalitarian and less dependent on the traditional pattern of the family relations. As Giddens (1998) indicates, 'the democratization in the context of family implies equality, mutual respect, autonomy, decision-making through communication and freedom from violence' (p. 93). In this context, people are more and more willing to support values that underpin the new gender division within the family, a higher involvement of men in the domestic work, an increased participation of women at the labour market and a greater need of women for self-development and self-expression.

Talking about the modernization and postmodernization impact on the

gender values, Inglehart and Norris (2003) distinguish two stages in the process of values' change. The first stage corresponds to the industrialization process which brings women into the paid labour force and dramatically decreases the fertility rate. This stage is related to the decline of the traditional family and consequently to the decline of values which sustain the traditional type of family. The second phase is the postindustrial one. It brings a shift towards greater gender equality, women being more and more involved in the management or in the political processes. According to this approach, the first stage set free women from the gender relations of the traditional family, while the second established the equality between sexes at the societal level.

However, the process of passing from the industrial society to the postindustrial one is simultaneous with a more complex social and cultural shift, known as the shift form the Modern society and culture towards Postmodern ones. As Inglehart (1997) points out, Modernization and Postmodernization 'are are strongly linked with the economic development, but Postmodernization represents a late stage of development that is linked with very different beliefs from those that characterize Modernization' (p. 8). The Postmodernization changes the values pattern in the domains of politics, religion, work, family life. The process tends to replace the values of homogeneity and universalism with those of institutionalized pluralism, with variety and with ambivalence (Mullard, Spiker, 1998, p. 130). The Postmodern culture encourages the diversity and the differences. It emphasizes the individualization and the fragmentation of the individual value systems.

One of the core value shifts in the process of changing culture from the Modern to the Postmodern society is the shift from the Materialist towards the Postmaterialiste values, described by Inglehart (1977, 1990, 1997). People socialized in the societies with a higher degree of affluence and security are less disposed to support materialist values, like economic achievement, accumulation of the material resources and economic security, are willing more to share Postmaterialist values, like the need for self-expression, self-actualization and the concern for the quality of life. The high degree of affluence, which has characterized many of the Western industrialized nations during the last decades, has produced a shift in the values orientation of the population, from the Materialist towards the Postmaterialist values. This shift has affected especially the younger cohorts, which have been socialized during this period of affluence. As far as gender values are concerned, the shift from Materialist to Postmaterialist values means an increased support for self-realization of the women and a change in their representation: from the image of the mother and the housewife to that of an independent, working person (Inglehart, 1997). Therefore, one can say that the new generations, socialized after the Second World War, are much willing to support the Postmaterialist values and to give priority to the gender equality and to the role of women as

employees, then the older generations are.

As I have pointed out before, between the cultural change and the socioeconomic one there is some interdependency. The change of values affects and is affected by the socioeconomic changes. I will consider here only some factors that have influenced the dynamic of gender values during the last decade, like the development of a commune legislative framework at the European Union level, the transformations of the Welfare State and the dynamic of the labour market.

The development of the European Union in the last decade has had a significant impact on the dynamic of gender values. Not only the free exchange of information among European states, but also the tentative made in order to provide a common legislative framework have had an influence on gender values. The relation between the values shared by the population and legislation promoted by a specific political regime is mediated by the concept of legitimacy. In order to be legitimate a regime has to establish a set of values concordant with those shared by the majority. Thereby, one can affirm there is a correspondence that between the type of promoted policies at one moment in time and the values shared by the population (Voicu, 2003). Therefore, the gender policy promoted by the EU influences and is influenced by the individual values systems.

In the first stage of the development of a European common legislation, the main concern was to assure the equal payment for women and men for equal labour. According to Haintras (1995) the main goal was not to promote the gender equality, but to ensure the equal competition on the international labour market. Stratigaki (2000) identified a second stage in the evolution of the EU common gender policy, during the '90. The core objective of this stage was to ensure equal treatment on the labour market for both sexes and to promote the reconciliation between career and family life. Thus, the policy of the last decade has strongly support the shift form the traditional gender values towards the equalitarian model in work and family life.

However, Haintras (2000) indicates that the EU members have joined the Union having "differentiated set of interests and expectations, in terms of its political culture and policy environment, which have influenced the approach of gender issues at supranational level" (p. 19). In this context, the policy measures promoted by the EU have had different impact on the mass values orientations, depending on the local political culture and on the local socio-economic background. Consequently, we expect to find different evolutions in the dynamic of gender values, under the impact of the European common legislation, depending on this background. On the other hand, the introduction of a similar legislation within the member states provides the opportunity to encourage what Easter, Halman and de Moor (1993) named 'values convergence'. Let also note that the values convergence occurs in a world of

cultural diversity.

During the last two decades the Western Welfare State has experienced a lot of transformations under multiple constrains. The Welfare State crisis from the '70 imposed the need of rethinking the structure and the function of the Welfare State. Different states have answered different to the challenges of the welfare crisis. Taylor-Gooby (1996) identifies three types of answers, among which the reorienting of the requests for welfare provision to other social actors than the state, like the market, the family and the local community. This has a direct impact on the gender values, especially in the countries in which the state provides little help in caring for the children and elderly and the burden for caregiving belongs almost exclusively to the women, like in the case of the Southern countries. Consequently, the retrenchment of the state means a supplementary burden for women and fewer chances for changing the individual value systems towards more gender equality.

On the other hand, the evolutions of the welfare concept and the debate around the welfare in the last years, place in the core of the political debate a new conception about welfare. The new welfare concept is adapted to the social, cultural and economic changes produced in the post-industrial society. According to Giddens (1994) and to Mullard and Spiker (1998), in the post-traditional society people seek to find the autonomy and the self-expression and, therefore, the new concept of welfare (*positive welfare* promoted by *the generative welfare state*) should have as core the autonomy and the free choice of the individuals. In this context, the values of gender equality in work and family life is one of the core elements of the new welfare state, being promoted and sustained by the new political and social movements.

The dynamic of the labour market is also important for the present analysis. In the last decades women became more economic active and much involved on the labour market. In some Western European countries, like The Netherlands, Germany, United Kingdom, the female participation on the labour market has increased in the last decades and this increase took place mainly on the basis of the part-time employment (O'Connor, 1996). On the other hand, some studies have indicated a decreasing in the participation in the labour market of the people above 50 years old (Taylor-Gooby, 1999). Therefore, there is a likelihood that elderly people to be less supportive towards the women involvement on the labour market, because there are much vulnerable to the unemployment and women represent a rival on the labour market. Moreover, Davis and Robinson (1996) hypothesize that 'men with less prestigious occupations or low incomes may tend to view women as a threat in competition for jobs' (p. 207). Thus, one can assume that men above 50 years old are less supportive towards the new gender values.

Alt (1979) points out that the generosity and the altruism are increasing with the personal well-being. During crisis, people will reject the policies that

advantage others, displaying more support for the policies which are in their own benefit. I am expecting that during the crisis periods, like an increase in unemployment, people, especially those vulnerable to unemployment, are less willing to support women involvement on the labour market and the values of gender equality. One can assume that the increase in unemployment will be associated with a decrease in the support for the values of gender equality.

The above assumptions could be formulated for both Western and Eastern European countries. However, in the ex-communist case, some important differences might occur. The culture shift from Traditionalism to Modernism and Postmodernism knows different stages. The impact of common legislation of the EU is different too. The dynamic and the structure of labour market have particular features in the ex-communist states, due to the transition from the planned economy to the free market.

The communist project was a modernization one. However, the transition from the pre-industrial to the industrial society was a forced one, imposed by the external forces of the state. The Eastern European countries did not experience 'the gradual disintegration of the traditional society which facilitated the individualization in its Western counterparts' (van der Broek, de Moor, 1993). From the bureaucratization, centralization and secularization point of view, 'the socialist state represented the culmination of Modernization' (Inglehart, 1997, p. 97), but, from the value patterns point of view, the ex-communist societies are unequally modernized. According to van der Broek and de Moor, if religious and political values are concerned, there are smaller differences between Eastern and Western population, but, in the domain of the work or of the primary relations, the Eastern societies are more traditional than the Western ones.

Following different approaches of the post-communist societies, Voicu (2001) labels the Romanian society as *a pseudo-modern society*, 'a society of a strained, dilemmatic and infirm modernity, which is oscillating between tradition and postmodernity' (p. 51). The modernization project was a hollow one, such as it was imposed and not negotiated, and it was lacking civil participation. At the end of the eighties, this half-modern society found itself in deep crisis. The traditionalist regress answered the crisis simultaneous with the post-modern influences due to contact with the Western societies. At a general level, this is more or less valid for all the ex-communist societies. Thus, the Eastern societies are a mixture of traditionalism, modernism and postmodernism, some domains being modern and other still traditional, some segments of the population being traditionalist and other oriented towards postmodernism. During the first decades after the Second World War, most of the Central and Eastern European countries have experienced a period of the economic growth and of relative economic security, due to the industrialization, urbanization and to the economic boom which has characterized the period. As

a consequence, some parts of the generations socialized during '60 and '70 are more inclined to share the Postmaterialist values. On the other hand, the economic recessions of the '80 and the greater decline, in terms of economic security and of quality of life during the transition period, have determined a shift from the Postmaterialist values to the Materialist ones. In addition, Mason (1995) shows that the materialist values prevail over the Postmaterialist ones in the region.

In the domains of gender roles and gender values the things are also different than in the Western part of the continent. The implementation of the communist project needed a quite numerous labour force and, therefore, the communist governments have encouraged the women to enter into the paid employment. Although the women involvement into the working force was quite high, the communist state did not take measures aimed to encourage the sharing of the domestic work between partners (Lohkamp – Himmighofen, Dienel, 2000). In addition, the communist ideology has stated the equality among all the citizens, and consequently between men and women.

Even if, at the declarative level, the gender equality was reached in the Eastern countries, in effect gender values were and are much traditional than in many Western countries. First of all, for the inhabitants of the Eastern Europe 'gender equality was a goal that was imposed from above, rather than one chosen and fought for by the women themselves during the communist era' (Wolchik, 1998, p. 292). As a consequence, the population did not completely internalized the values imposed by an external and not fully legitimated power. Secondly, the former communist regime did not support the sharing of the domestic work and replacement of the traditional gender roles within the family, with the modern ones, as we have indicated before. In this context, Eastern European countries score low that the many Western countries do on the household modernity dimension (Voicu, 2003).

During the transition, the greater economic insecurity determines a regress to the materialist values orientation, which would affect the gender values too. Moreover, the increased unemployment has affected the female participation on the labour market, but the high economic insecurity pushed them into the labour force, because their households need a second income. Gal and Klingman (2000) indicate that the opinion polls show that most women from the region are willing to work for salary even if they do not need money. However, in the Eastern Europe, during the last decade, in the context of greater job insecurity, it is quite probable to find a decreasing in values of gender equality.

On the other hand, during the transition period the state involvement in providing the support for families and especially for women has significantly decreased. The post-communist states have encouraged the deinstitutionalization in childcaring and they support the stronger family

involvement in childrearing (UNICEF, 1999). This trend towards deinstitutionalization is stronger in conservative post-communist countries like Bulgaria, Romania and Poland. Here the use of daily childcare facilities has decreased during the transition (van Dijk, 2001). Thus, these states have thrown the burden of caring for children on the family and the main carrier of this burden, according to the traditional family pattern, are the women. In this context, it is quite probable that the support for women involvement on the labour market to decrease.

The present analysis is focused on the dynamic of two gender values: the equality of women and men on the labour market and the gender equality within household. The first dimension refers to value orientations toward the equal access of women and men in the labour market. We have called it *equal labour*. It becomes manifest through an increase acceptance of the women as an employee and through the rejection of the housekeeper – breadwinner model. The second dimension, labeled as *household modernity*, refers to the representation of the household role division, with special focus on the traditional childcare role of woman.

According to the above theoretical developments, one can expect that:

(1) The dynamic of gender values is different in Eastern and Western countries, due to the dominant cultural pattern in the society and to the socio-economic context. Therefore, we expect to find an increase in equal labour and household modernity in the Western societies and a decrease in equal labour in Eastern countries. The household modernity rest at the same values in the ex-communist countries.

(2) The support for gender equality (measured on two dimensions, namely household modernity and equal labour) is increasing during the '90 for all the age groups.

(3) The support for gender equality (household modernity and equal labour) has a different dynamic depending on sex. The increasing in support for gender values is higher for women than for men.

Data

In analysis the dynamic of gender values during the last decade in the European countries, I have used data provided by the last two waves of EVS, 1990 and 1999. I have included in the analysis only the data for the countries which are presented in both waves and which allowed longitudinal analysis for each country[2]. I have identified two values dimensions regarding gender

[2] The countries included in the analysis are: France, United Kingdom, West and East Germany, Italy, Spain, Portugal, The Netherlands, Belgia Denmark, Sweden, Finland, Iceland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, The Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, Slovenia. I have excluded Ireland, North Ireland and

relations, in the EVS data sets, the same as in the theoretical model (*equal labour* and *household modernity*). The dimension labeled household modernity refers to the gender equality within household, while the dimension called equal labour refers to equal access on the labour market. The latent variable that underpin the first dimension explains the variation of the variables: 'Working mother can establish just as warm and secure a relationship with her children as a mother who does not work'; 'Pre-school child is likely to suffer if his or her mother works'; 'Job is alright but what most women really want is a home and children'; 'Being a housewife is just as fulfilling as working for pay'. Thus, those people who score high on this dimension approve less the idea that mothers provide the best childrearing and that the main satisfactions for women are providing by housekeeping and childrearing. The latent value that underlines the equal labour dimension explains the variation of the following variables: 'Working mother can establish just as warm and secure a relationship with her children as a mother who does not work'; 'Having a job is the best way for a woman to be an independent person'; 'Both the husband and wife should contribute to household income'. The people who score high on this dimension support more the idea that men and women are equal with the respect to labour market involvement.

The confirmatory factor analysis was firstly run for the 1990 data set. Maintaining constant the loadings, the analysis was run again for the 1999 data set. The analysis was also rerun for each country included in the data set for 1990 and 1999 waves. Each time the loadings were maintained constant, as they have resulted form the first analysis (for the entire data set from 1990)[3]. The coefficients for each wave and each country are presented in the Annex 1. They confirm that the factorial structure remain the same for the two wave and for each country. The factorial structure is presented below, in Diagram 1.

Graphic1 indicates that the Household modernity has increased in all the European countries, which are in the analysis, excepting Finland. Therefore, one can say than the Europeans are much modern with the respect to the gender roles division within household, that they were a decade ago. The trend is similar with those predicted in the hypothesis for the Western European countries. Under the impact of the cultural changes which characterizes the post-industrial societies, people become much willing to support a redistribution of gender roles within the household. Although I have expected to find a stagnation of the household modernity for the Eastern Europe countries, due to the social and economic transformation, the data indicates that people from the region became more supportive for a new division of the gender role in the

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Austria from the analysis because they have used a different scale for answers in 1999 and the data they have collected is not comparable with the data provided by the other countries.

[3] The goodness of fit indexes for the entire set of data, for 1999 wave are: χ^2 =1365.528 (v = 7), Δ2IFI = 0.997, RMSEA = 0.075

family.

Diagram 1. Factorial structure of the gender values



χ^2= 1365,528 (v = 7) p= 0,000
Delta 2 IFI= 0,997; RMSEA= 0,075



Graphic 1. The variation of Household modernity between 1990 and 1999



Graphic 2. The variation of Equal labour between 1990 and 1999

The second dimension, related with the women's and men's equal access on the labour market, apparently has a quite different dynamics from that predicted in the hypothesis. I have expected to find an increasing in equal labour dimension for the Western countries and a decreasing for the Eastern ones. In fact, for all the Eastern countries, with the exception of Romania, there was an increasing in support for equal involvement in labour for both sexes. One can say that the population of Eastern Europe became more equalitarian with the respect of gender role. On the other side, not all the inhabitants of Western countries are much inclined to sustain gender equality on the labour market then they was 10 years ago. In countries like Portugal, United Kingdom, Iceland and Finland, the gender equality is in decline. However, analyzing the levels of signification of the differences between means (the t test), one can note that the relatively small differences in the case of Iceland, Denmark, Spain, Slovenia, Romania and Italy are not statistically significative ($p=0,05$). Also, the UK decrease is very smooth in relative terms (reported to the 1990's values), while the increase for the Netherlands, Belgium, Germany and France are quite important.

Summing up, the Western Europe, as a whole, knows an increase in supporting women involvement on the labor market. The individual (country) increases are important for the continental Western Europe, while the few decreases are not significative or very slight (in the UK case). Finland and, especially, Portugal display a completely different behavior with huge decreases. I suspect for Portugal problems in gathering data.

The surprising findings for the ex-communist countries are probably related with several factors. Cultural exchanges with the western democracies, the legislative changes imposed by the EU for the accession countries are among them. As I will show in the following sections, it seems that the values imposed by the communist regime were stronger for the older people. The contagion phenomena, in the contact with western values, strengthen them, even if they were imposed by a not entirely legitimated regime. On the other hand, despite the general increase of unemployment, the situation is not necessary defined by the East-Europeans as a crisis one. Some of these societies escaped from the suzerainty of another state, and freed themselves. All of them perceived freedom as a new gain. For many of them, the end of the nineties meant a higher level of income than during the communist regime (see World Bank, 2002). Romania is the exception and this could be seen in the Graphic 1. Finally, as the starting point for those countries was lower, they had the possibility to increase more than the Western societies their support for equal labor.

Looking to the evolution of the two gender values in Eastern and Western countries, one can say that the general tendency in Europe is to a common model. If household modernity is concerned, in almost all the European

countries its level has increased in the last ten years. Taking into account the initial level of household modernity in 1990 (see Graphic 2.2, Annex 2), one can say that the increasing in this dimension depends on its initial level. Countries which have scored lower in 1990 have a grater increased than those which score higher. The same finding is valid for the other dimension – Equal labour (see Graphic 2.1 – Annex 2). The greater the initial level of the variable, the slighter is the increasing in the last decade.

Table 1. Changes in Household modernity and Equal labour by cohorts and region (West – East)

	Household modernity				Equal labour			
	West		East		West		East	
Cohorts	1990	1999	1990	1999	1990	1999	1990	1999
1900-1909	2,45	2,57	1,85	2,54	-2,60	-2,57	-2,34	-2,12
1910-1919	2,56	2,59	2,25	2,60	-2,59	-2,58	-2,24	-2,19
1920-1929	2,64	2,72	2,33	2,74	-2,45	-2,39	-2,29	-2,23
1930-1939	2,90	2,98	2,29	2,72	-2,41	-2,38	-2,33	-2,16
1940-1949	3,19	3,25	2,50	2,77	-2,39	-2,26	-2,27	-2,16
1950-1959	3,40	3,46	2,59	2,86	-2,36	-2,31	-2,34	-2,20
1960-1969	3,50	3,53	2,77	2,88	-2,32	-2,32	-2,33	-2,25
1970-1979	3,45	3,52	2,80	3,01	-2,24	-2,25	-2,22	-2,31
1980-1989	-	3,72	-	3,03	-	-2,25	-	-2,22

Table 1 partially supports the second hypothesis. According to the data, the support for Household modernity has increased in both Eastern and Western Europe for all the cohorts. The changing is quite small for the inhabitants of Western countries, but is quite significant for the East Europeans (see also Annex 3- Graphic 3.1 and 3.2). Moreover, for Eastern Europe, the changes are more important for the older cohorts than for the youngest ones. For 1999, the level of Household modernity is quite the same for all the cohorts in Eastern Europe, while in West the younger are significantly much supportive to the model of gender roles within family. Even so, to general level, the support for new gender roles is superior in Western societies, but the general trend is an increasing one in East. One can say that under the pressure of cultural and legislative factors, people who live in post-communist societies become more supportive for the redistribution of the gender roles in household. They adapt their value systems to the new cultural and social context.

With the respect of Equal labour dimension, the situation is different in West and East (see also Annex 3 – Graphics 3.3 and 3.4). In Western countries there is an increasing in support for equal participation to labour market for 'adult' cohorts (those born between 1940-1949 and 1950-1959) and stagnation for the younger ones. One can say that the population of these countries tends to

a common, uniform model, with the respect to women participation on the labour market. The younger generations have reached the 'optimum' level of gender equality on the labour market earlier and now, the adult cohorts change slowly theirs orientation in the same direction.

In Eastern Europe, there is a tendency in increasing the Equal labour dimension for all the cohorts, excepting the youngest one (people born between 1970 and 1979). The Graphic 3.3 (see Annex 3) indicates that the support, for equal participation on labour market for men and women, decreases on the same time with the age. The younger generations are less supportive for the women involvement on the paid work, both comparing with the older cohorts and with their own position ten years ago. Probably, the support decreased due to the economic difficulties produces by the transition period. The new context of amplified economic and social insecurity, people become less willing to support women involvement on the labour market. The transition has created on optimum context for the expansion of traditional gender stereotypes.

A deeper analysis, that takes into account not only the cohort, but also the sex of respondent, indicates that in Eastern Europe the men display a different pattern with respect to the dynamic of Equal labour dimension. Graphic 3 show that the younger men from post-communist countries are less disposed to support women involvement on the labour market then the older cohorts are. Moreover, the youngest cohort of men included in the analysis is less willing to sustain equal access for both sexes to paid employment than it was a decade ago. Their support decreased due to the economic difficulties of transition period. The younger cohorts of men and women are much affected by the unemployment comparing with the older ones and as Alt pointed out, the altruism decreased during the crisis period. Therefore, young women and men are competing on the same scarce resource in Eastern Europe – the working places. In this context, men are less willing to give equal chances for women on the labour market, instead they prefer to sustain the un-involvement of female work force on the paid employment. More, for these cohorts, the educational status of men and women is more similar, so they compete on the same labor markets.

The dynamic of the other dimension – Household modernity – is the same for men in Western and in Eastern Europe (see Graphics 3.5 and 3.6 – Annex 3). There is a rising in Household modernity for men in all cohorts in both parts of Europe. Even if this tendency is that predicted by the hypothesis, the level of changes is different in East and West. The transformation is much higher to the Eastern male population than to the Western one. The differences in Household modernity are very small, if male population of Western Europe is concerned. One can say that the trend is almost the same in both parts of Europe, but the changes are sharper in the post-communist countries. Furthermore, the dynamic of the Equal labour dimension is different for the two categories of male

population. For Western Europe the trend is similar with those predicted (see Graphic 4): there is an increase for all the cohorts excepting the younger ones. For the later the value orientation on women involvement on the labour market stagnates.

If the women's value orientations are concerned, the trends of variation for Household modernity are similar for Eastern and Western Europe (see Graphics 3.9 and 3.10 – Annex 3). Although the new model of gender roles in family is more sustained in both parts of continent and for all the age groups, the variation is somewhat higher in East, than in West. Western women have changed less this value orientation in the last decade than the Eastern women did. These ones become more oriented to a new division of the gender roles in family for all the age groups, but the level of the analyze dimension is still under that of women from Western Europe.

With respect to Equal labour, the differences between women from Western and Eastern Europe are rather small. One can observe an increase in support for female involvement in paid work in both sides of Europe, but there are some dissimilarity regarding the different age groups. While in Eastern Europe the level of support is quite the same for all cohorts and the increasing in the last 10 years is uniform, in the Western Europe, younger women are more willing to support female employment, than the older women are. However, the variation is higher for the cohort born between 1940 and 1949.



Graphic 3. Changes in Equal labour by cohorts and sex (male) in Eastern Europe



Graphic 4 Changes in Equal labour by cohorts and sex (male) in Western Europe

Discussion

Considering the data provided by the two waves of the EVS, one can say that, under the impact of cultural, social and economic changes, Europe tends to a common model of gender equality. In the Western countries, the changes produced by the shift from the industrial to post-industrial society are simultaneous with a cultural move from modern to post-modern culture. The gender values changed, too. The latent pattern of the new European society supports the equal involvement for women and men in the paid labour and a new division of gender roles within the household.

The data indicates that the Eastern Europe knows a similar trend under the impact of the globalization and the 'Europeanization'. After 1990, the population of post-communist countries changes its value orientation with respect to gender roles and gender equality. The contact with the Western culture and the impact of common legislation of European Union which was adopted by the accession countries too are among the factors which have played a role in this change. There are two main dimensions that shape the space of gender values: household modernity and equal labour. At the beginning of the decade, both of them recorded lower level in the Eastern than in the Western countries. However, during the nineties, Eastern Europe knew a greater increase on the tow axes. Moreover, the data indicates that the lower was the initial level of the support for gender equality on labour market and for the equal involvement on the domestic work, the greater is the variation of the two dimensions during the last decade.

The same findings are true for the variation in value orientation by cohorts. Younger cohorts have reached a higher starting level of gender equality

on the both dimensions. They change little these levels during the last decade. Older cohort knew some higher increase in the same period, such as the differences between generations became smaller. The population of Europe tends to a common model of gender equality which emphasizes woman involvement into the paid labour, the sharing of domestic work between partners and a new image of woman, seen as active economic person, not only as mother and caregiver.

There are some differences between the dynamic of the values shared by men and women in Eastern and Western Europe. Considering the levels and the dynamics of the gender values during the last decade, the men from the Western countries resemble more with the women from Western Europe, than with the men from the Eastern countries. One can say that the key factor here is the culture in which they have been socialized, not the gender. On the other hand, men from Eastern Europe significantly differ from women from the same region. Even if the communist regime has promoted the women involvement on the labour market, this was not an interiorized value. Thus, it was vulnerable to the transition challenges. Young men from the post-communist countries became less and less supportive to the female involvement in the paid work. This shift to the traditional values can be explained by the economic difficulties encountered by the population of Eastern Europe during the last decade. The rising of unemployment increased the competition between men and women on the labour market. Therefore, men become less willing to support female employment.

Considering the trends in the last decade one should expect that the common pattern of gender values will strengthen. Probably, in the new millennium gender differences will become smaller at least at the value patterns shared by the entire population. In the Western countries this tends to be true also for men - women differences, while in the ex-communist Europe is possible that men would display more conservative options than women.

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Annex 1– Goodness- of – fit indexes.

	1990			1999		
Country	χ^2 [1]	Δ2 IFI	RMSEA	χ^2 [1]	Δ2 IFI	RMSEA
Belgium	99.505	0.997	0.045	94.921	0.996	0.053
Bulgaria	211.985	0.984	0.113	56.498	0.996	0.053
Czech Republic	285.395	0.990	0.092	493.871	0.982	0.129
Denmark	95.924	0.994	0.072	177.507	0.988	0.103
East Germany	191.549	0.990	0.094	230.054	0.984	0.120
Estonia	289.413	0.976	0.135	81.479	0.995	0.066
Finland	122.183	0.985	0.110	217.568	0.985	0.114
France	101.609	0.992	0.076	159.421	0.991	0.077
Hungary	53.929	0.997	0.051	96.277	0.993	0.074
Iceland	122.488	0.989	0.101	175.825	0.988	0.105
Italy	305.846	0.989	0.098	251.758	0.991	0.089

	1990			1999		
Latvia	123.529	0.989	0.090	165.010	0.989	0.099
Lithuania	321.395	0.977	0.143	375.085	0.974	0.154
Poland	106.712	0.992	0.079	56.200	0.997	0.050
Portugal	195.259	0.985	0.101	155.289	0.990	0.097
Romania	230.765	0.983	0.114	195.788	0.986	0.103
Slovakia	97.361	0.994	0.070	107.579	0.994	0.068
Slovenia	106.443	0.993	0.077	105.260	0.993	0.077
Spain	119.165	0.997	0.051	54.060	0.997	0.047
The Netherlands	179.973	0.988	0.104	128.576	0.992	0.087
United Kingdom	164.117	0.993	0.082	133.203	0.991	0.089
West Germany	349.464	0.988	0.103	253.060	0.982	0.124

Note: 1. Degrees of freedom = 15.

Annex 2



Graphic 2.1 The variation in Equal Labour (%) by the initial level of variable (1990)



Graphic 2.2 The variation in Household modernity (%) by the initial level of variable (1990)

Annex 3



Graphic 3.2 Changes in Household modernity by cohort in Western Europe



Graphic 3.1. Changes in Houschold modernity by cohorts in Eastern Europe



Graphic 3.4 Changes in Equal labour by cohorts in Western Europe



Graphic 3.3 Changes in Equal labour by cohorts in Eastern Europe



Graphic 3.6 Changes in household modernity by cohorts and sex (male) in Western Europe



Graphic 3.5 Changes in Household modernity by cohorts and sex (male) in Eastern Europe



Graphic 3.8 Changes in Equal labour by cohorts and sex (female) in Western Europe



Graphic 3.7 Changes in Equal labour by cohorts and sex (female) in Eastern Europe



Graphic 3.10 Changes in Household modernity by cohorts and sex (female) in Western Europe



Graphic 3.9 Changes in Household modernity by cohorts and sex (female) in Eastern Europe

YOUNG PEOPLE AND EUROPEAN VALUES

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This study is a very general and synthetically view about values orientations of Romanian yong people. The whoh paper proves a Romanian youth attached to the most significant. European values such as democracy, greedam, solidarity, rust in other nations and tolerance toward ethnic minorities and towarce other minorities – racial, aexual, religions et. This approach is also about the way wich young people is relatece with the main ethical values. For example, concerning the responsability was indentified two categories of young: a. the young with a „social behavios", placing on th top of the list the needs'and expectations of others; b. the young displaying a „tradisionalist" or „romantic" behovior and who primarily appeal to a series of tradisional values such as honor, morality, integrityx, dignity.

Intoduction

This study has an main objective the construction of a socio-moral portrait of the young in Romania, containing the main characteristics which distinguish the Romanian youth from the rest of the population. In order to achieve this main objective the authors took into account two specific objectives:

a. The identification of the main socio-cultural sub-groups within the Romanian youth which display relatively separate value hierarchies within the large category of Romanian youth, who exhibit their own value systems which guide their attitudes and behavior.

b. The identification of the place of the Romanian youth within the contemporary European value system by estimating the socio-political and moral values which have lost some of their importance during the last few years, as well as the values which should be defended and restored today.

For the purpose of achieving these aims we have conducted a sociological investigation at national level, on a representative sample of approximately 2000 young from 21 counties from the following geo-cultural areas of the country: Moldova, Dobrogea, Muntenia, Oltenia, Banat, Crisana-Maramures, Transylvania and Bucharest. The conclusions of this paper were also based on the results of other researches having the same topic conducted by research institutes in Romania, France, Hungary and Poland.

As a broad remark we could state that the prevailing moral and civic values of the youth in nowadays Romania display the three fundamental axes of life: family, work and inter-personal relations, especially love and friendship.

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All these together constitute the leading values for the current and future behavior of the young.

We can also notice a relative state of value confusion of the Romanian youth which equally leads to an unequal manifesting of the growing-up process, inclusive on the formation of moral and civic conscience.

The youth in Romania significantly guide their behavior and reactions firstly **according to their own beliefs,** but also to the way in which, the community would react. Thus, the conforming behaviors seem to have their importance in the moral lead of the young, at least at the level of social perception.

A third very broad conclusion refers to politics and touches upon its powerful degrading on the evaluation scale of the juvenile population, as well as on the scale of the whole population. As we well know, Romanians and especially the young expected from the new regime after December 1989 a series of clear decisions and options, capable to ensure a bearable transition of this difficult period of social, economical and spiritual change. Unfortunately the weak efficiency of the Romanian political system, no matter the color of the various governments, led to powerfully demoralizing and alienating effects, including the large devaluing of the political on the population value scale. Accordingly, nowadays the political, politics and politicians are ranked the last in the hierarchy of the values appreciated by the young. Moreover, oftentimes the elements of the political system are envisaged as the main causes of the current economic and moral degrading.

On the first places in the hierarchy of the aspects which the young consider as essential for their lives is the family, money, work and love.

In so far as work is concerned we notice that, although it is considered as a fundamental form of accomplishing one's personality, still, the young seem to value more powerfully the extrinsic factor, such as money and the work place safety, and only secondly the intrinsic factors, such as self-accomplishment through professional fulfillment. On the last place as a work value comes the work's social utility. The young nowadays have become more individualistic and materialist (in the sense of being interested in the material side) comparatively with the young of the previous periods of time. It is possible that they are simply more honest and give less conforming answers to the social investigator's questions, comparatively with the communist epoch conformism.

In what follows we will stress in a synthetic manner the main results of the study regarding the following aspects:

1. The universe of the values and civic attitudes of the young in Romania.
2. The Romanian youth and identity values.
3. Manifestations of responsibility – as value and attitude – among the Romanian youth.

4. The young and the marginal cultural values.
5. The rural youth: elements for a special psycho-moral profile.
6. Tendencies in the evolution of the socio-moral values in Europe and the place of the Romanian young from the point of view of these tendencies.

The universe of the values and civic attitudes of the young in Romania

A first aspect concerns the civic priorities in Romania in the youth's view, which means the attitudes and civic actions which could improve the present situation. According to the national research, the majority of the young people consider that it is extremely important in order to improve the situation to respect the law, the maintenance of order in the country, human rights, the denouncing of fiscal frauds as well as the fight against any type of violence. At a closer analysis of the type of mentality supposed by the aforementioned attitudes we notice the stress on order as compared to freedom, on the respect of the norms and the limiting of the excessive manifestations of the individual freedom. We appreciate that this type of relating is not caused by any inclination towards totalitarianism of the Romanian young, but that it arises from the shocking remark that the laws and order and various types of norms have alarmingly not been respected in Romania during the past few years. This reality thus gives birth to reactions of an «authoritarian» type and not to any special attachment for totalitarian solutions of maintaining order and respecting of norms. **The balance between order and freedom is, for the moment, in favor of order,** given its extreme lack at the level of the entire society. We consider that as long as the attitudes and mentalities «pro-order» and «pro-limitation» of the excessive manifestations of individual freedom seek to ensure the public good and the defense of the others' sphere of freedom we can attach the label of «civic» to these attitudes without being wrong. The lack of harmonization and even the crisis in the normativity sphere during the past years induce in the collective mentality, including that of the young, the need to denounce all serious forms of law infringing, from the revealing and condemning the large fiscal frauds to the oppositions against all forms of violence.

In so far as the civism is concerned, just like in the case of other socio-moral and political values, the distance between **the intentional and the actional is quite significant.** Thus we appreciate that civism seems today rather a socio-politic ideal, rather than a reality in Romania; it seems «activated» only in some «social oases», the rest remaining, in the best case, **at a level of potentiality.**

In order to have a real democratic behavior it is not enough to have civic mentality and attitudes, which it seems that many young have assimilated, but something more is also necessary, and that is the effective implication in the

defense of public good, in one word civic participation. In modern times the best way for the **civic participation** is the association of people in various organizations or associations independent from the government or power And what these NGOs should primarily seek is **solidarity and protection.**

The potential of civic involvement of the young in Romania was revealed by the answers regarding the organizations (associations) in which they would like to activate. The result was that on the first places in the options concerning the civic involvement of the young were the associations for defending human rights, the one for the environment protection and humanitarian solidarity, all of them together make up a set of value oriented options which are in a perfect agreement with the abovementioned desirable civic attitudes.

An important role in expressing the desire of participation is occupied by the activities and organizations with a sports profile. Those, even if lacking en explicit civic character, are specific and necessary at a young age, not only for the development of physical skills, but also for the **development of sociability and competition spirit,** moral values which prove to be so useful for a good adaptation to the requirements of modern times.

On the second place we find the youth's option for organizations and activities which imply the defense the interests of the citizens, namely the associations for religious charity, fight against racism, organizations for the defense and preservation of culture and even the desire of participation in the school councils.

A different situation is registered in the case of civic implication through the means of **political parties and trade unions,** the institutional mistrust manifesting this time through the **cvasi-general refuse of the young to take part in the community's life,** in the political or trade union sphere.

Elements of civic activity are found in the analysis of the young's attitude towards **four serious problems of humanity:** globalization, interethnic conflicts, conflicts between the rich and poor, conflict between generations.

The evaluation of the seriousness of these problems for Romania reveals the fact that what firstly alarms the young are the increase of the difference between the rich and poor, the environment's pollution and the decrease of the importance of the national culture.

A second level of seriousness concerns the problems related to the inter-group or inter-identity relationships, be they interethnic, interracial or intergeneration relationships.

A third type of serious problems evaluated by the young refers **to globalization** with its two subjacent tendencies: **americanization** and the increase of the multinational trusts. Nevertheless, neither of those seems to constitute for the time being a very serious threat in the young's perception, comparatively with the perception of the young in other contemporary societies,

including the Western ones. So such anti-globalist stands appeared in Romania as well, although they **are still rudimentary, naïve and confuse,** representing shy rejection signs of the intrusion of the foreign companies in the national economy, sporadically being denounced the consequences in the field of economic life, the environment degrading (unemployment, poverty, pollution), harming of the national sovereignty and the decrease of the importance of the national culture. In spite of the incipient stage of the antiglobalist social positions half of the investigated young consider that „the rich West exploits the poor East", while about a third appreciate that „the Eastern European countries could not be an equal partner for the West".

Another important step towards a real civic behavior presupposes the **appropriation of tolerance as a principle for relating with the others**, as individuals, groups or communities. To the extent in which in one society the number of the individuals which manifest toleration s reasonably high that society qualifies as being authentically democratic.

If tolerance is the first step towards a civic democracy and pluralism in any given society (in the everyday life, politics, culture etc.), **intolerance,** on the contrary, can lead and oftentimes in the history did lead to totalitarian manifestations. There must be stressed that the totalitarian type of attitudes does not necessarily refer solely to the political regime, but also to the non-accepting or weak accepting of the opinion, habits, culture or even color differences, differences of physical look etc. All these attitudes can be found in the Romanian society, in the groups, communitiesor individuals', or even at the level of some public institutions or private firms. The discrimination on age, sex, skin color, religion, bodily weight bases are only some examples of manifestations of intolerance in society. We could also say that a society in which the dominant attitudes are those of rejection and intolerance towards the minorities (which go beyond the socially accepted patterns) is not a democratic one, even if formally, the laws and Constitution could create the impression that difference and pluralism are accepted and even defended.

The tolerance of the young regarding minorities other than the ethnic ones, was analyzed through the answers to the question: „Would you accept as neighbors individuals belonging to some groups considered as more or less marginal «social outsiders»?" By naming these minority groups we reached the result revealing that although **no social minority benefits from a maximum tolerance on behalf of the young,** there are some categories of people who, even if different from the «average citizen» are tolerated by the vast majority of people: **people with a different skin color and those with large families.** Also, the **political extremists,** be they leftists or rightists get similar results of tolerance, highly enough to allow us to infer that the Romanian youth is not intolerant from a political point of view. The highest if not the maximum intolerance had the alcoholic and the drug addicts. Also a

very low tolerance was registered in the case of persons having a criminal record and homosexuals, from here resulting that the infringement of the Penal Code and sexual normality are more difficult to «digest» and accepted by the Romanian youth as compared to other physical or spiritual differences.

The Romanian youth and identity values

The importance given by the Romanian young to the **national identity values** is quite significant and can be compared to the other socio-political values. From this point of view probably that the Romanian youth belong to the categories of a patriarchal and national type rather than to the cosmopolitan ones. This, in spite of the fact that the young population is powerfully attached to Europeanism and cosmopolitanism. The most important national values in the eyes of the Romanian youth are: the national unity, the country's economic independence, cultural richness, the maintenance of the national traditions and the political sovereignty of the country.

It should also be signaled that the necessity of securing the borders is not taken into account by the young, or at least not to the extent required by the European standards. **The more permissive thinking of the Romanian youth towards immigration and towards foreigners generally** is also confirmed by other indicators which will be analyzed further on, as well as the acceptance of the immigration phenomena on the Romanian territory and especially the tolerance towards other ethnic groups and other nations.

The criteria for ethnic identification include, in the perception of the Romanian young, objective factors like the language, as well as affective elements such as national pride or sacrifice for the country. Synthesizing the answer received at the question: „How should someone be in order to be considered Romanian?' we obtained at least four types of ethnic markers:

a. elements of self-identification which regard the feeling of belonging to a certain ethnic group; also in the sphere of psychology of the people are included other identity markers: to be ready to give their life for Romania, love the Romanian flag, know and love the Romanian culture and to be considered by the people in their proximity as Romanians.

b. another significant category of identification criteria is the linguistic one, basic objective criterion in differentiating and self-perception of identification.

c. a third category of criteria of national identification is represented by the so-called «benefit and respect of the law». In this case the Romanian young have included criteria such as: «to respect the Romanian law», «to exercise their right to vote in Romania» and the be «in agreement with the Romanian state».

d. a last type of identity ethnic predictors comprise what is understood by the objectifying of the national juridical status: in order to be Romanian an individual must live in Romania or at least one of the parents has to be

Romanian, or that individual must have been born in Romania or have the Romanian nationality.

In short, for the Romanian youth the ethnic identification is a concept which refers firstly to the free will and own option, secondly to the community of the desired or inherited language and thirdly to the respect of the same norms and the benefit from the same politic and civic rights. We find **in these identity markers the great political values of the modern Europe transferred in the field of ethnic identity: democracy, liberty, participation and freedom respect.**

In so far as the **attitude towards other ethnic groups are concerned, it can also offer relevant indications regarding the degree of tolerance and xenophobia within the society.** It was oftentimes said about Romania in a negative way of relating with the foreigners that its people have an excess of hospitality, even towards the enemies.(Anghel P.,„O istorie a literaturii române, apud Bădescu, I., *Teoria latenței*, Bucureşti Ed. Isogep-Evxin 1999 p. 234) defined this special characteristic of the Romanians as a «deficit of aggressiveness», the Romanians not hitting or attacking but very seldom and as having excessive trust in the foreigners. In the same sense Ilie Badescu (Bădescu, I., Op. cit., p. 234) talks about a high coefficient of «trusting expectations» of the Romanian population, visible until today.

In what follows we will reveal some elements which have resulted from the **research of the youth in Romania and Hungary** regarding the problems of the interethnic relations, tolerance and trust towards other ethnic groups and nations in the two countries*.

In so far as the **perceptions and representations about other ethnic groups or nations of the young in Romania and Hungary** are concerned there must be stressed that the prejudices, suspicions and exclusion processes do not disappear once treaties are signed between two countries, nations or official and formal statements of friendship and mutual respect.

In the analysis of the interethnic relations and representations we have used the following indicators: ***a.* the trust of the sone in various nations or ethnic groups; *b.* tolerance towards certain ethnic minorities and *c.* permissiveness towards immigrants and immigration**.

a. The young's trust in various nations or ethnic groups.

In so far as the Romanian young are concerned the research revealed the following types and degrees of interethnic trust: the nations which enjoy **the greatest trust in the eyes of the Romanian young** are the English, the French,

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* The research in Romania (The Institute of Sociology of the Romanian Academy of Sciences) on a representative sample of 2 049 young subjects was carried out simultaneously and with the same instruments as in Hungary, on a sample of over 3 000 young subjects (Institute of Minorities Studies, Budapest). D. Banciu, I. Petre, E. Balica were responsible for the project in Romania and I. Szabo and A. Orkeny were responsible in Hungary.

the Americans and, at some distance the Germans; the nations which enjoy a **medium amount of trust** are the Hungarians, the Chinese, the African Black; in descending order the following nations and ethnic groups enjoy **no trust at all:** the Roma, (Gypsies) the Russians and the Arabs.

The recognition of the others, their positive appreciation implicitly supposes the existence of a certain degree of trust in a particular ethnic or national group. The phenomenon of recognition, although present, is unequal in the social representations of the Romanian young, some peoples, nations or ethnic groups being better represented regarding the (positive) recognition. There is at the same time a group of ethnic or national communities which lack recognition in the eyes of the Romanian young, the most significant negative image being registered in the case of the Roma (Gypsies). Practically, the distance between the total trust and total distrust is enormous: **three quarters of the young in Romania declare that they have no trust whatsoever in the Roma population.**

The situation of the Roma is, in fact, a relevant example for the Romanian ethnic space but not only. In other European countries, including Hungary, the image of the Roma in the public perception is a very negative one. In this matter there must be noted that there are not many ethnic groups which suffered as a result of the negative social stereotypes the majority have in relation to them like the Gypsies and the Jews; the scope of these negative stereotypes reaching the European as well as the international space. To the two groups named above maybe another has been added, more recently, which is that of Arabs.

b. the self-recognition represents, together with the national one, a significant step in the processes of harmonization of the interethnic and inter-nations climate of social climat in general.

In a certain sense the self-recognition precedes the recognition by the others and even influences it. The trust in the value of one's own nation, and in the national culture induces a certain attitude of trust on behalf of the others. On the contrary, an ethnic behavior of continuous self-depreciation triggers a low evaluation on behalf of the other communities with which a community comes in contact. But the reverse is also true: the good opinion about oneself is sometimes decisively influenced by the trust that the others manifest in that someone as nation, ethnic group or individual; it is the image in the mirror (to look oneself in the others' eyes) which has determined so many times the colonized to feel inferior to the colonizers, women inferior to men, black people inferior to the white etc. From the perspective of the self-knowledge of the Romanians the present research has revealed something not necessarily positive: the Romanian young do not trust totally their own nation. Thus, at the question: „How much do you trust the Romanians?" the young have answered

44,2 % a lot, 38,9 % little, 16,9 % no trust whatsoever. Thus, we can identify a **quite widely spread feeling of self-humiliation among the Romanian young nowadays.**

Comparing the scale of inter-nations trust in Romania and Hungary we notice that in Hungary the top of trust is constituted by Germans , while in Romania by French and English. We can also notice that except for the perception of Germans the Hungarian young are less trustful in other nations than the Romanians. Here it is concretely proven that 'trustful expectation' of the Romanians, as compared to the Hungarians' circumspect attitude towards the foreigners. Generally we can state that the main feature of the inter-nations phenomena of relating is that in Romania the attitude of interethnic trust and tolerance is much more widely present than in Hungary, at least in the case of the young. The largest differences between the two countries arise from the attitudes towards the Roma, French and Arabs.

c. Mutual trust: of Romanians towards the Hungarians and of the Hungarians towards the Romanians.

The phenomenon of mutual trust between the two nations is extremely important, bearing socio-political consequences for both countries, even more significant since in Romania there is an important ethnic Hungarian minority. This stresses once more the way in which the mutual trust between the two nations is manifested in the eyes of the young in the two countries. Practicaly the Romanian young have got much higher grades than the ones in Hungary: the number of the Romanian young who trust the Hungarians to a large **measure is over three times higher than that of the Hungarian young who trust Romanians.** From this point of view the young Hungarians in Hungary place us on the last but one place on the interethnic trust scale, the Roma being the last. The differences are striking also if we compare the number of the young in Hungary having no trust whatsoever in Romanians with the number of Romanians having no trust whatsoever in Hungarians: 74,6 % as opposed to 38,1 %, which means almost double. This tendency is in fact similar to that of the young Hungarians who live in Romania and it expresses an hign deficit of positive perception of the Romanians.

The attitude towards immigrants and immigration has revealed an index with a high value of the hospitality degree towards foreigners of the Romanians', and, in any case, higher than that of theHungarius teen – agers. The permissiveness scale of immigration in descending order looks as follows: Romanians who live in other countries, African Blacks, Hungarians, Chinese, Albanians from Kosovo, Arabs, Roma. Once more the significantly unfavorable attitude towards the Roma and Arabs is confirmed as well as a high or reasonable attitude towards other ethnic groups or nations. In so far as the degree of reciprocal acceptability of immigration is concerned, immigration of

Romanians towards Hungary and of Hungarians towards Romania we noticed that the Romanians would accept the Hungarians as immigrant in a percentage which is ten times higher as compared to the Hungarians' acceptability of Romanians as potential immigrants.

Manifestations of responsibility - as value and attitude - among the Romanian youth

Among the important notions which characterize the young's behavior and which have undergone fundamental mutations during the transition period is that of responsibility which expresses the act of their involvement in the social interaction process through the assumption of the consequences relating to the results of their actions. In the present study the notion of responsibility was coded through a series of indicators such as: the degree of the young's involvement in the adopting of some important decisions concerning their lives, the main moral features which define or circumscribe a young's responsibility, the main factors which shape his behavior, the young's attitudes towards the deviant and antisocial manifestations which are morally or legally sanctioned.

In so far as the young's degree of involvement in taking personal decisions is concerned, the present study, such as other researches carried out by other institutions in the field, has revealed the fact that the **young consider themselves involved to a large extent in the decision-taking process** which regard their own lives, fact which equals an **independent, caution and safety** oriented attitude. Nevertheless, there are still many who exhibit a less responsible attitude and who consider that „caution does not lead to anything good given the fact that the events and decision-taking depend on external factors and not on us".

The most appreciated by the young moral features are the ones that they would like to cultivate in their children in order to facilitate their success in life.

On the first places we find good manners, responsibility, tolerance and respect for the others. Very closely they are followed by the characteristics referring to the pleasure of work, independence and perseverance. Almost all those values have predominantly instrumental functions and they can serve for a better adapting to the transition's difficult conditions and prolonged social crisis, prevailing in front of the so-called „expressive" moral qualities such as imagination, personal charm, popularity and which cans serve less as instruments for social success and adapting.

A weak representation is also registered in the case of the civic values such as moral integrity, self-assertion, reciprocity and trust in God.

In so far as the **responsibility for their own success is concerned the young in today's Romania seem to assume to a large extent their own failures and successes.** Thus, for the obtained successes the young consider that the main merit is their own or their family's, while factors such as: school, institutions of the present society , luck or chance play only a secondary role. In so far as the failures are concerned, the young attribute those to their own mistakes, and, to a certain degree, to the society, bad luck or lack of chance. It is surprising though that school, the institutions as such are perceived as playing a minor role regarding the success or failure of the young which could also mean a certain «contesting» of the present manner in which school is involved in ensuring the access of the young into the social life.

Evaluating hierarchically the factors which guide most the young and their behaviors we made the following scale:

1. Personal beliefs.
2. Moral Norms.
3. Personal advantages.
4. Legislation.
5. Religious norms.
6. Reaction of the community.

It comes out that the behavior manner represents the result of personal factors (level of aspiration, beliefs, convictions, habits and motivations) as well as of socio-cultural ones (moral and religious principles, the group's influences or the reaction of the community, normative influences and requirements).

The research has revealed a large consensus of the young concerning the major role of the personal beliefs and advantages in the orientation of their behavior. The young perceive the way of structuring of their behavior in life firstly from the perspective of the **internal dimension of the social control (self-control),** represented by the socialization and internalization of the beliefs and personal advantages and only afterwards from the perspective of the external dimension of social control, represented by morals, religion, legislation and social reaction. This proves **the trust of the young in their capacities, motivations and personal aspirations evaluated as more important in their orientation than the moral, religious and legislative principles.**

To sum up, one can identify at least two categories of young which relate relatively differently to the notion of responsibility: ***a.* the young with a «social» behavior** which place on the top of the list the others' needs and expectations, promoting social engagement, caution and safety in their actions and who reject the deviant or violent behavior; ***b.* the young displaying a «traditionalist» or «romantic» behavior and who primarily appeal to a**

series of traditional values such as honor, morality, integrity, dignity and less to competence, merit and social contribution in order to define responsibility.

The young and the marginal cultural values

In the search of an exit from the every day routine the young orient themselves more and more towards spaces in which they non-conventionally experience the social and cultural cooperation, towards the so-called «spaces of re-composition» or spaces which can make them escape the every day monotony, conforming and the misery of the political sphere, towards «spaces of creation» which offer them the possibility to express their attitude towards the present social and political order. From these groups one can distinguish the music groups which can lack a real success among the great music consumers, but which manage through their message and through the adopted artistic practices to concentrate around themselves a large number of fans, gradually becoming generators of behavior models and values for their fans. Found at the border line between normality and deviance these cultural minorities, also called «periphery cultures», are the expression of the desire of reverting of the individual life influencing processes by the institutions which have a socializing role (family, school, mass-media etc.). Organized as a response to a general state of boredom, mediocrity and poverty of the soul's aspirations and feelings the minority cultural groups offer the young the possibility to satisfy the needs specific to their age, including that of being different, that of having a little bizarre and exhibitionist identity. However these are identity values in the most obvious sense of the word. Thus, the techno-styles, rock, rap and alternative groups form nucleuses of minority culture but becoming more and more present in the Romanian social reality.

One of the objectives that the authors of the present study had in mind were the identification of the attitude (tolerance) of the **Romanian young towards these minority cultural groups.** We started as usual from the identification of the music styles preferred by the young, noticing that almost half of the young prefer the dance, hip-hop and rock music, styles which are also the ones promoted by the radio-TV channels. Less adepts among the young have the styles punk, rave and rap.

Placed in the situation of having to express their sympathy towards six minority cultural groups the Romanian young have structured their positions as follows: **the largest sympathy was registered in the case of the rappers, alternatives and rockers, groups which could be considered as moderate from the musical, socio-behavioral model offer and social and political message point of view, as compared for instance with the punks or skinheads** which have accumulated 3,4-3,5 % values of sympathy, being associated, as we well know, with the extreme right and even with neo-nazis.

Elements for a psycho-moral portrait of the young in the country-side

Corroborating results of researches carried out by the Center of Researches on Problems of the Young, by the Institute of Sociology of the Romanian Academy and by the Psychology Faculty of the „Spiru Haret" University we obtained a certain profile, relatively specific for the rural youth which includes the following average features:

- from the varied range of aspirations and projections about work and life it resulted that **the young in the rural areas are more realistic, more restrained in their desires and more rational when it comes down to means, instruments with which they could accomplish their goals.**
- they are **more scrupulous and more conforming** concerning the respect of norms and laws and less permissive with those who have inadequate behavior in society, they are less non-conforming.
- comparatively with the young in urban areas, the young in the rural areas seem more preoccupied by and sooner inclined towards accomplishment through work rather than through entertainment, fact which allows their being characterized as responsible. Although generally for the young in nowadays Romania work occupies a central place, **for the young in rural areas work is placed on an even higher step than for the young in urban areas.**
- the study of national or ethnic identity values reveals a rural youth which is more balanced but also more sensitive to the traditional values, customs and habits.
- according to the way in which the crisis situations are perceived, crisis with which the young are confronted at present the young in rural areas seem less panicked and therefore more resisting to stress, but also less idealist.
- the attitude towards the change of governments during the past years denotes **a lower degree of critical spirit,** probably out of reflex, and a higher timidity as well as a persistence of the inferiority complexes towards the other young.
- the lower propensity for the modern facilities of technique, including IT, results not only from the belief of its uselessness, but also from the lack of financial means for their procuring.
- the lower quality of life of the young in the rural areas is also reflected in the lower level of their education ins school. The research has revealed that the chances of access on the medium and higher level of instruction are quite diminished in the case of the rural young. Maybe that is why some young prefer to place on a second position their need for higher school instruction, so that, as the national statistics prove **the school abandoning in the rural**

areas has alarmingly extended, increasing thus the social gap as opposed to the quality of life in urban areas.

- according to the way in which the need for modesty and sociability is appreciated it implicitly results that the young in the rural areas are themselves more sociable, **less inclined towards infatuation an more modest in behavior and self-appreciating.**
- particularly from the researches carried out by the specialists within the Faculty of Psychology it came out that certain psychic features are better represented among the young in the rural areas, features such as: **seriousness, perseverance, depth in dealing with the life issues.**
- the comparative psycho-sociological studies have revealed that most of the young in the rural areas enter earlier the process of maturation and confrontation with difficult problems of life; due to that particular reason they have the tendency to assume more intensely responsibility of their own acts, own successes and failures, but also to solve themselves, without any external help their problems. **The real degree of independence in the decision-taking process and especially in solving the problems is superior to the young in rural areas.** Those learn earlier to manage on their own, to survive and progress, reason for which they are more independent and more adaptable to the oftentimes difficult conditions of the present life in Romania.
- although the young in the rural areas are more disadvantaged that those from the urban ones from many points of view (reduced opportunities of study, work, transport, entertainment etc.), they do not display an even more acute feeling of frustration. Generally all young feel today in Romania slightly marginalized and disadvantaged. When present though the frustration of the young in the rural areas refers to the fact that they do not value as the previous generations did the traditionally rural way of life, with its rhythm and its constraints: thus, numerous households tasks which become the young's after the allotment of the family roles increase their feelings of dissatisfaction, displease, even of desire to escape from that way of living towards which they no longer feel attached or attracted. The lower disposition for the rural way of living, especially for the agricultural and household works affect the individual lives of the young as well as their integration in the community, their support for the perpetuation and development of the village.
- in all difficult situations with which they are confronted (instruction and formation, job-search, practicing one's job, family problems etc.) the young in the rural areas **favor the importance of ambition, this being considered as an essential condition for the success of any action of the young person. The positive value of ambition does not limit to the stage of favorable opinion, the young in the rural areas being more ambitious**

and persistent when following and accomplishing a bigger or smaller goal, more fighting for a cause. This quality has developed more in the case of the young in villages since they realize that they cannot survive unless they insist, persist and they can succeed in life only by their own forces and competences. Their ambition developed also through the becoming aware of the fact that given the oftentimes harsh competition they have to surpass alone the numerous handicaps.

Tendencies in the evolution of Europe's socio-moral values and the place of the Romanian young regarding these tendencies

The relation with the socio-moral political values of contemporary Europe situates the following tendencies on the first place:

a. **during the past years** in Europe as well as in Romania we witness a significant **regression of some traditional moral values such as**: honesty, politeness, common good respect, family spirit, feeling of duty, equality.

b. **the material values overwhelm** today by their importance, placing on a second level the spiritual values, such as the psycho-moral, political or civic.

c. **the world** of the young appears today **more restless and uncertain, having the cult of money and of individual success.**

d. today, in the eyes of the young, as well as in those of the mature population **prevail the individual values** to the prejudice **of the collectivist ones.**

e. however the desirable social value element seems to be rather of the **«post-materialism» type,** the people, the young feeling though the need of **going back to some of the traditional** values, but also the **maintenance of some typical for the modern** times: honesty, justice, politeness, freedom and competition.

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THE ROMANIANS' SOCIAL REPRESENTATION OF NATO AND EU

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There is a wide spread idea nowadays (according to European level surveys and assertions) saying that Romanians show the highest sympathy (from all EU candidate countries) for the European and NATO integration processes because they are among the poorer populations on the continent. We thus tried, first of all, to see whether we could actually find a link between the high support for the integration process and the low economic status of Romanians. At the same time, we attempted to analyze the relationship between this high support and the Romanians' level of information concerning the two institution we are trying to be a part of: The European Union and NATO. The paper will try to show in what way and with what intensity is the Romanians attitude towards NATO and EU influenced by poverty and by their knowledge about these two international organizations. The first part of this research is a secondary analysis of a prestigious biannual national-level survey whereas the second part consists of a research concerning NATO and EU social representations among students.

First Part
Secondary Analysis on Public Opinion Barometer Octomber, 2002

Introduction

"Integration" has been a very fashionable word in the last five or six years, in Romania. Although there is a lot of public debate concerning this subject, public opinion surveys show that Romanians have a low information level when it comes to NATO and EU. They express their sympathy for different international structures but they do not know – for instance – what the EU institutions are or what the NATO mission is. Moreover, they are not informed about what the process of "integration" consists of - from a military or economical point of view. International public opinion surveys also show that Romanians' support for "integration politics" has increased in the last few years, while decreasing in the other European countries. How can this phenomenon be explained? Could there be a link between the Romanians' positive attitude towards integration politics (NB: the highest in Europe) and their low welfare level, their economic expectations? Can we rightfully assume that behind this positive attitude belies in fact the strive for economic benefits?

In order to answer to these questions and to reveal some attitude patterns among regular people, we chose to conduct a secondary analysis on a national bi-annual survey: The Public Opinion Barometer (POB). Ever since 1994, POB is a "traditional" survey led by the most prestigious research institutes in Romania, with Open Society Foundation support. The survey is based on an

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omnibus questionnaire and it includes social, political and economical items, as well as questions concerning attitudes, values and every-day aspects of people's lives. More recently, in order to reflect the integration process, POB has taken into consideration people's attitudes towards NATO and EU. We thus developed our secondary analysis on the Public Opinion Barometer issue of October, 2002.

POB Methodology

POB is based on a variable sample that has increased (since the year 2000) from 1200 to approximately 2200 individuals. Consequently, the number of questionnaire items and the overall duration of the interviews has also increased (the duration of one interview is about 60 minutes now). In 1995, the sampling schema has been standardized making data comparison possible. The sample is based on four stratum criteria: Romanian cultural area (18 categories); type of residential area (urban/rural); size of urban area (4 categories) and respectively level of rural area development (3 categories). POB data is representative for the Romanian population of over 18 years of age with a sample error of +/- 2, 3%.

Hypothesis

We will analyze Romanians' opinions about NATO and EU in relation to: (1) the life standard and the expectations related to personal welfare, (2) the level of information about NATO and EU.

We presume that the relation between the life standard and the level of information (as independent variables) - on one hand, and the individual opinions about NATO and EU (as dependent variable) - on the other, is mediated by the perceived economical situation of the individual himself, of the group he belongs to and of his country. In other words, the attitude towards NATO and EU is influenced: (1) in what the economic dimension is concerned: by the perceived welfare situation of the individual, of the group he is belongs to (neighbors, relatives, friends) and of the country (the general economic situation); (2) in what the informational dimension is concerned: by the informational level in general, and also by the sources of information (personal sources, group sources or media sources).

We also assume – in a broader sense – that NATO / EU social representations are mainly confused (not clearly distinctive in individuals minds). It is highly probable that individuals have a positive image on all kinds of "western institutions" and they accept them uncritically as being "better" or "welfare providing".

First of all we will analyze in what way does the perceived / real *life standard* influence individual's opinion about NATO and EU.

Life standard

Comparative surveys among certain European countries (*ex. The Eurobarometer* in the candidate countries, research initiated by The European Commission) show that Romanians score highest when it comes to positive perception and trust investment in the European Union: 80 % declare that EU is "good", 70% have a positive image towards EU, 74% trust EU[1]. At the same time (and not surprisingly, some would argue), the Romanian life standard is one of the lowest in Europe: the annual income per capita is about 1500 euros, compared to 3170 euros - the average individual annual income in other candidate countries[2]. Therefore, we cannot find Gunter Verheugen[3]'s declaration related to Eurobarometer results surprising: "*most of the inhabitants of the candidate countries support the integration process of their country in the EU and they want to enjoy the benefits of this integration in their daily life*"[4]. At this point, it is important to notice and stress words such as "benefits" and "daily life" because public debate in Romania also claims that Romanians' image of NATO and EU is less related to geo-strategical and macro-economic factors and more to concrete and daily benefits which seem to predominate. In other words a major part of public opinion analysts in Romania argue that the Romanians' positive image of NATO and EU is strictly related to personal economic advantages (this means that the individual dimension of perception would prevail over the national dimension).

In order to test these presumptions we used POB October 2002 data, and we analyzed subjective and objective indicators of the Romanians' life standard: (1) the individuals' perception of their own life standard today and also compared to 1989; (2) the individuals' perception of their life standard as compared to their neighbors, (3) how individuals think that "things are going on in our country" and how they "appreciate – in general - the lives of people living in Romania"; (4) the average individual income, as declared by the respondents; (5) the degree of housing comfort (number of rooms, the presence of hot water and / or heating in the houses and so on).

Data Analysis

For methodological reasons we divided the POB sample in two groups of subjects, using as criteria the answer to the following questions: "In general, your opinion about EU is "very bad", "bad", "good" or "very good"?" and "In general, your opinion about NATO is "very bad", "bad", "good" or "very good"?". We made a distinction between the subjects who had a rather a

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[1] The data was collected using a questionnaire realized around Europe, with a sample of 12000 individuals, in October, 2001 (http://europa.eu.int).
[2] source: The European Comission, 1998.
[3] the commissar for European enlargement
[4] *apud.* Gilles Ferreol (2002). "The Central and Eastern Europena Countries in front of European Union Enlargement: Stakes and Perspectives"; in Adrian Neculau (coord.). **Us and Europe**. Iasi: Polirom.

positive opinion about NATO/EU (those whose answer was either "good" or "very good") and the subjects who had a rather negative opinion about NATO/EU (those whose answer was either "bad" or "very bad"). To simplify the analysis we named the first group – group A and the last one – group B. Taking into account the above-mentioned distinction, we will try to correlate the Romanians' opinions about NATO/EU to their life standard (on the three dimensions that we have discussed above: personal, group and national dimension).

For the **first dimension** – the personal one – we considered questions concerning: 1) how the respondents appreciated their own life, their life standard, their money, their general income, their financial situation, as compared to the past, but also to the future; 2) their objective life standard, indicators revealing the real family income in the last month, housing comfort etc.; 3) how they perceived the benefits of the integration (having in view their chances of getting a job, of getting paid etc.)

Table 1 shows the results of a comparative analysis on both considered groups (A and B) in relation to their perceived life standard. Subjects from group B perceived their own economical situation more negatively, were more unsatisfied with their lives, more pessimistic than the others about their future and, objectively speaking, poorer. It is interesting to note that even though individuals from group B admitted (but in less proportion than those from group A) that their personal wages would probably grow after the EU integration, they tended to evaluate the effects of the "integration process" on their personal life more *negatively* than the others.

Table 1. The results of the comparative analysis among groups of people with positive opinions about UE (group A) and respectively negative opinions about UE (group B).

	Question POB October 2002	Group A*		Group B	
Perceived life standard	How satisfied are you with the way you live?	↓ ↑	61,6 % 37,6 %	↓ ↑	80,4 % 19,6 %

*In order to simplify the data interpretation we used the sign "↓", for the negative answers (such as „totaly unsatisfied", „not so satisfied", „worse", „will decrease", „negative effects"); the sign "↔ for neutral answers (such as "will be the same" "neither satisfied, or unsatisfied", "will not grow" and "nor will it increase or decrease") and the sign "↑" for the positive answers (such as „very satisfied", „satisfied", „better", „positive effects", „will increase").

	Question POB October 2002	Group A*		Group B	
	How is your life now, as compared to one year ago?	↓ ↔ ↑	31 % 48,6 % 20,1%	↓ ↔ ↑	62,7 % 21,6 % 15,7 %
	How do you think you will live in one year's time?	↓ ↔ ↑	19,5 % 34,8 % 38,2 %	↓ ↔ ↑	43,1 % 25,5 % 17,6 %
	Is your life standard better, worse or the same as in 1989?	↓ ↔ ↑	41,2 % 27,7 % 29 %	↓ ↔ ↑	66,7 % 17,6 % 15,7 %
	How satisfied are you with the money you earn?	↓ ↑	74,7 % 24,5 %	↓ ↑	87,2 % 13,8 %
Integration benefits perception	When Romania will enter the EU, do you think that your income and that of your family will...	↓ ↔ ↑	4,1 % 51,7 % 34 %	↓ ↔ ↑	29,4 % 9,8 % 49 %
	When Romania will enter the EU, do you think that your chances to find a job will...	↓ ↔ ↑	4,6 % 32,9 % 17,2 %	↓ ↔ ↑	25,5 % 5,9 % 23,5 %
	What kind of effects do you think the EU integration will have on yourself?	↓ ↔ ↑	3,4 % 13,3 % 79,4 %	↓ ↔ ↑	37,3 % 39,2 % 17,6 %

We also found the answers' distribution to the following question extremely revealing: "In all societies there are people who define themselves as being poor and others who define themselves as being rich. Where would you fit on the following scale? – from 1 = "poor" to 10 = "rich". Nobody from group A (those with positive opinions about NATO / EU) nor from group B (those with negative opinions about NATO / EU) declared to be "rich" so there are practically no "9 " and "10" values on the graphic. Those from group B tended to evaluate themselves as being poorer than those belonging to group A, and, as we can see in *Graphic 1,* there are more answers cumulated under the no. "5" value. We should also note the high interest of the respondents in the above-mentioned topic (questions related to poverty), shown by a very small percentage of missing values (non-answers) in group A and inexistent missing

values in group B. This probably shows that this is a topic that people are concerned about and think of very often, since they were eager to answer.





Graphic 1. The perceived level of economic status: Group A and Group B.

Objective indicators sustain the same subjective perception of personal life standard. Consequently, 47,1% of respondents from group B as compared to only 35,9% respondents from group A, don't have a bathroom and 52,9% from B group (as compared to 41,4% from A group) don't have a toilet in their houses. Furthermore, only 15, 7% from group B (27, 6% from group A) have heating in their houses and 17, 6 % from group B (28% from group A) have warm water. At the same time, the average income per capita is lower in group B (approximately 50 euros per month) as compared to group A (approximately 70 euros per month).

In conclusion, on the personal welfare dimension, the respondents who considered themselves as being poor and who actually *are* poorer are also those who have more negative opinions towards NATO / EU and who think more about the negative effects of the "integration process". All of this comes to contradict the idea that Romanians have a more positive image about NATO / EU just *because* they imagine major changes in their personal life standard after the "integration".

In order to analyze the **group dimension** of the life standard perception, we took into consideration the following questions: "How is the life of the people from your town/village now as compared to one year ago?" and "Is your present life standard better, worse or similar to the one of your neighbors and your friends?" The distribution of the answers to these questions was also different among group B and group A: 62, 75% of the respondents from group B (and only 39,1% from group A) considered that in their town/village, people's lives became worse than last year. And 54, 9% from group B (only 27, 85 % from group A) evaluated their personal life standards as being worse than those of their neighbors and friends.

The differences between group A and group B are more significant on the personal dimension than on the group dimension: thus the pessimists are more pessimistic and the optimists are more optimistic when they evaluate their own economic situation than when they evaluate a more general situation (using the group as an anchor).

We can identify the same answering pattern when discussing the perception of the **national life standard.** Those with more negative opinions about NATO and EU also consider that "things are not going well in the country" and appreciate that people's life standard has decreased since 1989. About 86 % from group B (as compared to 50 % from group A) considered that Romania is going in a wrong direction. When saying this, they admitted that they were thinking about the life standard and the unemployment rate. Also 66, 7% of group B (44% of group A) considered that the life standard in the country had decreased compared to one year ago. The pessimists are also pessimistic when it comes to the future. No less than 35,3% from group B (9,9 % from group A) appreciated that the economic situation of the country would be worse

in the future and no more than 17.6% from group B (41,8% - group A) appreciated that the economic situation of the country would improve in the future.

Concerning the effects of the European integration on Romania, *Graphic 2* shows the differences between group A and group B. We can notice that only 4,2% from group A considered that European integration would bring "only negative effects" or "more negative than positive effects" on the country, while 43,1% of the respondents from group B gave the same answers.



	negative	no effects	positive
Group A	4,20%	1,90%	88,80%
Group B	43,10%	13,70%	31,40%

Graphic 2. The perceived effects of EU integration on the country

It seems that the benefits of NATO integration are perceived to be more relevant on the *national level,* while those of EU integration on the *personal level*. Those who have positive opinions towards NATO / EU are "less worried" about a possible terrorist attack on Romania (only 35,1% from group A declared they were "worried" and "very worried" while 66,7% from group B declared they were "worried" and "very worried"). At the same time, respondents from group A are more confident that NATO would help Romania in a possible attack, than respondents from group B (91,1% from group A believe that NATO would "certainly" or "probably" intervene while only 51% from group B believe the same thing). We can say that those who have positive opinions about

NATO / UE are generally more optimistic, less worried about a possible terrorist attack and take more into consideration the benefits of "integration". Conversely, those who have negative opinions towards NATO/EU are generally more pessimistic, less confident, more worried about possible terrorist attacks and stress more the disadvantages of the integration processes.

Analyzing all three dimensions of the perceived life standard: personal level, group level and national level, in relation with opinions about NATO and EU, we can say that the personal and national economic dimensions are more clearly structured on people minds, as compared to the group dimension. More precisely the missing values on questions related to personal and national dimensions are lower (people are used to evaluate things on these dimensions). Similarly (as we noted before), the differences between group A and group B are more evident on the personal and national dimensions (they can be seen as better predictors for positive/ negative evaluations towards NATO and EU). We can consider that the degree of perception configuration is different on these three dimensions (as well as its influence) and that its representation is "U"-shaped, like in the graphic below.



Graphic 3. The influence of personal, group and national economic dimension in the way people evaluate EU and NATO.

***Halo Effect*: general positive or general negative perception**

In conclusion we can make two assertions. On one hand - that there is a relation between life standard (real or perceived) and individual opinions towards NATO / EU (ex. individuals with a high life standard also have more positive opinions about NATO / EU). But the nature of this relation is not simple, nor direct. The influence of the life standard on individual opinion is differentiated on three levels: personal, group and national economic level; we have also proved that personal and national economic levels are more structured – being, at the same time, better predictors in explaining opinion distribution

about NATO and EU. This means that our initial hypothesis was partially confirmed.

On the other hand, individuals who consider themselves as being less poor tend to be more optimistic about "integration" and to give more credit to international structures. Those who perceived themselves as being poorer are more skeptical in what the "integration process" is concerned, and more pessimistic regarding the future of the country. We can talk about a generalized optimism and also about a generalized pessimism, about a *halo effect*: the optimism/pessimism on one dimension extends over the other dimensions and tends to become a life strategy or approach.

Information level

In this part of our research we will try to define the relationship between the level of information and the Romanian's declared attitude towards NATO / EU. We will start by making a methodological distinction between the self-declared level of information and the real level of information with regard to NATO and EU. We based our analysis on the self-declared level of information as presented by the following POB question: "Using a scale from 1 to 10, how informed do you feel about EU respectively NATO?" After that we took into consideration some quantitative indicators: the intensity of media exposure (press, radio, TV) and the intensity of the individual's contacts with other countries. We presumed that the level of information about NATO and EU increased if the individuals were more exposed to media and if they had some direct or indirect contacts with other countries (either by travelling, working or just by having relatives or friends abroad).

While trying to determine the nature of the above-mentioned relationship (level of information -- individuals opinion about NATO / EU), we will proceed to a differentiated analysis as in the previous section of this research. We used the same methodological separation between group A (those who have a rather positive opinion towards NATO and EU) and group B (those who have a rather negative opinion towards NATO and EU). Also for methodological reasons we re-coded the variables to the following questions: "In Romania some people know a lot of things about UE, its policies and institutions, whereas others don't know anything. Where do you find yourself on a scale from 1 to 10, where 1 = "I don't know anything about EU" and 10 = "I know everything about EU" and "In Romania some people know a lot of things about NATO, its policies and institutions, whereas others don't know anything. Where would you fit on a scale from 1 to 10, where 1 = "I don't know anything about NATO" and 10 = "I know everything about NATO". We transformed this 10-point scale in a 5-point simplified one: (1) low level of information, (2) low to medium level of

information, (3) medium level of information, (4) medium to high level of information, (5) high level of information.

The analysis cross-tables with the information level and the opinion (rather positive/negative) about NATO and EU can be found below. The *chi square* test was significant for p=0,000 - so we are entitled to claim that there is a relation between the self-declared level of information and the opinion towards NATO and EU.

Table 2. The relation between the declared level of information concerning EU and opinions about EU

		Level of information concerning EU					Total
		1.00	2.00	3.00	4.00	5.00	
EU Opinion	Negative	39	36	23	13	9	120
	Positive	242	420	569	247	104	1582
Total		281	456	592	260	113	1702

Table 3. The relation between the declared level of information concerning NATO and opinions about NATO

		Level of information concerning NATO					Total
		1.00	2.00	3.00	4.00	5.00	
NATO Opinion	Negative	43	30	31	24	6	134
	Positive	251	473	527	245	119	1615
Total		294	503	558	269	125	1749

We can ask ourselves what kind of relation is there between the level of information and opinions towards NATO/EU. We can notice, from *Graphic 4,* that the respondents who had negative opinions about NATO / EU also had lower levels of information than those with positive opinions.



Graphic 4. EU : Level of Information



Graphic 5. NATO: Level of information

It is interesting to see that the level of information concerning NATO seems to be higher that the one concerning EU, for both groups (A and B). Thus 23,5% from both group A and B had a higher-than-the-average information level about NATO; 22,55 % from group A and 17,7% from group B had a higher-than-the-average information level about EU.

These assumptions are confirmed by quantitative indicators as well: individuals from group A read the newspapers more often, watch more television and listen more to the radio than individuals from group B. The table below shows the quantitative indicators that we analyzed. In order to better emphasize the differences between the two groups we will only show the polar answers: "daily" and "never", excluding moderate answers such as: "few times per week", "few times per month", "less than once per month".

Table 4. The relation between opinions about NATO/EU and objective indicators of informational level

How often		Positive perception NATO / UE	Negative perception NATO / UE
...do you read the newspapers?	never	18,4%	39,2%
	daily	23,8%	17,6%
... do you listen to the radio?	never	13,5%	27,5%
	daily	59 %	33,3%
... do you watch TV?	never	4,5%	19,6%
	daily	80,5%	54,9%

At the same time, individuals from group A seem to be much more informed about Romania's request to become a NATO[5] and EU member. Only 1,5% and respectively 1,6% from group A had never heard about this request, as compared to 7,8% and respectively 9,8 % from group B.

When we focused on "international contacts" we found that those with a positive image towards NATO / EU have also traveled or worked abroad more extensively than the others (36, 6% - compared to 33,3%); the same thing happened with people who declared that they had relatives abroad (25,7% from group A - compared to 21,6% from group B). We can see that in this case the differences are not so obvious (only aprox. 3-4 %) so we can presume that "international contacts" is not such a strong predictor for our analysis.

We continue with a more detailed analysis on the way the level of information influences people's opinion towards NATO and EU. We used the same methodological approach and we divided the POB sample in three groups using the predicted level of information as separation criteria. We thus identified three major groups: (1) individuals with a low information level, (2) individuals with a medium information level and (3) individuals with a high information level. Consequently, we tried to determine the differences between these three groups in what their EU and NATO evaluation is concerned. We selected six items (from the POB questionnaire) concerning the effects of integration for the EU evaluation and we analyzed the differences among these three groups. Some of the items are related to the perceived effects on the individuals' personal life (*personal dimension*) and the others to the perceived effects on a national level (*national dimension*).

[5] On the time the data have been collected Romania wasn't yet invited to join NATO .

Table 5. The difference between groups (with low, medium and high level of information) concerning perceived effects of EU integration

Effects of EU integration (Questions from POB – October 2002)	**Dimension**
What kind of effects do you think that Romanian EU integration will have on **yourself**?	*Personal (P)*
What kind of effects do you think that Romanian EU integration will have on the **country**?	*National (N)*
Do you belive that after Romanian EU integration, the **population income** will increase, decrease or be the same?	*National (N)*
Do you belive that after Romanian EU integration, your personal income and that of your family will increase, decrease or be the same?	*Personal (P)*
Do you belive that after Romanian EU integration, the unemployment rate will become higher, lower or be the same?	*National (N)*
Do you belive that after Romanian EU integration, your chances of finding a job will increase, decrease or be the same?	*Personal (P)*

We tried to see which one of the two (personal or national) is the prevailing dimension for each group (with low, medium or high information level) considering the NATO / EU evaluation. In other words, which one of these groups is concerned more with the personal benefits and which one is concerned more with the national benefits.

Table 6. Predominant dimension of evaluation - groups with different levels of information

	Low information group	Medium information group	High information group
Predominant dimension	-	P / N	P

Individuals with a low information level considered that EU integration would be accompanied by the increase of Romanians' incomes but it would have negative effects on the country. So the perception of UE is confused among individuals from this group and we could not find a predominant dimension. We could argue that they have a so-called "false negative non-attitude" (P. Converse, 1964) - assertion also sustained by the higher number of missing values in this group.

Respondents from the second group (with a medium level of information) declared in a higher degree that EU integration would be accompanied by positive effects on a national level, especially on the unemployment rate and on the population incomes. We can thus find both dimensions of evaluation in this

case (personal and national, P/N). Compared with the low information group, the medium information group proved more structured and also more positive evaluations towards EU.

The third group, with the high level of information, offered the most complex evaluation on the integration process. Individuals here considered that the effects of the "integration" would be almost zero on a national level, the unemployment rate would be the same, the population incomes would not grow or even will decrease, that the personal incomes would be the same but, in general, the effects on Romanians' personal lives would be positive. We can therefore notice the predominance of the personal dimension (P), in a moderate positive way. People from this group considered in a higher proportion that the overall effects of European integration would have a more positive impact on their personal lives (86,9%) than on the country (national effects - 80,3%). The other groups considered that the integration process would rather bring benefits to the country than to their personal lives: 67,8%- national benefits, 57,6%- personal benefits, for the low information level group and 87,5% compared to 77,3% for the medium information level group.

For NATO evaluation we used some items from the POB questionnaire that could be differentiated on two dimensions: National (N) costs, National (N) benefits, as in the table below.

Table 7. The difference between groups (with low, medium and high level of information) concerning perceived effects of NATO integration

Effects of NATO integration (Questions from POB – October 2002)	**Dimension**
If Romania becomes a NATO member, do you believe that NATO will intervene if Romania is atacked by another country?	*National (N) – benefit*
How worried are you about terrorist attacks on Romanian territory?	*National (N) – cost*
Would you agree or not with NATO military drill on Romanian territory?	*National (N) – cost*
Would you agree or not with regular flights in the Romanian air space?	*National (N) – cost*
Would you agree or not with the settlement of NATO troops on Romanian territory?	*National (N) – cost*
Would you agree or not with the establishment of military bases on Romanian territory?	*National (N) – cost*
Would you agree or not with the sending of national troops in NATO missions?	*National (N) – cost*

When talking about NATO we have to particularly take into consideration the national dimension: costs and benefits that individuals perceive to apply to the country and only indirectly to their own personal life.

After analyzing the data, differentiated on the three groups (with different levels of information), we can conclude that:

1. When the level of information grows, people are less worried about the possibility of a terrorist attack.
2. When the information level grows, individuals become more confident about NATO help in case that Romania would be attacked (91, 8% from those with a high information level and 73,7% from those with a low information level). We can presume that highly informed individuals are aware of Article 5 from the North Atlantic Treaty which claims that any attack of one of NATO members will be considered as a direct attack towards all members ("all for one and one for all").
3. When the information level grows, people approve more with the responsibilities that NATO membership claims for. "The establishment of military bases" on Romanian territory is the most unacceptable implication, and then follows "troops settlement", "military drill", "regular flights in national air space", and the last one "sending national troops in NATO missions"- this last "cost" being the most acceptable for Romanians.

The data analysis shows that NATO and EU evaluations are different in relation with the individual's level of information and in relation with personal and national dimension of perceived costs and benefits.

Conclusions

First of all, the relation presumed by the Eurobarometer: that positive opinions about EU are related to the low life standard of therespondents *is not confirmed* by our secondary analysis. On the contrary, the poorer the people are, the higher their negative opinions about EU and about NATO. When people consider themselves to be poor and actually *are* poor (according to objective indicators) - they do not show support for the integration process.

Generally speaking, Romanians evaluate effects of EU integration rather from a personal perspective and effects of NATO integration rather from a national perspective.

Second of all, there is a relation between the Romanians' level of information and their attitude towards NATO/EU. The better informed people are, the higher their support for NATO missions and EU integration; this relation is mediated by the evaluation of costs and benefits on a national and a personal level.

Second part
A Research Concerning NATO and EU Social Representations among Students

The data analysis presented above emphasizes the opinions distribution about NATO and EU and also some variables that determine such distribution: the information level and the life standard of the respondents. In this second part we would like to know more about the structure of the social representation about NATO and EU, namely, which are the common and the distinctive features of these social representations.
Social representations are images about reality, "the way people interpret and think about aspects of daily life" (A. Neculau, 1995). They are not only "images from our mind" but also the expression of norms and values of a specific group in a social-cultural context. There is a deep link between the individual who achieves the social representation and the object of the representation, in a way that individual gives interpretations to social reality (to represented reality) according to his cognitive and value patterns. So by analyzing social representations, we can conclude also about social reality and about the construction of reality in a subjective way.

Social Representation theory has been initiated by Serge Moscovici (1961) who re-considered an old concept proposed by Emile Durkheim (*Représentations individuelles et représentations colectives*, 1898 and *Les formes élémentaires de la vie religieuse*, 1912). Then social representations studies were developed all over the world on two different directions: (1) one structural direction (Jean Claude Abric, 1984) who stresses more on the idea of "core" and "peripherical elements of social representation. The core is the rigid part of social representation according to what we establish the significance of the flexible one; (2) the theory of organized principles (W. Doise, 1986) which claimed that the opinions, the attitudes of peculiar groups are determined by some social regulations, that can be named "social representations". In our research we will rather prefer this second approach of social representations and we consider them more like maps of interpreting the reality, based on communication, common language and based on group experience.

We developed an explorative survey based on questionnaire among a group of 207 students from four faculties: Faculty of Communication and Public Relations, SNSPA, Bucharest (FCRP), Faculty of Political Science, SNSPA, Bucharest (SP), Faculty of Sociology and Social Assistance (SAS), Bucharest, Faculty of Engineering University of Pitesti (MT). The data has been collected between 15 and 30 April 2003 and -for the sample homogeneity- all the respondents were students in first year of faculty.

Sample structure

Age:	18 - 20 years	166 students (80,1%)
	21 - 24 years	35 students (40,0%)
	over 24 years	3 students (1,4%)
	missing values	3 students (1,4%)
	Total	207 students (100%)
Sex:	feminine	123 (59,7%)
	masculine	83 (40,3%)
	missing values	1 (0,4%)
	Total	207 students (100%)
Place of residence:	urban	185 (89,4%)
	rural	22 (10,6%)
	Total	207 students (100%)
Faculty:	FCRP	58 (28%)
	SP	53 (25%)
	SAS	44 (21%)
	MT	52 (25%)
	Total	207 students (100%)

Our sample is not representative (compared to the overall Romanian student population), but we considered it an available sample based on which we were able to analyze the way social representations towards NATO and EU are structured.

In the research instrument (questionnaire) we used the *semantic differential*, first introduced by Charles E. Osgood , George J. Succi and Percy H. Tannembaum (1957), a technique that has been standardized in social research. The Semantic differential allows us to emphasize the cognitive elements which structure individual's evaluations on some particular stimulus (in our case- NATO and EU). We used nine bi-polar scales, grouped on EPA (Evaluation, Potency, Activity) and we analyzed where the respondents placed NATO and EU on those dimensions. The bi-polar scales had 7 points (1 represented the negative point and 7 the positive point) and they could also show the direction and the intensity of individual's attitude. We compared the scores (moderate means of answers) for each of the nine scales and also for the three considered dimensions (Evaluation, Potency and Activity). The following tables reflect the scores obtained after the data analysis.

Table 8. Scores for the scales related to EU social representation (1 – very much in favour; 7 – very much against)

Score EPA	Scale	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Scale	Frequency	Score scale
Evaluation 5,02	Good	2	9	11	47	42	57	32	Bad	200	5,09
	Pleasant	3	3	18	66	48	44	17	Unpleasant	199	4,77
	Useful	2	14	12	30	44	59	43	Useless	204	5,20
Potency 5,17	Big	4	4	12	42	52	55	28	Small	197	5,09
	Powerful	3	4	17	32	55	67	26	Weak	204	5.14
	Construc tive	4	8	2	23	66	70	29	Destructive	202	5.30
Activity 4,43	Flexible	8	18	27	78	45	20	5	Inflexible	201	4,06
	Active	4	15	22	34	54	49	24	Passive	202	4,79
	Clear	3	15	34	50	47	38	14	Ambiguous	201	4,46

Table 9. Scores for the scales related to NATO social representation (1 – very much in favour; 7 – very much against)

Score EPA	Scale	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Scale	Frequency	Score scale
Evaluation 4,83	Good	5	15	16	65	49	31	18	Bad	199	4,52
	Pleasant	3	3	18	66	48	44	17	Unpleasant	199	4,77
	Useful	2	14	12	30	44	59	43	Useless	204	5,20
Potency 4,81	Big	4	4	12	42	52	55	28	Small	197	5,09
	Powerful	3	4	17	32	55	67	26	Weak	204	5,14
	Construc tive	1 1	17	28	62	38	35	9	Destructive	200	4,20
Activity 4,52	Flexible	1	20	42	56	41	19	7	Inflexible	199	3,88
	Active	4	4	21	21	39	51	57	Passive	198	5,35
	Clear	5 7	22	33	44	48	28	20	Ambiguous	202	4,33

The social representation of NATO and EU is in general a positive one among students and we can identify some common elements on the following axes: "pleasant-unpleasant", "useful-useless", "big- small" and "powerful-weak". Thus both NATO and EU are seen as useful, powerful, big and pleasant international institutions. The EU representation is more positive compared to NATO, especially on the Activity dimension. The respondents see EU as more "constructive", more "flexible", "clearer", and "better" then NATO, and NATO

is being seen as more "active" than the EU. If individuals assimilated the two institutions when it came to attributes such as "good", "useful", "pleasant", they made a clear distinction between them concerning the Potency and especially the Activity dimension. Thus they represented the fact that NATO is a military organization while EU is based on social and economic purposes.



Graphic 6. Social representation of NATO *versus* EU.

The research instrument included questions about the information level of the respondents (self –evaluated) about NATO and EU: "How informed do you consider yourself about the European Union?" and "How informed do you consider yourself about NATO?"- just like the questions were analyzed from the POB – in the first part of this analysis, but we also measured the real information level using a group of items that referred to general knowledge about EU and NATO. We could compute an individual index that measured the real informational level.

The maximal value of the information index towards NATO was "8", the minimal value "0", and the mean value "4". In the same way, the index of information towards EU had a maximal value of "9", minimal value of "0" and

mean value of "3,87". The students from our sample were averagely informed about NATO and EU. Significant differences have been found between the students from the Faculty of Political Science (SP) and the students from the Faculty of Engineering (MT) when it came to EU, the first group being the best informed and the last one the least informed of all. About the NATO level of information, significant differences have been found between the political science students (the best informed) and the sociology students (the least informed). As we had expected, the Political Science students were better informed than the others on both calculated indexes.

To these observations we can add the fact that the measured information level significantly correlated with the self-appreciated information level. In other words, the respondents were able to diagnose their personal level of information in an accurate way. This observation has methodological implications because it proves that we can trust in people's self-evaluation concerning their level of information.

We can say that the respondents had more general information about NATO and EU and not enough specific information. Thus, about the European Union institutions, most of the respondents declared that they are "well known": The European Council (44%), The European Commission (41, 5%), The European Parliament (38,2%), The European Court of Justice (47,8%). But when we introduced a non-existent institution – The European Committee - 24,25% from the subjects declared that this was also "well known". Thus we found a *placebo* effect that applied to almost half of the students. We can presume that their information level is not as solid and specific as they declare.

The opinions about NATO correlated with the index of information about NATO. The Bravais-Pearson coefficient has been found significant (for a probability level p =0,004%). The more informed students are towards NATO, the more positive their opinion is about NATO. This issue sustained the results of our analysis on POB. And also the opinions towards EU are in relation to the index of information about EU (*chi* square – 60,275, p =0,002< 0,005) even if the coefficient of correlation *r* is not significant.

Our research purpose was also to emphasize how could some economical or professional values influence students' opinions about NATO and EU. Again, we tried to validate the presumption that peoples' positive images about NATO and EU are related to personal economic benefits. In order to achieve this purpose, we used the *Work Values Inventory* realized in 1960 by D. E. Super and adapted by S. Chelcea in Romania (1993/1994). The *Work Values Inventory* is a sociological instrument designed to measure professional values grouped on 15 dimensions: altruism, aesthetic values, intellectual stimulation, professional success, independence, prestige, leadership, economic benefits, and professional safety, and physical ambiance, relations with superiors, relations with colleagues, life style, variety and creativity. Three items correspond to

each dimension, and in total the Inventory contains 45 items related to professional life; the respondents are supposed to evaluate all these issues according to a five-point scale: from "very important" to "without importance". In this way we can compare the scores for each dimension inside one group or between different groups in order to understand the prevalence of a specific value and its implication on behavior.

For our present research we only took into consideration 10 dimensions (30 items) which were relevant to the discussed subject: *altruism* (items 2, 20, 21), *intellectual stimulation* (items 1, 15, 26), *professional success* (items 9,11, 30), *independence* (items 5, 13, 28), *prestige* (items 6, 18, 23), *economic benefits* (3, 14, 27), *professional safety* (items 7,12, 29), *leadership* (items 10,16, 25), *life style* (items 8, 17, 24), *variety* (items 4, 19, 22) –see Annex.

The students' opinions towards EU were linked to the „intellectual stimulation" values, „professional success", „prestige", „professional safety", „economic benefits" and to „variety" (*chi* square was significant for $p = 0{,}000$). We found that „intellectual stimulation" and „professional safety" were correlated with the respondents' evaluation of EU. ($r = 0{,}178$, $r = 0{,}200$, $p < 0{,}005$). In this way, we could conclude that the students who valued an intellectually stimulating and secure work were also those who had positive opinions about EU.

The opinions about NATO were related - in a higher degree - with „altruism" and „life style". Thus students tended to appeal on distinctive personal values when expressing their opinions about NATO and EU.

Conclusions

Both NATO and EU are being seen as useful, big, powerful and pleasant international structures. The EU representation is more positive as compared to NATO among the respondents. And EU has been seen as more „constructive", more „flexible", „clearer" and „better" than NATO. In the same time, NATO has been seen as more „active" than EU. We can't say that students have confused images about these two international institutions but on the contrary, that they differentiate between them, even if their level of information is a medium one.

Positive opinions about NATO and EU are based on a complex value spectrum: intellectual stimulation, professional success, prestige and professional safety, when it comes to EU and altruism and life style, when it comes to NATO.

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Annex

***Work Values Inventory* (D.E. Super, 1960), adapted by S. Chelcea in Romania (1993/1994). The dimensions used for the present research**

1. To have the possibility to solve new problems all the time.
2. To help the others
3. To obtain a salary raise.
4. To have frequent changes at work.
5. To have freedom of choosing the rhythm of work.
6. To have high professional prestige
7. Not to be afraid of unemployment.
8. To fulfill yourself in the way you want.
9. To permanently have the feeling of living a full day.
10. To have authority over the others.
11. To have the possibility of work evaluation based on results.
12. To be sure that you have always something to work on.
13. To decide for yourself .
14. To obtain a salary that rises proportionally with the life cost.
15. To have the possibility of talking about the things you are preoccupied of .
16. To use your leadership capacity.
17. To have the life standard you

want.

18. The others to be aware of the importantance of the work you do.
19. Not to do the same thing all the time.
20. To have the feeling of helping the others.
21. To contribute to the happiness of others.
22. To be involved in different things.
23. To be admired.
24. To have the lifestyle you want.
25. To organize and plan the work of others
26. To always be intellectually stimulated.
27. To earn as much as necessary to live a decent life.
28. To be you own supervisor.
29. To be sure that you would obtain a job in the same firm, if the old position is removed.
30. To be able to know the results of your work

ECONOMICS OF EDUCATION AND SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION: The Role of the University

Persa Fokiali - University of the Aegean
and
Maria Kaila - University of the Aegean

This paper aims to examine the challenges faced by the countries that have recently experienced radical changes in their politico-economic system, with respect to social transformation. More specifically:

The first part of the work (Chapters 2 and 3) examines the boundaries and links between globalisation and regionalisation, two tendencies that struggle to compromise to each other, giving a specific role to the process of managing social transformation with the aim to control the type, extent and directions of development.

The following part (Chapters 4 and 5) examines two fields that stand at the edges of social transformations' management, forming the background which should be constructed for this management to be effective. On the one edge one finds the need to define, explain and investigate the way in which the new system operates within the global environment, a task in which social sciences seem to play an important role. On the other edge, one meets the need to define the goals of social transformation, described by the profile of the developed society of knowledge. In shaping these goals the role of economics of education appears to be decisive linking productivity and quality of human capital to education.

The last part is devoted to the role of the University, as an institution that could undertake the responsibility of working towards a desired social transformation.

Introduction

We live in a world that changes dynamically. Technological and scientific, political and economic developments, as well as new institutions and ideologies, influence at a speeding rate regions, countries, the whole world. It is not an exaggeration to state that "no century has experienced so many social transformations and such radical social changes as the 20th century" (Drucker 1994). Moreover although this century has lived the wildness of many wars (wars that insistently we keep experiencing also nowadays), surprisingly enough, some very important transformations took place gradually without war, if not "in total silence" at least in limited noise. It is worth stopping in three of them:

- The first refers to the transition of the developed world from an agricultural economy/ society to other types of economy/ society. Thus, in a chronological order, in the last half of the 20th century the emphasis in the developed economy has moved from industry and technology in the fifties, to the quality of human capital and innovation in the sixties

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and seventies in order to proceed in the eighties and nineties on information (Psacharopoulos, 1999) and recently on knowledge (Drucker,1994).

- The second refers to the social impacts of technological development, which have made information accessible to anyone, in any place, at any time and at low cost.
- The third refers to the political and economic changes that took place in the nineties, referred to as the democratisation process of many countries, among which those of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE).

These transformations are highly interconnected: The structural transition from an industrial society to an information society and later to a society of knowledge could not take place without the development of Information and Communication Technology (ICT) and its impact upon many aspects of life. Furthermore, the reshaping of Europe in the nineties and the socio-economic and political transformations in the post-communist states cannot be viewed independently from the constantly and systematically changing international socio-economic environment.

Globalisation vs regionalisation

The radical changes of the last fifty years of the 20th century in the international political, economic, social, cultural and technological environment, have been dominated by two distinct and, from a certain point of view, conflicting trends; globalisation on the one hand and regionalisation on the other. These trends seem to develop operationally at a much higher speed than their conceptual and epistemological development, thus leaving open the long and rich debate over their definition, the factors that explain or justify their existence and the variables that determine them.

With respect to globalisation, there are many different ways in which the term may be interpreted (Castles, 1999). In a narrow sense, globalisation refers mainly to issues of trade and investment, considering the penetration of economic factors into national and local markets as predominant. In a wider sense, globalisation embodies not only the flow of products, services and activities on trans-national or interregional level, but also the development of trans-national and interregional networks that affect social functions and politics. Finally, at an even more general level, globalisation refers to a process of change that affects the regions around the world in various sectors among which economy, politics, technology, culture, environment and, possibly, governance. According to such a definition (Held, 1999) it could be stated that globalisation is the widening, deepening and speeding up of worldwide interconnectedness in all aspects of contemporary social life, not excluding the philosophical and spiritual.

With respect to regionalisation, the conceptual difficulties are also big. Regionalisation refers to the process of governing, organizing, acting and deciding on a regional basis, -a process that emerges because of differences in historical, geo-political, economic, social, cultural and educational backgrounds. In an extreme, monolithic form, regionalisation could be interpreted as synonymous to concentration on national homogeneity. Most of the times, however, the platform of regionalisation permits integration through a positive stance over common denominators that promote co-existence, cooperation and solidarity, leaving adequate space for respect to some specific, local or national, social and cultural characteristics. Such a regionalized political environment seems to be a realistic situation in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) after the end of the communist era.

Regionalized areas, among which CEE, today face the challenge of globalisation -a challenge that cannot be ignored since it affects, if not all, at least the most important sectors of society. Reaction to such a challenge may take the form of (a) resistance with the possibility of marginalisation (b) complete adaptation or (c) response up to a certain degree, accepting global challenges under the constraint of respecting culture, social traditions and region-based diversities. In theory, the alternative that is adopted is a matter of choice which depends on many factors -politics, geography, history, heritage but also mentality being only a few of them. In practice, the efforts of CEE states to become members of the European Union (EU) and the recent spectacular EU's enlargement, institutionalised in Athens in April 2003, are indicative of the CEE's response to globalisation.

More specifically, it seems that CEE countries, despite a well-justified, fierce attitude towards their local and national identities, have rejected marginalisation and isolation. However, although they may accept that globalisation is a central driving force behind major economic, cultural, social, political changes, and that (to some extent) modernisation assumes some global convergence, they are in favour of national identities and national pluralism, not confusing global convergence with the emergence of a single world society. Each local and national society with its unique own features, has the right, the ability, the willingness or the opportunity, keeping its identity, to integrate (partially or completely) into trans-national or global networks of power or, alternatively, not to integrate at all, to reject integration or to be rejected by the global environment.

Once this choice is made, policy makers, institutions, economic units and social agents are expected to act by developing plans, applying productive methods, taking measures, adapting legislation and applying policies that either reinforce or diminish the impact of global changes on national and local societies. The net effect of this process is reflected in social, economic, cultural and other indices and this effect, which may be viewed as a differential from a

specific starting point, if described in terms of quantitative and qualitative changes, may be referred to as "social transformation".

Management of social transformation

Social transformation describes a change in the picture of a society. From an operational point of view it may be considered:

(a) According to comparative dynamics, as the net impact, or the net outcome of a process that leads to social changes, in the form of difference between two equilibria.

(b) In a dynamic sense, as the framework[1] used to analyse, measure and evaluate the effects of social procedures or events; in this sense social transformation refers to the process itself rather than the outcome, reminding of the dynamic notion of development.

In either case, social transformation is present in any non-static society, irrespective of whether it is on the road to regionalisation or during the process of applying one of the various forms of global governance. As with development, social transformation (no matter whether it is described by reference to one or a few or many relevant variables) is worth mentioning only if the emerging changes in the society are significant.

Narrowing down to the case of CEE, social transformation provides the framework for realising, explaining, even measuring the impact of global change on local communities and national societies, i.e. it refers to a process during which the global, the international or some trans-national economic, social, political and cultural environment affects the national and local one.

Within this framework, the application of the classic definition of management, as a term in the world of economics and businesses (Koonz, 1988), helps in defining the term "management of social transformation" which may be approached as the process of planning, organising, leading and controlling resources, with the aim to make the best contribution and reach the optimum impact in the process of social transformation.

Management requires decision making, motivation and action and is equally essential for a society in the process of social transformation as it is for any organisation. However, management of social transformation can be exercised successfully, provided that there is a well-prepared background. This background is established if two assumptions are met. The first refers to the acquisition of adequate information and knowledge about the way according to which the system works; the second concerns the goals / objectives that the

[1] Following Castles (Castles, 2000), the notion of social transformation, which is increasingly used in social sciences, provides a framework for understanding the way contemporary processes of global change affect local communities and national societies throughout the world.

national or local society sets as the desired outcome of the transformation process. It is worth mentioning that both issues are matters in which social sciences may contribute a lot, as seen below.

Background for social transformation management: getting to know how the system operates

Following the above analysis, it may be stated that globalisation is one side of the story, regionalisation is another, whereas social transformation at a national and local level is the mediator that relates the causes and effects of regional trends to the causes and effects of global trends. In the case of societies which are in the process of democratisation, global strategic considerations are in many aspects assumed as creating appropriate conditions for a rise of an area; yet these are not the only ones. Political systems, geographical structures and the culture of various countries determine to what extent these societies should, or are able to, or prefer to participate in global economic and political patterns.

Under such circumstances, it is necessary to analyse the process of mediation between globalising forces on the one hand and specific local and societal conditions (such as demographic, economic, environmental, political, social and cultural) on the other. In this respect, analysis of social transformation is equivalent to an analysis of social, economic, cultural, technological and scientific forces at local, national, transnational and worldwide level. This analysis creates the need for the development of an integrated approach that explains the interconnectedness between the local or national environment and the global or trans-national one, expressed preferably in the form of a complicated model of social transformation.

More specifically this implies:

- The translation of the theoretical notion of social transformation into specific indices of social, economic, cultural and technological development, possibly applying benchmarking techniques or upper limits[2].
- The explicit definition/ specification of variables, functions and relationships that enter in such a model.
- The explicit definition/ specification of parameters, features, diversities, constraints and limitations.
- The development of analytical instruments that make measurement of such relationships possible[3].

[2] The EU's criteria for membership could be a good example in this direction, possibly supplemented by some more.

[3] With the help of quantitative methods such as statistics and econometrics.

- The application of research projects, case studies and comparative studies.
- The continuous monitoring of social transformation parameters.
- The investigation, prediction and evaluation of the effectiveness of policy measures and actions.

The development of this type of holistic, multi-variable and multi-dimensional model, the collection of the background information, the framework, the methodology and the tools of research and analysis are issues that require the interdisciplinary co-operation of social scientists of various branches.

Background for social transformation management: the economics of education and the knowledge society profile

Management of social transformation is successful provided that it reaches a specific objective. In the case of CEE countries and other emerging market economies this objective, though unique for each region, is expected not to ignore the profile of an economy and a society towards which the global world converges. This implies the existence of such a "global' socio-economic profile which (though subject to changes within time) provides an "ideal" for a society that wants to be competitive in the global economy, irrespective of whether it is already developed or undeveloped, north or south, east or west.

Some of the features of this socio-economic profile are set by the principles of the economic system that is dominant in the global economy. Within this context, in socio-economic terms, the situation that these economies should reach is related to the establishment of a stable market economy on the one hand and a satisfactory level of socio-economic development on the other.

Thus, with respect to the market economy, there should be a guaranteed stability over the operation of the market forces, implying that supply should be able to meet demand (with its peculiarities, which may be partly explained by the fact that demand has been deferred for a long time). With respect to development there should be a guaranteed increase in income (or GDP) per capita, which together with other parameters will provide a viable and sustainable long-term level of development.

It is not doubted easily that both, marketisation and development, require the full employment in the process of production of all the endogenous as well as exogenous factors that are available. In an efficient market system these factors should be directed towards production of goods and services that either directly improve living standards, reflecting demand, or, help indirectly,

production of such goods and services[4]. These factors of production are typical: land, labour, capital, human capital are their general categories. However their relative importance is not typical, it keeps changing within time[5] and it is decisive in structuring the socio-economic profile to which the developed world globally converges.

As already mentioned, this profile in our days is provided by the shape of the "society of knowledge" which , more than ever before, connects the development process with knowledge (Drucker, 1994). This interconnection seems to provide a satisfactory goal for management of social transformation, justified by means of the theory of human capital -one of the basic themes in the field of economics of education[6] (Psacharopoulos, 1999).

In its simplest microeconomic form the theory of human capital states that an individual's income varies according to productivity and that, in general, a person's productivity is higher the higher his/her level of knowledge, acquired mainly through education. The reasons why a person with higher education is more productive than someone with lower education is found in the consideration of education as a lever that helps in the development of the individual's skills and abilities properly channelled in the market. This perception turns the ex- industrial worker of a developed society into a "worker of knowledge" (Drucker,1994).

In its macroeconomic form, the theory of human capital states that an educated society has an accumulated knowledge that makes it more productive since this accumulation (a) reflects more productive individuals (b) acts in a multiplicative way to all the rest of the factors of production (c) allows the society to specialize by creating comparative advantages and (d) produces externalities (such as better health, respect to the environment, social cohesion, democratisation, equal distribution of income, higher propensity to save etc) that increase productivity.

The application of the recent developments of the economics of education in the context of management of social transformation explains why the

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[4] We refer to investment goods.

[5] Indicatively, in the 18th century the important factor was land. Later capital was considered as playing a crucial role in development and in the sixties this was substituted by human capital.

[6] Economics of education is a rather new field in economic theory. In its mainstream form, it examines education as a field of economic activity, that supplies a series of goods -knowledge, attitudes and socialization- acquired by the learners. Supply of these products needs the employment of factors of production (mainly labour but also land and capital). The output of production is transferred from the educator to the learner through a transmission mechanism known as educational process. The main productive unit is any educational unit/ institution providing formal or non-formal education, covering a rather differentiated range from nursery to university.

The educational product as an economic good satisfies certain needs: It has mostly an indirect usefulness for the learner since it gives him/her qualifications for his/her future life. To a great extent these qualifications determine the learners' opportunities for entering competitively in the labour market and, in this sense, the output of education may be considered as an investment good, in which the individual and the state spends at present with the prospect of a future return.

developed economic order is one in which "knowledge, not labour, or raw material or capital, is the key resource; a social order in which inequality based on knowledge is a major challenge; and a polity in which government cannot be looked to for solving social and economic problems" (Drucker, 1994).

The interconnection between knowledge, hence education, and development makes necessary for societies in the process of social transformation to set education as a main goal and to seek for more knowledge, especially advanced knowledge, which is offered mainly by the educational system but also by other institutions well past the age of formal schooling, through lifelong educational processes. The knowledge society as a profile of global convergence seems to be a great challenge for the CEE countries. These have a long educational tradition, rather high standards in education and their relevant indices in this aspect do not differ substantially from those of the economically developed countries, as seen in the following table.

Table 1: statistics on education on a sample of countries, 1999

Country	Population	GNP/per capita	Adults Illiteracy Rate %	Adults Years of Schooling	% of age in tertiary education	Public Expenditure in education % of GNP	Pupils/ teacher in primary education
Hungary	10,000,000	4800	0.7	9.1	36,7	4,7	10,6
Slovak Rep	5,000,000	3700	...	9,3	28,9	4,3	18,8
Poland	39,000,000	4240	0.3	9,8	50.4	5.0	15.8
Chech Rep	10,000,000	5270	...	...	28,7	4,4	18,3
Croația	4,000,000	4550	1.9	...	29.0	4.2	19.2
Bulgaria	8,000,000	1650	1.7	...	42.7	3.4	17.9
România	22,000,000	1720	2.0	...	23.2	3.5	18.7
Slovenia	2,000,000	9760	0.4	7.1	60.5	5.8	14.1
Albania	3,000,000	1340	16.1	...	14.7	3.1	17.8
Germany	82,000,000	23560	...	10,2	46.3	4.6	17.0
France	59,000,000	22730	...	7,9	52.5	5.9	18.9
USA	282,000,000	34280	...	12.0	23.9	5.1	15.4
Greece	11,000,000	11430	...	8,7	50.5	2.9	15.0

Source: Worldbank statistics

Having this background, it seems that, if not all, at least some of the countries of CEE have a comparative advantage upon which they should rely in order to increase their productivity. However for this to be accomplished they should make some adjustments. These are discussed below.

The role of universities in social transformation management

In the case of CEE, setting the knowledge society as a target is one thing. Defining the type of knowledge is another. Knowledge as a factor of production, or as a new competitive resource in economics, is fundamentally different from traditional factors, land, labour, capital/ technology. Moreover, it differs from what has been traditionally meant by this term in earlier years: Nowadays, general knowledge as a factor of personal development –which in earlier times would represent an ideal for a human being- is not considered to be the target. An individual with wide general knowledge is not assumed as productive as the one that has specialised knowledge, provided though that such a specialised knowledge:

(a) is appropriately channelled in the right position in the production process (or in the economy in general);
(b) is given the chance to prove its effectiveness and efficiency ;
(c) is accompanied by some specific features related to human behaviour and social relations, that, probably, have nothing to do with the individual's specialised knowledge but certainly act as an interdisciplinary supplement to it. This supplement corresponds to a managerial and social aspect of knowledge and helps to connect specialised knowledge with (i) production and (ii) citizenship.

Under such circumstances the countries that are in the process of some social transformation, are expected to provide education which should cover, among other things, the following dimensions:

1. It should go beyond the formal educational system and cover training, in-service training and lifelong education.

2. Given the rapid increase in the context of cognitive subjects, the spectacular changes in the production methods and the development of new jobs, education should give learners adequate knowledge and skills on "how to do things", "how to apply knowledge" but also on "how to learn".

3. Taking into account the economic environment, in which the relative importance of the private, the public and the social sector are interchanging, education should be adjusted to make future employees ready to move from one sector to another, not relying on tenure or on state jobs. Though the private sector is expected to increase in CEE countries, the international increasing trend of the social sector should be taken into account. This is expected to play an important role in any state in the 21st century.

4. Given the expected changes in the working environment, education should help human capital's flexibility and prepare individuals to adapt to new working schemes and environments –such as work at a distance, under conditions of high uncertainty and low social security etc.

5. Given the process of CEE economies towards privatisation, education should focus in promoting the human capital's creativity, its decision making ability and the development of managerial skills.

6. Given the characteristics of the worker of knowledge, whose knowledge is highly specialised but also unique (hence useful only in cooperation with other workers that have different skills), education should teach learners to be partners and colleagues. For similar reasons and for promoting development, education should teach learners to respect diversities, accept interdisciplinarity, work in team and co-exist.

Within these context, educational institutions and more specifically universities can play a significant role. Together with other (local/ national and international) institutions and with other agents of transformation, they can undertake the responsibility

- To provide education of adequate quantity and good quality in any field, so as to produce human capital with specialised knowledge well-linked to production.
- To provide this managerial and social supplement to education that will make human capital ready to adjust and to promote social transformation.

However if the University accepts to become an effective agent of transformation, it is necessary to update its own profile and set new terms for playing its multidimensional role as knowledge transmitter, creator of values and attitudes, agent of socialisation and democratisation and producer of active citizenship. Such a shape makes necessary for the university not to rely simply on its role as a centre of excellence but to become:

- a producer of social values and social behaviours,
- a creator, transmitter and disseminator of world thinking,
- an active and positive contributor to the international dialogue,
- an institution that combines technocratic perceptions of expertise with cultural values, a centre that promotes interaction and interdisciplinarity between social and "exact" or soft and hard sciences,
- an agent that promotes relationship and develops partnerships with social actors and other local, national and international social and economic agents.

Conclusions

The spectacular developments of technology and the increased needs for specialised knowledge are reasons that give priority to the so called 'exact' or hard sciences, putting into question the usefulness of social sciences, particularly after their failure to predict the radical political transformations of the last decades of the 20th century. However, it would be an injustice for social sciences to be marginalized in the process of social transformation. Social sciences create a scientific and research platform that produce frameworks for holistic as well as sectoral approaches, useful to decision makers, policy institutions and social transformation agents. Moreover, social sciences help management of any type and form, hence also the social transformation management.

Social sciences consists of a series of branches, which differ substantially among themselves, ranging from very "soft" to "hard", with fields like economics being among the latter. Collaboration among these branches is expected to produce models and paradigms that are essential for understanding the operation of social transformation. These models, if properly developed, could have a satisfactory predictive capacity, under assumptions and constraints explicitly described.

The role of the scientific field of economics, can be decisive.. Being a hard branch, highly based on quantitative methods, yet close to "soft" social sciences branches, this field may provide methodological instruments and techniques that facilitate social sciences in creating the background information for social transformation and in determining the model of social science transformation. The rationale on which econometric models are based is typical for integrated approaches usually applied in the context of studying multi-dimensional economic phenomena.

Furthermore, the inter-disciplinary collaboration of soft and hard branches of social sciences could be decisive in determining the goals of social transformation management. As mentioned above the theoretical background of economics of education may be applied to specify the notion of the society of knowledge and the profile of the knowledge worker. This specification could help social transformation agents and policy makers to proceed to sectoral decisions. Educational authorities, for example, could shape the goals of education accordingly and, within such a framework, the University as a social agent could re-examine its social profile.

Inter-disciplinary collaboration among branches of social sciences, together with collaboration on an trans- scientific level between social sciences and other scientific fields, will provide the links between social scientists and policymakers and will provide a background for social transformation that will be well adapted to global profiles, well accepted by local and national societies

and not at the expense of the regions' comparative socio-economic advantage and national or local cultural values.

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EXPERIENCES OF BENEFICIARY PARTICIPATION IN DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS FOR ROMA PEOPLE

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The article analyzes the relationship between NGO personnel and beneficiaries of five development projects in Roma communities in Romania, trying to assess opportunities and challenges for achieving beneficiary participation. The focus is on strategies of action and the structural differences in the positions of the two partners, which may lead to systematic tensions and unexpected frustrations for all participants in the project. The article is based on qualitative case-study research conducted in the years 2000 – 2003 in five Romanian localities.

Introduction[1]

After 1990 the number of development projects in Roma communities in Romania has increased continually. A comprehensive research on this topic identified 519 organizations that have implemented 1013 projects between 1990 and 2000, 80% of which were done after 1997 (Anăstăsoaie & Tarnovski 2001, p. 181). Given the increasing social relevance of this type of practice, it is important to study its achievements and challenges.

The particular significance of studying development projects in Roma communities derives from the fact that they represent an experiment in building citizenship for Roma people, bridging the social distance between them and the non-Roma citizens and authorities.

Table 1. Differences between the position of State policies and NGO projects in relation with the Roma population

State policies	Civil society development projects
Perceived as unmediated People view the State as the financer and the implementer at the same time. The State may be generous or absent, but not treacherous.	Perceived as mediated People view the NGO's as attracting funds from external sources, generally from abroad, in order to implement their projects. Sometimes NGO's are believed to abuse these funds, changing their destination.
Stable Policies have certain continuity, and the public officials are usually employed for several years at least.	Unstable Projects often last for one year or less, and the presence of the project staff in the community may fluctuate greatly.
Distant, impersonal Public authorities maintain a considerable	Claiming closeness and personal relationships

[1] This article is based on work supported by the Research Support Scheme of the Open Society Support Foundation (grant No.: 1621 / 2000) and by the New Europe College fellowship program, 2001-2002.

State policies	Civil society development projects
social distance towards the Roma people, and they judge (and often condemn) their behavior openly. Therefore, conflict tends to be explicit.	NGO staff claim to be the representatives of the Roma people and to try to help them with their needs. Relations are sometimes more personal. Therefore, conflict tends to be masked, and implicit.

Projects are opportunities of contact between Roma people and outsiders who, although they may share a paternalist "Enlightenment-type model of the Roma" (Anăstăsoaie & Tarnovski 2001, p. 183), believe that marginality is not inherent in the Roma life-course, and that social inclusion is desirable and possible. This belief in the possibility of change differentiates them from the more fatalistic state authorities, who more often than not ignore Roma communities, keeping or even pushing them in a de facto stateless population.

Still, unlike state policies, development projects create a relationship between assistants and the target population that is structurally vulnerable to suspicion, mistrust, and frustration. The NGO's are perceived (usually correctly) to be intermediaries in the circuit of funds towards the community. People sometimes suspect them of diverting resources from this circuit for personal profit. In the context of an interaction claiming to be based on mutual help and understanding, these suspicions lead to anger, mutual feelings of injustice, and sometimes open conflict.

The development projects that have taken place in Romania have been analyzed in evaluation reports that assess the progress in specific dimensions, with little focus on the structural conditions that inform them (such as the position of the development team as intermediary, and the strongly asymmetrical relationship with the beneficiaries – see also Table 1). The evaluation reports are also based on some normative judgments, such as putting a high value on consensual beneficiary participation, as means for sustainability and feed-back, and also as end in itself (proof of autonomy). The transformative value of conflict as a form of participation is rarely stressed, conflict being viewed as dysfunctional. This may be true for the case of short-term initiatives, where there is not enough time for adaptation and learning from errors, and conflict is synonymous with loss and failure. Still, in longer-term relationships, conflict is often a constituent fiber in the general texture, as Georg Simmel wrote one century ago:

"The opposition of one individual element to another in the same association in by no means merely a negative factor, but it is in many ways the only means through which coexistence with individuals intolerable in themselves could be possible. (...) In such case opposition is an integrating component of the relationship itself." (p. 493).

The research that informs the ideas presented in this article was conducted in two years, from 2000 to 2002. The methodology was qualitative: the research

was based on semi-structured interviews and more informal discussions with development practitioners in several Roma projects:

- The project of "Medecins du Monde Suisse" in Zăbrăuţi neighborhood, Bucharest;
- The project of "Prieteni pentru Hetea" and "Mână deschisă" in Hetea village, Vâlcele (Covasna county);
- The project of "Asociaţia Femeilor Tigănci - Pentru Copiii Noştri" in Colonia Ştrand neighborhood, Timişoara (Timiş county);
- The projects of Wassdas Foundation and the Resource Center for Roma Communities in Pata Rât neighborhood, Cluj-Napoca (Cluj county);
- The project of "Institutul Intercultural Timişoara" in Satchinez and Periam (Timiş county).

During fieldwork I did have the opportunity to have brief discussions with people targeted by the project (especially in Zăbrăuţi, where I also conducted semi-structured interviews, and, to less extent, in Hetea, Pata Rât and Timişoara). Still, these discussions are insufficient to support a beneficiary assessment of the project. Therefore, the following findings refer much more to the experiences and perspectives of the project teams, than to those of the Roma people who interacted with the project. In the article I have used the terms "beneficiary" and "client" interchangeably to refer to persons targeted by the project, and who have interacted in some way with the project team.

With the exception of the IIT project, the others have lasted for several years, thus having a considerable continuity, and undergoing many transformations. The relationship between clients and assistants was therefore quite structured, based on the experience of constant interaction.

Table 2. Brief description of the development projects

Organizer	Location and type of community	Period of intervention	Activities	Target population
(Previous : UNDP) "Medecins du Monde Suisse"	Zăbrăuţi neighborhood, Bucharest Blocks of flats occupied by homeless families or migrants Mixed community, including Roma of many groups and Romanians	MDM: 1999 – 2003	Medical assistance Social and juridical assistance (obtaining ID cards, means tested benefits, and other) Homework preparation with school pupils Job search	All inhabitants of Zăbrăuţi (individual assistance)

Organizer	Location and type of community	Period of intervention	Activities	Target population
			mediation	
"Prieteni pentru Hetea" and "Mână deschisă"	Hetea village, Vâlcele (Covasna county) Isolated village "Lingurari" Roma	1990 – present	Material assistance (various types of aid) Kindergarten Building a farm, for economic and educational use in the future Religious services	All inhabitants of Hetea (Also: former homeless children from Bucharest, and former drug-addicted people from Dordrecht, Holland) (attempts to organize a Village Council)
"Asociația Femeilor Țigănci 'Pentru Copiii Noștri'"	Colonia Ştrand neighborhood, Timişoara Neighborhood of the Timişoara city Mixed community of Geambaşi, vătraşi and Căldăraşi Roma	1996 – present	Homework assistance Theatre and dance classes Other educational activities (excursions and camps, various classes, editing a publication, etc) Other assistance as required by special cases	Children, mostly from the Strand neighborhood Persons in need from the community (individual assistance; attempts to involve parents)
(Previous: Medecins sans Frontieres) Wassdas Foundation and the Resource Center for Roma Communities	Pata Rât neighborhood, Cluj Shanty town next to the garbage pit of the city of Cluj Mixed community of poor Roma and Romanian families, looking for a source of subsistence	(MSF: 1991-1997) Wassdas: 1997 – present CRCR: 2001 - present	Contribution to organizing a school for Pata Rât children Accompanying and assisting the pupils Various types of assistance (medical, juridical)	Main target: Pata Rât children Other: Pata Rât inhabitants, according to available resources (individual assistance; attempts to involve parents attempts to

Organizer	Location and type of community	Period of intervention	Activities	Target population
				organize community leadership)
"Institutul Intercultural Timişoara"	Roma neighborhoods in Satchinez and Periam villages (Timiş county)	2000-2001	Intercultural camps with Roma and non-Roma young people Fieldwork in two Roma villages	Young Roma and non-Roma volunteers for the project

The concept of beneficiary participation

"Participation" has become a key word in the literature on development. Participation is valued instrumentally as well as intrinsically, and it carries a significant emotional weight. As A. Hall observes, "for many theoreticians and practitioners of development, 'participation' has become an article of faith, a fundamental prerequisite for any successful project or programme, and the single most important key to improving the livelihoods of the world's poor" (p. 91).

In the following paper I will argue that common conceptions about beneficiary participation, as illustrated in the development literature and in the evaluations shared by development practitioners, do not adequately reflect the experience of development in Roma communities, at least as it appears from the case studies I have researched. More specifically, the frequency and the significance of conflicts are underestimated, while consensual cooperation and participation are overestimated. As a consequence, when conflicts and misunderstandings actually occur in development projects, project workers are sometimes puzzled, sometimes frustrated; they end by getting used to it, but they still perceive these conflicts to be a sign of failure in the project, something that should not have happened. After a longer experience, when they redefine rules and criteria for success, they stress the need for adaptation and tolerance for conflicts, given the high potential for "traumatic" interactions:

And this job probably has to be negotiated between what we generally expect from them and what they expect from us, or how they think, such as to be the least traumatic for each of the participants...(A.S., program manager, Pata Rit)

By its very definition, participation involves an interaction with an outsider who wants to help. The issue is: who will have control over the helping process? Who is "in the driver's seat" (Ellerman [1], p. 8): the helped, or the helper?

The typical case of full, consensual participation appears when the person, aware of her needs, makes a decision to address them, designs an operational plan, but lacks some of the resources needed to implement it; therefore, it asks for help. Then, the assistant will provide the missing resources. In the end the beneficiary will solve her problem, proving mastery of her own life.

For many reasons, this situation is rare. The most marginal people may not be aware of all of their needs; they may not have the courage or determination to try to solve them, or they may not know how to start. They may not know where or how to ask for help. Therefore, the assistant is the one who will have the initiative; the need to be solved and the way to do it will be somehow negotiated between the helper and the beneficiary. Therefore, development is often an intervention from outside, which aims to minimize the further need for such an intervention.

It is also true that organizations that implement development projects do not always efficiently promote beneficiary participation. In a review of the literature on the role of civil society in reducing urban poverty, D. Mitlin points towards several reasons why this may happen: NGOs allow little control to grassroots organizations over the development projects, they are sometimes insensitive to issues of power struggles within the community, and they often take over most of the responsibilities of the project, becoming "over-active" and thus lowering opportunities for beneficiary participation, learning and improvement (Mitlin 2001, p. 159 – 160).

Building the capacity of auto-determination from outside is a difficult task: it involves more than just filling a gap in resources. It needs to create a particular connection of the assisted person with the world, based on the capacity to diagnose oneself, the capacity to get the necessary resources from outside, and to organize them such as to obtain the solution. Control over oneself and control over the outside world are both necessary, and it is a tricky task to obtain them under the guidance – that is, under the control – of somebody else. In what D. Ellerman calls "the helping conundrum", helpers must sometimes decide not to help the "doers", the assisted persons, in the way they demand, because this help will actually undermine their autonomy: "If the doers have sufficient own-motivation to help themselves then non-distortionary aid to supply the means would indeed help the doers to help themselves. But if the doers are motivated to help themselves primarily in order to avoid certain adverse consequences and if unrestricted aid could itself alleviate those consequences, then the aid would subsidize the doers not helping themselves." (Ellerman [1], p. 5)

From this point of view it is understandable that conflicts may have structural causes and an important role too: conflicts are a manifestation of autonomy, and they promote the independence of the involved parties.

There are other reasons as well that account for the significance of conflicts in development. They derive from the characteristics of the relationship between beneficiaries and project workers, features which are detailed below. In brief, there are three main reasons for conflicts:

1. Roma people often experience discrimination and / or conflicts with non-Roma people and institutions; project staff comes to mediate this difficult relationship of marginalization, and it is unavoidable to enter a few such conflicts themselves.
2. The relationship between project workers and their clients is deeply unbalanced, despite all discourses that portray beneficiaries as equal fellows and partners in development.
3. Assistance is often negotiated between clients and project staff. Conflicts may appear in these negotiations for strategic reasons, as both parties try to defend their reasons and perspectives on how assistance should look like.

Participation within the beneficiary-assistant relationship

The process of participation is part of the relationship between assisted people and the assistants. The study of this relationship is essential for understanding challenges, and strategies for fostering participation.

This relationship is characterized by several important tensions, some of which are especially related to the Roma communities, and some are determined by the structure of the relationship. These tensions often give rise to conflicts. It may seem that in such a relationship conflicts must be avoided and minimized, while participation should be encouraged and maximized, meaning that the quality of the relationship is described by somehow subtracting conflicts from participation. In the following pages I will argue that conflicts are an unavoidable part of this relationship, often the means to achieve beneficiary participation, and that they should not in themselves be considered signs of a failing relationship.

In the particular case of the projects in Roma communities, conflict may arise even more often than in projects that deal with other groups, less subject to discrimination and better integrated into the mainstream society. The development assistants have to mediate the conflictual relationship which usually exists between Roma community members and the broader Romanian society (including insitutions such as the local authorities, the school, the Police, the health care providers, employers, etc). Assistants intervene in a situation dominated by conflicts and discrimination for many years or even for many generations. They often have to face themselves negative attitudes from various authorities and institutions, in their role of representatives of Roma interests. On the contrary, for the Roma people assistants may be considered part of the generally hostile non-Roma society, and it happens that beneficiaries use the

skills acquired in managing previous conflicts into the new relationship. It is not easy for the team to define a new game of interacting with the Roma community, a game that is not based on conflicts but on cooperation.

To the extent that it involves two very different partners, the relationship between assistants and clients is bound to be marked by tensions. Differences are multiple, such as: unequal access to ressources, unequal involvement in the relationship, different expectations about the relationship, and diverging tactical orientations for solving problems.

The access to resources is usually in the hands of the assistants. They are the ones who ultimately decide how these resources are to be used, according to criteria devised by their organization. These criteria may not be very popular with beneficiaries, and resources may often not be enough to satisfy all demands. Therefore, clients are often frustrated because they do not receive the type or the amount of aid they believe they should.

Expectations of development assistants towards their relationship are quite different from beenficiaries' expectations. Assistants define their work as helping people in need, and they expect the recipient of aid, in return, to acknowledge this help, to be grateful, to volunteer to participate in order to ease the assistance process, and to remember past assistance. On the other hand, people expect that assistants will address their most important needs. Because assistants often prefer to address needs that are of secondary importance (but can be more easily alleviated in practice), none of these expectations are fully satisfied, and conflicts are probable to emerge.

These asymmetries in expectations are amplified by differences in involvement and time investment. Professionally, assistants spend their working hours in the project, interacting with people in the target population. Beneficiaries have other jobs and work to do in their daily lives, which obviously means that clients spend considerably less time in their relationship with assistants. This asymmetry is a reason for the higher estimate of the significance of aid by the assistants, compared with the beneficiaries. The difference in involvement is important for understanding the structure of the beneficiary-assistant relationship.

Moreover, the interaction between assistants and beneficiaries is influenced by the internal relations within the target community (and within the assistant organization as well). This interaction may be impeded, for example, by gender inequalities and restraints within the Roma community, or by the interference of local leaders. Assistance may also generate competition for resources between potential beneficiaries, resulting in feelings of injustice or even in conflicts.

According to the time spent together by beneficiaries and assistants, and to the depth and variety of their interactions, mutual knowledge can vary along a broad continuum. From the five projects included in this study, only one of

them was initiated by a local Roma person, who consequently had intimate knowledge of the beneficiaries (Timişoara). In the other projects assistants shared to a variable extent a common experience and / or cultural background with the beneficiaries.

Some obvious examples of value differences between assistants and beneficiaries concerns the tactics of solving problems – such as the temporal orientation (long term or short term), and the attitude towards cooperation.

So they came in the last minute, the same as they did with all the things. They need their identity cards, they need them tomorrow. They come today, "you know, I need my identity card immediately" or "I have lost my birth certificate and I need it this week for no matter what". They did the same with the divorces: they came right now, they were entitled to receive an apartment from ICRAL, but people from ICRAL told them "because you are married, we would not draw the contract to your name, but to your husband's. So we would need your husband's papers and copies of his identity card etc." Of course they did not have those papers, as they had been separated for a long time. So some five of them came saying they would want their papers, but they want them now - "Is it possible to have them in a week or two?", "No, it cannot be done", "But I need them in order to get my contract!" (Social worker, MDM)

Assistants value strongly the capacity for long term planning and for cooperation; after all, this is what development projects are about. We can say that project assistants are, in a way, in the business of planning and networking for change. Beneficiaries, on the other hand, live their lives, are they may be less committed to planning, or to cooperation with strangers. Team members repeatedly pointed to "short-term orientations" and "lack of cooperative attitudes" among neighbors as main challenges for them:

At a certain point, we have spoken to the mothers, because a lot of children skip school these days, because they have to take care of their younger brothers, so we have decided to do something of this sort: "we are 10 to 15 women with very young children, two of us baby sit the 15 children today, tomorrow another two stay with them and so on". But we could never do this, as we did not have a location where to accommodate so many children. The women did not want this, probably because they would not trust their neighbor. If I had insisted more, maybe I would have done it. And maybe they would have got to communicating and to co-operating between themselves, as they would have been forced to, so to speak. And, after two years in this project, I have drawn the conclusion that if you do not force them to co-operate, they would not co-operate voluntarily. (M.U., project manager, Pata Rit)

Assistants also hope, at least implicitly, that they are going to change the value orientation of the beneficiaries. They work to change attitudes towards

planning and towards cooperation, but also to shift the motivation structure towards a better appreciation of school education, family planning, regular employment, and gender equality. The difficulty of this change may be underestimated, especially when little time is available to dedicate to individual beneficiaries. Failure to induce such changes generates frustration and pessimism among assistants.

Because of these characteristics of the relationship between assistants and beneficiaries, specific challenges arise in trying to foster participation. These difficulties are detailed below: apathy or outright resistance to project initiatives, conflicts of interests, gender blockages, and feelings of suspicion.

Challenges in achieving individual beneficiary participation

Apathy

Apathy may result from a long experience of powerlessness, and to mistrust in outsiders, both common to the lives of many Roma people. On this background of suspicion towards non-Roma, initiatives that demand their effort or that contradict their priorities may generate resistance. This is the case, for example, with projects that require women participation or interactions among men and women in communities with more traditional, restrictive gender relations.

Apathy in relation to a specific project activity can be explained by various mechanisms. It could be that the respective activity does not visibly enhance the self-control of the people, and therefore it does not challenge a reasonable attitude of passivity towards uncontrollable situations. Maybe the proposed tools are too expensive for the beneficiaries, and involve an overwhelming change in their lives. Another possibility is that some people do not believe that it is appropriate for them to participate, because they lack the minimum competence, and they feel that have nothing to say: the project is useful if it goes on according to its own (and somehow alien) logic. It could also be that the potential beneficiaries are in fact actively resisting the project, because it runs against their interests or preferences.

These diverse situations may occur at different times in development projects. In Zăbrăuți, people were initially ignoring the program of assistance related to ID cards, divorces, applying to social aid and other legal issues, because they were not planning to solve any problem related to such apparently intractable bureaucratic problems. Gradually, as the project enabled some of the people to improve their situation, the number of clients has increased considerably. What seemed impossible before, was now possible and worthy of intervention. Using the project coordinator's words, people have become "more reactive" to their own situation, instead of being passive.

Education is a field with many cases of parent apathy or even resistance to specific activities. Meetings never seem to mobilize parents according to

teachers' expectations. Parents do not see what contribution they could make to the education of their children, which is best left for the teachers to deal with:

- *So, how is school? How do you get along with the teachers? What do you think?*
- *My daughter tells me from time to time, as I tell her too: if you do not pass, I will beat you or else, and his father tells her the same thing. But she tells us: well, you teach me then. But what can I teach her, I cannot teach her as I do not know how. I am now like a one-eyed man, I cannot see, so I tell her: read! Write! (Mother of a pupil, Zăbrăuți)*

This does not mean that parents do not care about their children's education, but only that they have a different view about their responsibilities. A. Lareau describes a similar situation in her comparison of working-class families with middle-class ones: "Although the educational values of the two groups of parents did not differ, the ways in which they promoted educational success did. In the working class community, parents turned over the responsibility for education to the teacher. Just as they depended on doctors to heal their children, they depended on teachers to educate them. In the middle-class community, however, parents saw education as a shared enterprise and scrutinized, monitored, and supplemented the school experience of their children" (p. 81).

At the same time, though, interviews with parents in Zăbrăuți show that they seem to value mostly in education the benefits with visible uses, such as literacy, the ability to speak politely, and, if possible, professional qualification. This is probably also true of other poor Roma parents. This is why, if professional qualification seems unattainable, the utility of the fifth to seventh grades in school is declining abruptly.

Lack of interest in project activities may also be due to the fact that people are busy going on with their lives along difficult paths. Project activities may be central in the work and lives of project assistants, but this is not necessarily the case with beneficiaries, who have other concerns and other work to do. For example, in the IIT project several young Roma people, previously involved actively in the project, chose to abandon the initiative and to go to work abroad, since this was more valuable for them:

-For now, there is only the 5 of us involved in this project, but unfortunately, we are now down to 3.

-What happened to the rest of the team?

-One of them left for Germany, another is in Austria, but we are counting on him coming back. We hope to be able to work with him again in the future. We are looking for other volunteers as well.

-Why would you not leave for Germany as well, would it not be more profitable?

-I do not think so.

-Do you not have the means or is it too expensive?
-No, I even had an offer, I could have left some 3 months ago, but I refused, as I believed I should finish what I have started. (...) As far as going abroad, there is not much I can do. I have no place to stay, nothing to do. (...) I have decided not to go abroad for now, as we have started this project here, the association. After this is over, in 3 – 4 months time, I will go as well, I cannot stay here, I will try my luck abroad. Leaving would not be a problem, as I could pay my travel insurance even tomorrow, I could obtain all the necessary documents and I could leave. Leaving would not present a problem. (Roma project worker, IIT, Satchinez)

Resisting the project: conflict of reasons

It is also in the field of education that many conflicts of reasoning occur, proof of the fact, among others, that parents do have an active interest in the upbringing of their children, contrary to what development assistants sometimes believe (as it can be seen in the quote below). For example, parents may be especially protective of their daughters. This means, among others, restricting their mobility in unknown environments. This is why young Roma girls were not allowed to go into educational camps in the IIT project, and also in the educational project from the Strand Colony, Timişoara, as one participant recalls:

-The first year I worked there, Ms. M. organized a trip to Hungary, she intended to take just the children, and not the parents, to Hungary. But the parents opposed the idea with no reason. They would not sign; they would not agree to let their girls go. This is the Roma way of thinking... what happens with the girl, what if something happened to her, or to her virginity... well. They would not let them go, and I could not understand why. Because there is a certain good will, openness towards them. They either opposed or they did not care. Ms. M. always kept on asking for their signatures, in fact some official statements in front of a notary if I am correct, but they just would not want to sign them... they were not interested in fact. I believe Ms. M., even not being a parent, actually cared more about the children then the real parents. In this case, there should be a change in their mentality.
-Did the trip finally go on as planned?
-Yes, it did, but due to some enormous efforts. I have never seen Ms. M. in such a state; she was exhausted, having to cope with the Romanian authorities on one side and with the parents on the other. (D.C., project worker, Timişoara)

While the project worker attributes the resistance to a lack of motivation for education, it is probably fit to understand it as a conflict of reasons, of priorities for educating a young woman.

Also in the field of education, Roma parents may oppose the idea of learning Roma language in school:

There were no adverse reactions, but there were some attitudes, so... why learn the Roma language, they do not use it at home, they do not need it. (School Director, Pata Rit)

In these cases we cannot speak of a conflict of interests proper, because in fact each party is trying to promote the interests of the children, or other beneficiaries. It is just that these interests may be understood differently, in what we can term a conflict of reasons.

Conflicts of interests

Conflicts of interests may appear in the cases when the development agents have an interest of their own to defend. In Hetea, for example, the team was building and then managing a farm. While the farm was intended to serve the Roma community in the future, and actually did support the community kindergarten by offering each child a sandwich, at the time it was mainly operated for the benefit of its inhabitants. Specifically, it was a project of rehabilitation for former street children, who were living and working in the farm under the supervision of a social worker. Therefore, the local team who had a direct interest in the safety and welfare of the farm, while some Hetea inhabitants perceived the farm as a threat to their interests, a waste of the resources to which they were entitled. This was a source of tensions and even violent conflicts.

In Zăbrăuți it also happens that the interests of the team, who is providing free mediation services for people in their interaction with local authorities or medical institutions, are in conflict with the interests of some local leaders, who are also providing mediation services, in exchange for money or other benefits.

Gender issues

Gender can be a factor in explaining lack of participation in two ways. First of all, women are generally participating less in public life than men do. In particular, young unmarried women are subjected to strict parental control. On the other hand, married women may also find it difficult to quit their chores and get involved in extra-domestic activities, especially if their husbands are opposed to it.

Women are usually in charge with family issues, such as taking the child to the doctor, but men are in charge with local politics, with the relationship with outsiders. For example, in Hetea, the Village Council includes the most influent heads of families, all men. On the other side, many conflicts appear in Hetea between women and the development team members (such as the doctor), as they enter into direct contact. Therefore, these conflicts tend to be solved less by dialogue and negotiation between the interested parts (namely, women, on one

side, and doctors, on the other side), but as a domestic issue, after the husband is persuaded that their wives have done something wrong. This interaction starts with verbal aggression (between women and doctors) and ends with domestic aggression, without leaving space for women voicing their concerns in a neutral space.

Structural suspicion

The relationship between assistants and clients is, by its very design, unbalanced. Assistants have considerably more control over valuable resources, such as money and influence in the outside world, than the people they want to assist. The two parts have very different social positions, and this difference often leads to misunderstandings, or even suspicion.

On this background, withdrawing support from beneficiaries may be a source of tremendous tension. Such a general and intense suspicion from community members against the development team happened for example in Hetea. Members of the Village Council feel that significant resources, to which they are entitled, because were collected especially for them, are being unrightfully withheld from them and spent for other purposes. This tension developed especially after the foundation ceased to distribute cash aid for families (because of resulting problems with an increase in alcoholism), reorienting the money towards the kindergarten and the farm. Former recipients of the cash aid are very frustrated about this loss, which they attribute to the selfishness of the team. At a smaller scale, ceasing to distribute small aid in kind (such as sugar, oil, coffee) to Hetea inhabitants has also led to conflicts between farm inhabitants and the community.

Also in Zăbrăuți the project coordinator reports tensions due to what she perceives to be a misattribution of their actions to strictly selfish motivations:

We went to Zăbrăuți because people there are very hospitable; they are nice to those who care about them, about their situation, this is why we decided to stay there. We used to have good relationships, except for some of them, who had some problems. There are many who have psychological problems. We have to admit that we have some trouble with some people we know. But this is just normal, we cannot do everything and there are scandals as well. Besides that, everything runs smoothly, but it was not like this right from the start. At first they received this aid and they were very happy. Now they have got used to it, they consider us just an NGO, dedicated to their cause, so we have to do anything for them, we cannot refuse them anything. We cannot say no to anything, because many of them take it very badly and from time to time we have some unpleasant reactions. They consider us some sort of administration. They come to us like when they go to the supermarket, "I would like a consultation" "I need a fiscal stamp for who knows what". This is not too good, but it is a normal situation, considering that they think

we make a living by helping them, so we have a duty towards them. That is what they think. We have already told them: "we could leave tomorrow; there is no problem for us". This is hard for them to understand. Because they always think people only work for a profit, and this is the problem we have with this job project. They usually come to us when they are desperate because they could not get any job, because they never even tried to get a job and after they have been living in debt for a long time. So, they are desperate. They come and tell us "you have to find a job for me, now". They are not aware of the fact that we can work, because the thing we do for them means in fact money. This is how they think and they believe we think in the same way. This is the problem. It is hard to say "you know, we work hard here because we like it and if we did not, we would not be here. (Project coordinator, Zăbrăuți)

Creating a workable beneficiary – assistant relationship

Achieving beneficiary participation in a project requires a capacity to negotiate priorities and uses of resources, to make and to obtain credible promises about future actions, and to enforce these promises on both sides. The most important process instrumental to achieving beneficiary participation is shaping a useful relationship between project workers and beneficiaries. This relationship must make possible meaningful communication between parts, and it must also make possible making commitments.

To be more precise, in cases of totally participatory aid, when project workers simply fill in resources which beneficiaries lack in order to complete their own initiatives, there is not much need for such a stable relationship, since potential for conflict and ensuing need for negotiation are low. A workable relationship becomes necessary when project workers aim to change something in the patterns of behavior or in the motivational structure of the respondents. Their disagreements over what is to be done have to be worked out through negotiations, reaching agreements for common actions.

In the relationship with the targeted people, assistants claim not to protect their own personal interests, but to fight mainly for the welfare of their clients. This poses a clear limitation on the amount of conflict and divergence that this relationship is able to bear. Moreover, disagreements between assistants and beneficiaries, and the refusal to grant a specific type of aid, must be carefully justified by project workers, such as not to convey the impression that assistants are indifferent towards beneficiaries, that they are unable to understand people's needs, or that they follow their own agenda. Refusal must be thoroughly justified in terms acceptable to beneficiaries.

Assistants may work and establish a workable relationship with all targeted people, or they may devise a filter and select a few beneficiaries that are closer

to the desired behavior model and easier to integrate into the project (and who will maybe offer an example to other potential clients). This is where community leaders may become very useful for the project, facilitating the interaction – sometimes at the cost of a broader involvement and transparency:

Things would have been a lot easier should it have been a traditional community, with a proper leader that we could have talked to. At least, even if we did not agree on certain aspects, we could at least get to talking... and as the leader would have agreed to something, the whole community would have acted accordingly. But this was not the case here; there was no one to talk to. (Social worker, MDM Zăbrăuți)

Assistants' involvement

One of the main obstacles in achieving a workable team-beneficiary relationship in actual projects is the unstable involvement of the development assistants. For example, staff members change, and the personal interactions with the community members have to start again, from scratch. Or, interaction may be discontinuous, sporadic.

This difficulty appears clearly in projects of Hetea and IIT. In both of them, in some ways, local development was intended as a by-product of the interventions that had a different aim. In the IIT project, the main objective was intercultural contact. In Hetea, the situation is further complicated by a double agenda: rehabilitation for former drug-addicts in Dordrecht (who come once per year to help Roma people in Hetea), and rehabilitation for former street-children of Bucharest (who have lived for a year in the farm built by the team in the village). To be sure, there have been many attempts to establish a constant presence in Hetea: six teams have come to the farm, stayed for a while, and left afterwards, because of difficult living conditions and / or conflicts with the villagers. Kindergarten teachers, the doctor, and the pastor have also been present in the village. A constant presence of an agent dedicated to interacting with the entire community is still to be obtained, though.

The idea that a development project requires constant participation of the development agent has been repeatedly stressed by respondents. Informal, personal relations with the beneficiaries, the kind that can only be based on long-term mutual knowledge, are also considerably easing the interaction (as it can be seen in Hetea, in Pata Rit, and also, to a lesser extent, in Zăbrăuți).

When the intervening team does not have enough people to insure a constant contact with beneficiaries, many of the relevant variables are escaping control. Beneficiaries' trust in the success of the intervention in changing their lives (although not necessarily in the person of the agent) declines. The agent becomes a guest, either welcomed or not, but in any case losing influence and the capacity to stir people's interest.

Participation is rarely a cheap solution for the assistant team, as it demands a lot of effort on their behalf. Participation cannot be achieved as a byproduct of other activities, especially in very marginal communities. Team participation and dedication is essential for beneficiary participation.

Rules and filters

People try to shape their relationship with assistants such as to optimize need satisfaction. The meaning of this relationship is strictly related, for beneficiaries, to helping them out in times of need. On the contrary, assistants attach importance to another characteristic as well: rules. Rules for interaction are important for assistants instrumentally, because they simplify the complexity of the situation, and they increase the efficiency of the team's efforts. Such rules especially include schedules for appointments, criteria for granting aid. For reasons of scarcity, aid cannot be distributed all the time and to every person in need. Rules are imposed to filter the demand. Not surprisingly, strict rules tend to be unpopular with beneficiaries, because the crises they confront demand a more unpredictable action. For example, at least in Zăbrăuți (and also in Hetea), people often come and ask for medical and social assistance outside the scheduled intervals, which has been a constant source of minor quarrels. People who have been denied assistance because they did not match the project criteria are angry and discontented with the activity of the team, suspecting them of a hidden agenda.

Assistants sometimes condition aid on what they consider to be tokens of participation, in order to filter beneficiaries, distributing resources only to those who value them. For example, beneficiaries may be requested to find their way to a certain institution (such as the Unemployment Office, or the Hospital) instead of being led there by the agent. The reasoning behind this choice is that only really motivated beneficiaries will come, while the others will stay home and spare valuable efforts of the assistants.

Assistants tend to value rules in themselves too, because respecting a certain discipline is seen as a first step of integration of the beneficiaries into the broader society. Understanding and complying with rules of interaction is seen as an independent objective of the project, as this ability would further ease the interaction of the beneficiaries with other institutions that have rules and criteria for assistance (such as local authorities, the Police, schools and medical centers, etc).

While the formal approach is applied to the main activities of the project, there is some space for informality in more peripheral and personal activities. A variable degree of informality and rule-flexibility may be integrated into the project too. Special cases need special treatment to be solved. Still, too many exceptions may disrupt the rules or they may upset those who have not

benefited from a special treatment; this is why making exceptions is a delicate decision.

Sanctions imposed by assistants

In order to negotiate effectively, project assistants must clearly demonstrate good will and comprehension, but also trustworthiness and commitment to the implementation of decisions. Otherwise, agreements will be broken by partners when it is more convenient. On their side, project workers must reduce incentives for defaulting on agreements, without having proper sanctions at their disposal. Basically, the assistants cannot impose other significant sanction than withdrawing assistance, which means a failure in the project, and may generate considerable hostility (as we have seen above), therefore being quite undesirable.

Instead of looking for sanctions, it is therefore more profitable for the team to structure their relationship such as to condition further assistance on present performance and participation. As Schelling observes in matters of general strategy, "what makes many agreements enforceable is only the recognition of future opportunities for agreement that will be eliminated if mutual trust is not created and maintained, and whose value outweighs the momentary gain from cheating in the present instance. (…) So, if a major issue has to be negotiated, it may be necessary to seek out and negotiate some minor items for 'practice', to establish the necessary confidence in each other's awareness of the long term value of good faith" (p. 45).

For a development agent it is difficult to impose sanctions that would contribute to further deteriorating the already precarious situation of their clients. Finding mechanisms of pressure that in effect lead to no harm is very difficult. Limiting or withdrawing assistance in various ways may be one solution; another solution consists of using threats, and the authority of feared institutions, such as the Police:

The Education Law stipulates in one of its articles, I think it is article number 178 or... I do not recall the number, that the parents are compelled to send the children to school. The parents can be sanctioned with a fine if they do not send their children to the mandatory school. So this is another kind of incentive. But the problem was that we had neither whom to fine nor where to send the fine, but they were a little scared that someone would come and ask them questions and so on. And... it worked. Other time, we realized the parents did not come to the meeting. What could we do, if they did not show up? There were 2 or 3 of them coming, Mr. G. came as well, we got to talking, but those were the parents whose children were not in trouble. And then, we started discussing the options: not to give them the allocation was one of them. But that was not a solution, I said we should give them some subpoena, to invite them to a meeting by the means of a written form, that would be

stamped by the Police as well, so we could analyze their reasons and understand what they want... (School Director, Pata Rit)

Most frequent measures taken to adjust assistance include stricter rules and criteria, and especially choosing that type of aid that cannot be abused, but only used. This is why cash assistance is very rare: project workers do not trust beneficiaries to follow their "best long-term interests" if given cash benefits. Projects include benefits in kind, such as goods or services. Precautions are then taken that these goods are not sold. For example, in Hetea, after several years in which donated roofs made of aluminum sheets were sold by the house owners, the team has started to repair roofs with plastic materials which cannot be sold or used in other purposes. Similar measures were systematically taken in Pata Rit:

We used to give them halves of soap, so they could not sell it or... We would give them powder milk for the baby and we would only give them another ration only if they showed or gave back the box it was delivered in. So we had sort of a system, that was the main thing, we had the principle of working materially, of finding and satisfying a material need there. And then we wait for a response. We have always tried to achieve a certain dynamic from this process. (A.S., Project manager, Pata Rit)

Project workers also condition assistance on what they value most as a tool for improving beneficiaries' lives – such as school attendance, following medical treatments, etc. Aid is used as a currency for obtaining specific responses which would otherwise not be possible.

Sanctions imposed by the targeted population

In what looks like a paradoxical situation for an outside observer, some villagers in Hetea were threatening the development team with expulsion from the village and rejection of further aid, if the team would not provide some aid in cash. Refusing assistance is one of the few forms of sanctions that people can impose on assistants when they believe that the relationship is not fair. Suspicions that project team members are using resources for their personal benefit, instead of the needs of the people, are frequent, and cannot be easily refuted. Since assistants are often mediators between sponsors and beneficiaries, the latter do not have direct access to the former, in order to check what resources have flown into the project. The position of intermediary in a financial circuit is a challenge for building an open and transparent relationship.

Trial and error

Project workers try to approximate to their best a participatory model of assistance, by adapting their assistance to the variable requirements of the situation. The situation includes the needs of the beneficiaries, the beneficiaries' behaviors that the assistants would like to see changed, but also the limits on

what the project workers can realistically do. Aid is then finding a combination of assistance, requests (or conditions) and rules that works well in that context:

We are trying to find a need that we can satisfy, because, obviously, their needs are a lot vaster and we have to choose something that we can achieve and also find something in return. For instance: "she would not send her child to school, except for receiving the children allocation, because she does not have clothes, no soap to send the child neat to school", so we give her soap, and we give it gradually, not for a whole month, in order to avoid them selling it. We used to give them halves of soap, so they could not sell it or... (A.S., Project manager, Pata Rit)

These combinations are fragile, as they are devised under uncertainty. A constant work of gathering information and feeding it back into the project is necessary:

In fact, it is enough to talk to them; in reality communication must take a lot of the time in this job. Practically, you can obtain the information you want and you can think it through..(A.S., program manager, Pata Rit)

Overall, the project develops in practice by trial and error, "step-by-step":

When we first came here, we did not have a proper method, so we got inside the community and listened to what they wanted, what they needed and we identified the major issues and the ones we could solve. Then we continued step-by-step. At first, there was the medical assistance, then, after one year the social assistance came and we never stopped anything. We did everything they said we should. We did not have a system right from the beginning. We learned along with them. And the Sunday work schedule came 6 months after the social aid. So, we said, "ok". We cannot have a social assistance program. But we could help them with things that would generate this social security and certain independence, also money for buying food and everything". So, we went step-by-step. We listened and we decided "ok, we can do this". (C.T., program manager, Zăbrăuți)

Concluding observations

The systematic difficulties encountered by development practitioners in their work in Roma communities, and probably in other communities as well, are underrepresented in the development literature. Project workers themselves seem to have been, at least at the beginning of their work, ill prepared to deal with the conflicts in their projects. These conflicts were unexpected and difficult to interpret in a paradigm that centers on the value of direct, consensual beneficiary participation.

Beneficiary participation does not just happen in a project; it is fostered within a difficult and sometimes frustrating relationship that requires intensive involvement from project assistants. Assistants and beneficiaries are different in

many ways – from their values, priorities, motivations to interact, to their skills and access to resources. The relationship between assistants and beneficiaries is therefore very asymmetrical, and it has to mediate a general tense relation between Roma and non-Roma people. The challenge is to accommodate these tensions and to make them functional in promoting learning and autonomy, in a stable relationship based on communication and cooperation.

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*** "*Îmbunătăţirea situaţiei romilor. Proiecte de success din România*" ("Improving the Roma Situation. Successful Projects in Romania"), PHARE Project RO 9803.01 and National Office for Roma

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A THEORETICAL EXPERIMENT IN ORGANIZATIONAL TRANSFORMATION: IMPLEMENTING THE CHANGE AT POLYPROD'S M&DDIV

Ciprian Bădescu – I.C.C.V

Change management is one of the main organizational processes influencing the success of any organization in the marketplace. Assessing the factors that might be directly responsible for a successfully implemented change management process should represent a continuous managerial concern. The main purpose of initiating the change management process at organizational level is reducing the potential gap between what the organization does and what should do according to the realities from the marketplace. The change management is a continuous re-adjustment of organizational capabilities in the business environment. Polyprod is a potential organization that failed to re-adjust its organizational capabilities. It is a multinational organization confronted with a fussy climate dominated by functional hierarchy and cross-functional tensions. The organizational culture at Polyprod hindered better adding value processes. The following analysis addresses both the present state of Polyprod as organization and the factors that might improve organizational competitiveness through a potential change management process.

Introduction

In this paper we shall propose a new type of social change approach in the field of organizational studies. Our purpose is not to study the organization but to find out a method appropriate for the implementation of a changing plan so that to get finally a sustainable change within that organization. To attain such a goal, you have to handle a huge amount of data. Dealing with information at the organizational level means abilities to keep up with increasing data complexity. That is why the information management or the ability of keep up with the burgeoning quantity of data has become a critical factor for high-technology companies.

These are not confronted only with high technology and complex information systems but with special organizational structure, trained people and organizational interconnectivity.

The way that senior management, the employees deal with this structure and interconnectivity within the organization and environment is essential in gaining competitive advantage in the market.

The pace of technological change coupled with pressures from a competitive environment (competitors, consumers, regulations) could be overwhelming that the companies cannot afford to waste time re-inventing methodologies or re-justifying costly-errors-even injuries-can result.

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That is why the organizational culture and climate should allow appropriate operating procedures.

Otherwise, a serious gap between what actually the organization should do and what, in reality, does could induce higher costs and decreased market share.

PolyProd is a relevant example of failing to improve current information management practices.

There is a need for initiating the change in the manufacturing and distribution division of PolyProd (M&Ddiv) due to the risk of occurring the gap above mentioned. This initiative will involve change and project management techniques traditional in large engineering firms.

A planned change should be emphasized within obtaining the authority, resource allocation and monitoring the progress.

From the very beginning we posit that several stages should be followed in implementing the change as following:

A. Choosing the approach to change
B. Favoring a climate and culture for sustainable change
C. Planning the change

A. Choosing the approach to change

Leavitt's Four Interacting Organizational Variables

Dealing with change in an appropriate manner should address at least four interacting variables[1] as following:

a. *Task*
b. *Technology*
c. *People (actors)*
d. *Structure*

PolyProd could be viewed as a multivariate system with all these four interacting variables as potential "entry points" for any change action.

a. ***Task***. The company's business strategy is focusing on those processes performed by the headquarters site like:
- Designing products and
- Manufacturing methodologies

with transferring the maturing manufacturing processes offshore.

b. ***Technology***. It is, mainly, the documentation system that consists of a number of components:
- An electronic "vault"
- The computer systems and networks that allow access to the "vault"
- The documents themselves

[1] Harold J. Leavitt – Applied Organization Change in Industry: Structural, Technical and Human Approaches, in W.W. Cooper, H. J. Leavitt and M.W. Shelly, II (eds.), New Perspectives in Organizational Research, Wiley, 1964, pp. 55-71

- The protocols for routing and approving revisions.

c. ***People (actors)***. They are an important component of technology. Changing the technology could not be accomplished when the people who interact with technological components are resisting changing.

d. ***Structure*** like:

- ***Communication*** that is shaped by the nature of technology and the organizational structure (M&Ddiv has five locations around the world).
- ***System of authority***. It is based on the organizational relationship between headquarters and local sites. When the authority is rather perceived as obstructionist for some of the tasks performed by lower organizational levels, then, the system itself is damaging the organizational goals in relation with external environment.

The way that the managing change is implemented at each of these "***entry points***" is a critical issue that should be properly addressed.

The key to efficient change management is the ability to read not only the environmental signals but also the internal organizational signals.

These variables are so-called "***triggers***"[2] for implementing change. The "triggers" are not isolated because the organization is not static but a dynamic system.

More than this, the "change may be directed at any "entry point" and have a resulting, possibly predictable, knock-on effect elsewhere."[3]

Consequently, implementing change would induce a "***shock wave***" reverberating throughout the organization, as Leavitt identified.[4]

What variables would reverberate more than others? Once the "entry points" have been established, where the "shock wave" will reverberate more within the organization?

Is there any possibility of finding out with certainty the amplitude of change effects?

The answer is that when facing the organizational transformation, the organization itself is far from certainty.

The members of an organization "are not able to make connections between cause and effect and, therefore, they cannot predict the outcome of their actions over the long term."[5] The change process is influenced by uncertainty. This could be related to inefficient past experience in managing change within the organization or unstable external environment.

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[2] Robert A. Paton, James McCalman – Change Management

[3] Ibid. p. 30

[4] Ibid.

[5] Ralph D. Stacey – Strategic Management & Organizational Dynamics, 2nd ed., p. 26

That is why the implementation process of organizational change should assure that those uncertain factors could be properly managed.

One way of reducing uncertainty is making a more smoothly, productive interaction between corporate departments and functions by promoting a "***business process orientation***" (BPO).

The Business Process Orientation (BPO)

Michael Hammer coined this term (BPO) to address the issue of a "customer-focused strategic-business-based organization focused on a process-oriented way and using information technology as a key enabler."[6] He is using the concept of "re-engineering as a strategy to overcome the problematic of cross-functional activity."[7]

The "***business process culture***" of a high-tech company like PolyProd should be a "cross-functional, customer-oriented along with process and system thinking."[8]

This orientation is changing the hierarchical approach within the organization in a multitude of processes. The system of authority is not any longer a functional hierarchy but processes with emphasis on outcome and customer satisfaction.

Once the "triggers" that could bring on the change and the orientation of change have been established, then, the key players of change process should be aware of the difficulties in accepting the change at the human resource level.

Creating a Better Cross-functional Communication through Simulation

Running a simulation of an improved documentation system could really help the process of implementing change at Polyprod. Its aim is to show participants how effective their decisions really are.[9]

One important pre-requisite is to relate the simulation content to the real business process.

Using a simulation of a real situation could help participants in having a better understanding of their status in the organization, improving cross-functional communication between headquarter and local sites at PolyProd. The status is not relating only to the participants' job requirements but to their specific role or place in the business situation especially when the processes are business oriented.

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[6] Kevin McCormack – Business Process Orientation – What Is It and How Do You Know You Have It?,
[7] Ibid.
[8] Ibid.
[9] Dory Bertche, Christopher Crawford, Stephen E. Macadam – Is Simulation Better than Experience? in The McKinsey Quarterly 1996 Part I, p. 54

B. Favoring a climate and culture for sustainable change

PolyProd "feels" unproductive with friction between headquarters and the other locations. The management and employees at the sites generally are dissatisfied with what they feel as a patronizing and demanding attitude. The organizational policies are regarded as being unilaterally sent out by the headquarters. Headquarters staff, in turn, resent the fierce and individualism of the other locations.

This friction is inducing tensions at the organizational level and is, actually, shaping the climate of PolyProd.

To change this tensionate climate into a productive and innovative one should require new practices like changing the functional hierarchy with an operational one, emphasizing the importance of delivering better added value to the customer (business process orientation).

Thus, the cross-functional tensions would be re-directed towards what really matters for everybody within the organization. That is profitability and customer satisfaction.

Climate is closed related to culture. The dissatisfaction perceived by the employees and managers at the sites influences "their interpretation of organizational policies, practices, and procedures (climate)."[10]

"The sustainable organizational change is assured when both the climate – what the organization's members experience – and the culture – what members believe the organization values – change."[11]

Any past attempt to impose change has lead to failure. It proved that any change could not be accomplished unless there is a suitable organizational experience and a favoring culture.

Explained past change failure could be related to headquarters' own internal issues. There is a long tradition of conservatism and hardened reluctance to change, fact that could be the biggest obstacle for initiating the change.

Besides that, the organizational climate has rapidly grown following the organizational transformation from a small, independent factory into the hub of a global business.

A discontinuity in its own cultural history has been reported with rapid hiring and promotion, insufficient mentoring, heavy outsourcing and downsizing of certain competencies and extensive use of a temporary workforce in non-engineering areas. All these so-called organizational practices and policies could have produced a cultural dissolution with impact on organizational homogeneity.

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[10] Benjamin Schneider, Arthur P. Brief, Richard A. Guzzo – Creating a Climate and Culture for Sustainable Organizational Change, Spring 1996, p. 9

[11] Ibid. p. 9

All those four ***interacting organizational variables*** (Leavitt) have been rather disconnected within the organizational context.

a. ***The People (actors).*** The nature of interpersonal relationships is less cooperative and less competitive because of a certain degree of frustration between headquarters and local sites.
b. ***The Structure.*** The managers and employees perceive the decisions as dissatisfiers. On the other hand, the headquarters perceive, sometimes, unnecessary individualism of the other locations. This could be a feedback reaction of the decision made by senior managers.
c. ***The Task*** could not be properly performed due to the discontinuity perceived in the cultural history.
d. ***The Technology.*** The quality is everything at this level. That is why the control of a high-volume manufacturing process can arise more difficulties especially when it hinges on a huge quantity of documentation.

It is obviously that these so-called "triggers" are not ready for implementing the change.

Better said, choosing now to implement the change would induce "shock waves" that will reverberate throughout the organization at higher levels of uncertainty.

Thus, the probability of a failure in trying to transform the organization is now bigger.

Further improvement of the variables should be carried on in order to make change successfully.

All these variables form the organizational climate. The culture can be changed focusing on climate.[12]

Further directions should be followed in order to enable the climate and culture to accept the transformation, as following:

- *Localizing the problems*
- *Planning the change.*

Where Could Problem Be?

Is there a single problem or a multitude of problems? Some of the problems have been already identified as related to the variables (Leavitt's four variables).

The organizational structure is not only a hierarchy between headquarters and local sites but also a network of inter-related departments that are both consumer and producer of documentation. Better said, the departments are both inputs and outputs into the documentation system.

[12] Ibid. p. 12

Any organizational dysfunction would affect, finally, the documentation system or any fault in the documentation system would affect, finally, the organization.

There is a widespread dissatisfaction with the documentation system in the design departments at headquarters, fact that would reverberate throughout the entire organizational structure.

Actually, a fault in the system reported in a particular department would affect other departments that are completely interdependent with the first one.

It happened in reality. A dissatisfaction reported at the design department was not a singular experience. Thus, the quality department is distressed by some delays. Technical writers are unhappy with the general usability. The last ones get little co-operation from the subject matter experts and reviewers they rely on for information.

It is not only a matter of system interdependency but inadequate personal workloads that could explain some organizational problems.

Hiring temporary staff for managing increasing documentation requirements would provoke a hemorrhage of accumulated experience that, otherwise, would have been really necessary within the business. The temporary staff will take everything they learned with them when their contracts end.

There are a number of interrelated causes producing M&Ddiv's documentation problems. Senior management has tried to improve documentation quality in the past. The effort was implemented partially and the project lost momentum after some early successes. Anyway, a documentation-related task was rather perceived as a distraction from the "real work". That means the climate was not responding properly to change. It was an example of initiating the change without an organizational climate support. The project failed because the social and technical aspects of work were not, probably, sufficiently integrated. There is a socio-technical philosophy arguing that an "effective change is a product of integrating the social and technical aspects of work."[13]

The lack of co-ordination among the sites combined with exacerbated workloads, the workforce temporarily used and the tensions reported between headquarters and local sites contributed to an inadequate climate to change.

The lack of integration is not limited only to the relation among different local sites but there are also internal integration problems within each location. The responsibility falls within several organizations.

Consequently, there is a risk of disruption and time delays when decisions are to be made.

More than this, a fragmented responsibility is not matching the integrated configuration of the documentation system.

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[13] Ibid. p. 14

On the human resources' side, there is a lack of training or experience in the field of documentation. There are no rewards for communicating or collaborating, and the groups frequently develop similar or conflicting solutions to what turn out to be common problems.

There is, actually, a chain of weaknesses as part of the workforce is not properly trained, then, day-to-day operation also is less than optimal. As a result of this, the quality of the processes controlled by the employees is affected. There is a lack of rewards.

Consequently, the employees believe that the management is not, actually, valuing their works. The lack of a rewarding system could induce a lack of linkage between culture and climate.

Thus, a rewarding system could be regarded as a link between climate and culture. The "rewards (***climate***) make people believe that management values quality (***culture***)."[14]

There is also a lack of communication and sharing problems and frustrations at the organizational level, among different locations and departments. Generally, each of the problems and frustrations outlined above is restricted to the departments immediately affected. That means the climate is not favoring a culture of communication and problem solving. The problems reported by some departments could not be visible to upper management. This uncooperative climate induces an individualistic approach: most people were aware only of their own difficulties with the documentation. The overall sense of shared pain in the organization was very low. On the other hand, upper management was completely unaware of the magnitude, frequency, and very real cost of the problems. The proposed solution for improving the business processes is, anyway, focused on local aspects of the problems. There is no attempt for a larger-scale solution.

That is why there is a need for a planned organizational change that would generate larger-scale solution.

C. Planning the change

It is obvious that a potential organizational change will improve performance if technological and social changes are integrated.

Anyway, the problem emphasized earlier is a complex one, with needs of change both at technical and organizational level.

Firstly, the process of managing change should be regarded as problem solving, once the problem finding has been discussed earlier.

Secondly, using the word "problem" could have connotations that people would try to avoid. More than this, using the word "problem" would arise

[14] Ibid. p. 11

difficulties in dealing with the psychological aspect of the issue. Generally, people try to avoid this word because a problem is seen as a bad situation. It is like saying that someone should be punished for what has, actually, generated the problem. That is why using the word "opportunity" would be more appropriate.

Besides that, the organization itself could face threats from the external environment (competitors, customers and regulations).

It is clear that the change should be carried on at all organizational levels from senior management to the lowest organizational level with a focus on business processes in relation with the external environment.

Stages in Change Implementation

1. Committing an Active Participation of Leadership. Pursuing a Training Program at the Upper Management Level

The change needs a champion. The more powerful the champion is, the more likely the change would succeed.[15] Stewart Jones is the M&Ddiv executive that is most likely to be the potential sponsor of the project. He should plan and manage the change with departments' directors. It is necessary that the new team should follow a training period in order to understand and improve their culture. The training program should be focused on the importance of re-designing the business processes. Emphasizing the importance of business process orientation and its relationship with the necessity of improving cross-functional interaction would generate a new cultural awareness. The concept of "interoperability across the value chain"[16] should lay the foundation of the new cultural approach. Thus, the focus on finding solution strictly related to a department's own processes should be changed with a new vision focused on business process orientation (BPO). That means the new vision should be outcome-oriented.

The training period should not stop at the upper management level. Assuming that a new outcome-oriented culture will be successfully implemented at this level, the team should be responsible with communicating the new cultural pattern to the lower organizational levels. The team would be the "change implementor"[17]. So, they should communicate the change to the "change recipients"[18] They are the largest group including those who must adopt and adapt to the change.[19]

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[15] *Organizational Change: Managing the Human Side*, an *American Productivity & Quality Center* White Paper based on findings from APQC's 1997 *Organizational Change consortium benchmarking study*, 1999

[16] Kevin McCormack apud Michael Porter

[17] Todd Jick, Implementing Change, Harvard Business School Case N9-491-114, 1991

[18] Ibid.

[19] Ibid.

2. Culture Change through Simulation Process. It Is the Time for Signaling Down Throughout the Organization

The "change implementers" should spread the change signals by using the simulation as a way of preparing the way in which every individual within the organization is prepared for change. It is a process fundamentally based on a continuous feedback received from participants. Both of the "change implementers" and "change recipients" would take the role of planner, operation manager and engineer manager "deciding how to allocate resources and what kind and quality of maintenance activities should be performed."[20]

Therefore, both of the upper management and lower staff levels would be involved in a cooperative process of taking and sharing the right decisions for improving the business processes.

The simulation would take place throughout the entire network of documentation system, respecting the structure of the engineering-intense environment in M&Ddiv.

The technological design of the simulation program should include and communicate all those aspects considered to be essential in the change process as following:

- *Cross-functional communication,*
- *Customer-oriented function,*
- *Improved technological parameters for a better documentation system,*
- *A certain degree of autonomy in decision making strictly related to the business process orientation.*

Running the simulation could overcome those barriers to learning and inter-departmental communication. The participants are expected to make decisions according to the technical parameters and quality requirements.

Hopefully, they will visualize better the entire technological system.

More than this, a better communication would arise among participants as well as a sense of participation to the principal decision-making process.

The simulation process should not be regarded as a single change agent. A better performance appraisal system, a performance management system and compensation system should bring on the appropriate change to the corporate structure and would boost the work motivation of the employees.

The simulation process combined with a better appraisal and rewarding system should assure the four-pillars of a successful change process as following:

- "Formal education and training,
- Formal and informal communication,
- Changes to the corporate structure (especially to the human resources systems),

[20] Dory Bertche, Christopher Crawford, Stephen E. Macadam, op. cit. p. 54

- Financial incentives."[21]

Finally, the lack of consensus on the need for standardizing would be minimized.

At this stage of the change process, a better top-down communication would be implemented.

The success of the change implementation would rely on the commitment of upper management and the real participation of lower staff.

The techniques used for enabling change (the simulation process, a new appraisal and rewarding system) combined with the direction used for change (business process orientation) could assure a successful implementation of the planned change.

3. Monitoring the Change Process

Assuming that the planned change would be successfully, the change process should not be stopped. This process is a dynamic one with risks that could affect the outcomes.

Larger and more complex the organizational architecture, bigger the potential risks could be.

PolyProd is an organization with a worldwide architecture. It is difficult to manage such a wide and diversified structure, especially when a planned organizational change is in place. There are many branches spread over different geographical markets with various impacts from different and, sometimes, "unfriendly" national regulations (e.g. fiscal policies).

For instance, the cost of implementing change could be too high, affecting a cost target of a particular branch. The simulation itself could be costly. Implementing a new attractive rewarding system and initiating a system of financial incentives for management could increase the cost.

That is why the financial cost of the change process should be careful designed and monitored.

There might be some people arguing that the change is too costly. That is why the emphasis should be on improving productivity that would be generated as the main outcome of the change.

On the other hand, the change process would take a longer time and higher costs. A judicious plan with stages, specific periods and costs should be put in place.

The Role of Project Manager in Implementing the Change at M&DDiv

The role of the project manager could be explained within the four "golden rules of the change agent"[22] as following:

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[21] *Organizational Change: Managing the Human Side,* an *American Productivity & Quality Center* White Paper
[22] Robert A. Paton, James McCalman, op. cit. p. 190

1. *"The nature of the relationship" between project manager (the change agent) and the "system needing help"*[23] *(the organization).* R. Paton and J. McCalman argue that there is a voluntary link between two parties.[24]
2. *The change agent should solve a current or potential problem.*[25] Here comes the role of senior management that should recognize a potential opportunity for change really exists. More than this, the change agent should provide an expertise based on some previous experiences and information collected at the organization.
3. *The role of the project manager is a temporary one.*[26]
4. *The change agent should not be part of the organizational hierarchy.*[27]

The project manager should be objective in relation to the change process.

The project manager should be the initiator of the change process. That means activating the leadership role and monitoring the training program at the upper management level.

The project manager is the change strategist. He should identify "the early work, creating a vision of the desired outcome, deciding what change is feasible, choosing who should sponsor and defend it."[28]

His work could be focused at the upper management structure because the leader of the organization should pursue the change implementation.

The senior management could be powerless to force change at the beginning of the change process. That is why the project manager should activate their leadership role.

Once the leadership role has been activated, the role of the project manager could be to monitor the implementation process.

The upper management and key players at the local sites (directors or supervisors) should play the principal role in the implementation process.

Project Management requires a comprehensive process of understanding, controlling and managing the following aspects related to change process: Scope, Time, Cost, Quality, Human Resources, Communication, Risk.

Conclusion

The process of change implementation could be more difficult to accomplish in larger organizations where technology plays an important role.

The level of uncertainty is greater because a potential failure of change could generate huge costs related to technology, different geographical locations of organizational departments.

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[23] Ibid. p. 190
[24] Ibid. p. 190
[25] Ibid.
[26] Ibid.
[27] Ibid.
[28] Todd Jick, op. cit.

Some techniques used for change implementation could be expensive and, consequently, could induce opposition from senior management.

The organization could be confronted with financial constraints. So, any further cost increasing (due to expensive change techniques) could face difficulties.

That is why the project manager plays an important role in convincing the senior management that the change will have a noticeable impact on productivity and the overall business performance.

Therefore, the project manager should emphasis the benefits of the planned change.

Then, these benefits would compensate the costs of change process. Moreover, the benefits should have a huge demonstrable impact on the overall business performance.

"Return on capital employed" is a well-known financial indicator measuring the profitability of the capital paid by shareholders for having a future expected return (dividend). It is like saying that the change would produce a return on effort employed (cost paid for change implementation) greater than the cost paid for the same effort.

The project of the organizational change is expected to have a financial impact that would not only compensate the costs occurred in the process of implementation but to leveraging the initial financial performance of the business.

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CITIZENS' EMPOWERMENT THROUGH FIGHTING CORRUPTION

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The transition in Romania brought about, besides a range of important social-economic and political changes, an unprecedented amplification of the corruption phenomenon which manifests with increasing intensity in most of fields of human activities. The setting-up of the market economy mechanisms has represented a profitable terrain for the flourishing of corruption and its extension in the entire social life. So, nowadays many analysts say that it is generalized and institutionalized.

The failure to eradicate this cancer of our society poses major obstacles in creating a healthy business climate needed to bring in vital investments, in poverty reduction and reaching of a higher level of life. And, unfortunately, the most corrupt are high-ranked officials who extort big bribes and state founds in their own interest.

At the base level, the most frequent corruption acts happen in the administration sector where the use of public function for private gain and its sale as a good is a main way to maximize benefits and economic interests. This was rationale to choose "The case of the Mayor Lutzu" as an empirical case in Romania.

Introduction

Our paper responds to the invitation of the World Bank to frontally address issues of empowerment not only in development projects and practice, but also through social research. We have been directly inspired by Deepa Narayan's books about ***Empowerment*** and about ***Voices of the Poor,*** and by the World Development Report (2001) that made a path-breaking theoretical and policy link between empowerment and poverty reduction.

The challenge to us has been to place the empowerment issues within the Romanian context and Romanian realities. As you all know, it is a lot easier to speak and praise empowerment than to actually capture, "measure" and quantify it sociologically as a distinct variable.

We thought hard on how we can identify what is usually named a "strategic research site" which would enable us to lay our hands more directly on this process of empowerment, in order to "capture it in action," grasp it, measure its emergence, dynamics, and manifestations.

Finally, our search for a strategic research site resulted in a choice that holds great interest on its own.

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This is the phenomenon of ***corruption in the public administration arena***, of which we have plenty in Romania (more than we would ever want or need even for research purposes!) The paper we prepared for this conference, within Deepa Narayan's conceptual framework, is at the confluence between concepts and trends familiar to us all, such as: corruption; dis-empowerment; participation; and empowerment.

Our hypothesis is the following: in public administration corruption undermines democracy, robs people of the options to exercise their rights, and dis-empowers them. Therefore, when corrupt individuals and practices can be eliminated from a certain unit of public administration afflicted by them, the citizens may be empowered to exercise their voices, rights and entitlements. Finding a significant case if eliminating corruption will therefore enable us to measure the effects in terms of empowerment and design good indicators for such measurements.

The case identified was that of an ultra-corrupt Mayor of one of the Capital City's (Bucharest) large districts, who was caught, tried, imprisoned, and replaced. The new Mayor's office introduced indeed a different style of governance with citizens gaining much more access to the levers and seats of power. This is the empirical case we have analyzed. Our paper talks in detail how we have done this. I'll offer in this brief presentation only an abstract.

Corruption during Transition: Dis-empowerment Effects
Rationale

The transition process in Romania brought about, besides a range of important social-economic and political changes, an unprecedented amplification of the corruption phenomenon. Corruption is now present and intensifies in most fields of public activities. The market economy mechanisms represent a propitious terrain for corruption and nowadays many analysts consider that it is widespread and often institutionalized.

Fighting corruption became a key target for the Government, which developed an Anticorruption Strategy in 2001 but with still limited effects in Romanian society. Speaking in Parliament on the state of nation, President Ion Iliescu asked legal bodies to tighten the rule of law against those guilty of corruption, remove them from public life, and restore people's confidence in public institutions. The war on corruption is a priority for citizens as well, who pay the heavy costs of bribery and fraud.

A National Anticorruption Prosecution (PNA) agency was constituted for fighting corruption efficiently, but it cannot do too much with only 55 prosecutors against 700 cases of big corruption! In our country people say: "*We do have corruption, but we cannot find corrupts ones*". The newspapers write, for example, about "the local barons" of the party in government who make all kinds of illegal arrangements in their own interest, forgetting poor people's

needs and troubles. But very little has been done against them, because most are members of the government party.

As a direct consequence, the failure to eradicate this cancer of our society leaves major obstacles on the way to creating a healthy business climate, needed to bring in vital investments. Unfortunately, the most corrupt are high-ranked officials who extort big bribes in their own interest. Corruption seriously affects economic growth and poverty reduction. Though there is a governmental anticorruption strategy, only a few measures have been taken to implement it. Our working hypothesis is that this strategy is not enough, and it does not effectively mobilize the population and citizen's participation to uncover and eliminate corruption.

The most frequent corruption acts are happening in the public administration sector, in the form of using public function for private gain. The sale of privatized assets as part of the transition is a main way to maximize benefits and economic interests. The press and citizens' complaints point clearly, better than official statistics, to the involvement of state officials and local representatives in corruption, which result in resource redistribution in the interest of private groups with great lost for the process reform.

Besides its immoral and conter-productive character, corruption is a powerful impediment in the efforts to reduce poverty and social inequalities. It has a negative impact on development programs and policies, and last but not least, on strategies aimed at democratic empowerment of the poorest strata of the population.

So, special cases of corruption in Romania are the "service offenses" committed by some mayors which, according to Romanian law, include bribery, traffic of influence, abuse in power, and embezzlement of public funds for personal interest.

In the last five years, despite increasing number of citizens' complaints about corruption acts of mayors has increased (see Annex), state authorities have not taken firm actions to punish them. Often they have even covered up cases involving the mayors belonging to the party in government. Yet, there were a few cases where community as a whole acted perseveringly against corruption at local level, demanding and finally obtaining the elimination of the corrupt mayors.

Indicators of Power and Empowerment: Community Involvement in Fighting Corruption

In our view, citizens' involvement in opposing corruption at local level offers more than one dimension for measuring empowerment.

In Romania, the Mayor's office (Primaria) is a crucial institution in people's life. The allocation of public funds, implementation of socio-economic

development programs, the financing of social assistance, infrastructure modernization, and general public administration are only some of the Primaria's prerogatives as an institution with communitarian character. Unfortunately, these are also exactly the areas of most abuses and corrupt activities in Romania by mayors and the representative of Local Councils. For instance, the implementation of the law of restitution of agricultural and forests lands, essential for transition purposes and for enabling many people to regain their confiscated properties is one most profoundly distorted by the corruption of many local power representatives.

An opinion pool, carried out 2 years ago, found that the vast majority of people (75%) regarded the Primaria and the mayor as crucial for many aspects of their existence. But only a small minority – about 15% of the respondents, felt that the Primaria and the mayor are a credible institution. Most explained their negative answers by stating that the mayor and the representatives of local power are corrupt and abuse their functions for gaining personal advantages. "Only if you bribe the mayor does he gives you your land back. He makes the law", the respondents say.

Because central authorities have not taken action against abuses perpetrated by mayors despite bottom-up signals, the majority of citizens feel discouraged and abandoned, powerless and voiceless. They are deprived of information needed to influence Primaria's decisions or to participate in decision makings. They have no effective mechanisms for making transparent decisions concerning community life and for holding the local representatives accountable for the policies that affect their well being.

In conclusion, being excluded from participation in decision-making and from allocation of local resources, and living in an unequal power relations network, the citizens become silent witnesses of their own existence. They have limited control over key aspects of their existence. Their voicelessness, powerlessness, distrust, and incapability to change abusive decisions and corrupt acts of local power representatives are the key concepts for understanding and measuring the levels and forms of empowerment in many communities in Romania. This substantiates our hypothesis that only by gaining economic, political, and cultural control over decisions and resources, the citizens can gain "voice" and "capability" to make local governors accountable for their illegal acts of corruption. Only afterwards can they become really "empowered".

Because under circumstances of extended corruption poor people tend to be powerless, we can derive several indicators for measuring empowerment as a reversal of this situation. For instance:

- Since the hidden corruption of government/public/ local officials deprives citizens of rights and entitlements granted to them formally, fighting corruption successfully makes formal "rights" and

"entitlements" more real, not only "paper-rights": Therefore, we must measure the actual exercise of some such entitlements and rights.

- Fighting corruption gives more "voice" and more power to the powerless: Therefore, we must measure "voice".
- Fighting corruption encourages people to participate more: Therefore, we must measure various forms and manifestations of "participation" where some success in fighting corruption in a community or institution is achieved. Our hypothesis that participation increases as a result of fighting corruption could be empirically confirmed or falsified.
- Fighting corruption increases the sense of "ownership"- a psychological variable in this case - which is expressed in a heightened feeling of security, of being in control of one's own affairs, in a stronger sense of pride and human dignity.
- Fighting corruption successfully results in increased propensity for collective actions, and social energy mobilization. People are more ready to contribute their energy and become less cynical. This again is empowerment, strengthening the posture of the poor as "stakeholders".
- Fighting corruption enhances trust, thus it increases social capital and social cohesion. Therefore, measurement of changes in trust levels is a way of measuring empowerment – the trust in the central or local government, in leaders, in the citizens' capability to reduce corruption.

In conclusion, the various dimensions and indicators of citizens' empowerment can be grasped in our case by observing the involvement of these citizens in fighting corruption. Better knowledge of citizens' involvement can help us decipher better the dimensions and indicators of citizens' empowerment.

A Case for Empirical Research in Romania: "The Case of the Mayor Lutzu"

A major case in Romania which demonstrated the importance of citizens' involvement in fighting corruption was the so-called "Lutzu case".

As mayor of District 4 of the Bucharest Municipality – the capital of Romania - elected of 1996 on the lists of the governmental party, Marin Lutzu perpetrated between 1996 and February 2000 - when he was removed and arrested – many abuses and corrupt acts. The most serious abuse was the appropriation - through a simulacrum of auction - of 6 agricultural-food markets from South of the capital, the biggest and the richest markets in the area. The mayor, together with his daughter, the Secretary of the Primaria and 30 (out of 32) council members of the Primaria-established a new firm "Comprest" having as object of activity, among others, modernization and exploitation of these

markets. Then, through an "official" decision (signed by the Mayor, the Secretary and the councilors), this firm was declared the winner of the auction and, on this "legal" base, it was given the right of concession over those 6 agricultural-food markets for a period of 20 years. The auction was faked. Only 2 firms participated: "Comprest" – a firm established only a few months before the auction, though according to Romanian law it had to have balance sheets from the last 3 years -- and a second firm belonging to the chief of mayor's office with only a decorative role: to give the appearance of legality to the faked auction led by mayor and his accomplices.

This was only one of the many onerous businesses of this mayor, nicknamed in the media "Octopus Lutzu". When the authorities' finally did a search in his house, they found great amounts sums of money, bank savings, and other important values like: expensive wrist watches, collections of paintings, precious icons, sculptures by famous artists, and other things. In fact, as it was proven later, after becoming Mayor, Marin Lutzu had also became, in the short time, one of the richest individuals in Romania.

Yet in Romania it is also possible today to fight corruption despite it being considered a "fatality".

We have to note, first, that many complaints sent by citizens and businessmen to different authorities – the Police, General Prosecution, the Control Dept. of the Prime Minister, the Parliament's Commission of Abuses, etc, remained without any answer. Like other statesmen accused of corruption. Mayor Lutzu beneficiated of "immunity". For all his illegal acts he received only a simple reprimand from the governmental party to whom he belonged.

As a consequence of this perpetual refusal of the authorities to take actions against the case of a corrupt mayor, a group of citizens, disadvantaged by the fake auctions and transactions made by the Primaria, adopted different forms of protest: they organized meetings of protest and wrote "manifests" in which they disclosed to the public opinion the abuses of Primaria's leaders. One of this manifests sounded like this: *"We call on the merchants of all markets, commercial societies, individuals, family associations, to oppose the illegal actions of Primaria by all legal ways, by creating committees to inform and make complaints about perpetration of business crimes. This way we will defend our interests and also fulfill our civic and moral obligation!"*.

In brief, the case of this corrupt mayor became an opportunity for citizens from District 4 of the capital to unite in the fight against an endemic phenomenon in Romania and to crystallize a "collective conscience" against public officials' corruption.

In this light, we contend that measuring empowerment can be achieved through the evaluation of such collective actions and initiatives, because these help the population to become more and more conscious of its entitlements and

interests, to assert its right to be informed and to hold accountable local governments.

Distilling and Testing Indicators of Citizens' Empowerment

In our opinion, distilling and testing indicators for measuring empowerment, can be achieved through evaluation of community involvement and participation in fighting corruption. This dimension could be made operational.

As any social problem, corruption involves two main elements:

a) An objective condition, whose real content is measurable through the damages caused to public resources and interests, the conditions in which it is perpetrated, and the position of the authors of corrupt acts;

b) A subjective condition which consists in concerns and worries of many persons, difficult to quantify but meaningful for people is perception of a phenomenon that affects the conduct of public life.

Only when the members of a community become aware that their interests are hurt and, consequently, they mobilize themselves specially for fighting against a corrupt mayor, for instance, can it be said that the corruption phenomenon is not only an undesirable objective condition, but also a veritable social problem. In this case, the opinions of insiders are more important than those of outsiders observers.

All social problems, including corruption, have a "natural history" which means that people are increasingly aware of their gravity, according to certain stages of their own evolution. Every new stage brings new elements. The following stages are the most important in the case of community members' involvement against corruption:

a) The stage of making people aware of something - the most characteristic effect of this stage is the genesis of a new collective awareness embodied in the idea that "We have to do something for solving this problem. This situation is unbearable". The "Lutzu case" and others cases, for instance, could not become publicly visible without citizens' actions who, after becoming exasperated by authorities passivity, resorted to the media. Through its visible signals, the press helped catalyze a flow of "public opinion" favorable to fighting corrupt mayors.

b) The stage of reactions concerning a very specific problem - the awareness of the "corrupt mayors" problem became a constant object of public debates, engaging, on the one hand, public opinion reactions, and on the other hand the authorities' reactions. Public debates, hosted by mass media, parliamentary interpellations, etc. generally tried to answer the question: "What must be done concerning the problem of corrupt mayors?"

c) The stage of citizens' reactions to the way authorities react. The inability of power representatives to take firm measures against corrupt mayors caused strong discontents citizens and determined protests and the formation of different associations for collective more impactful action.

d) The stage of action - following public debates - implies citizens' mobilization, on the one hand, and of the authorities, on the other hand, with the aim to initiate actions and improve policies. Unlike previous stages, that one is characterized by dynamic action and community mobilization. That means that people pass from problem awareness to the organization of collective actions. Such actions, like in "Lutzu case" and other corrupt mayors, have been upheld in an institutionalized form by different ad-hoc associations created and also by some central authorities.

In our opinion, the succession of these stages (which can be reflected in specific indicators) can be summed up as the crystallization of a "communitarian consciousness" in fighting corruption of mayors, these "large scale solutions to such a serious and generalized problem in Romania

Starting from assessing formation and gradual affirmation of this communitarian consciousness, some specific indicators for Measuring Empowerment could be identified.

The "Voices of the Empowered" get a Hearing: the After-Effects of Removing a Corrupt Mayor

Aware that real distilling and testing indicators and measurements could be done successfully only through an empirical case research, we propose to continue investigations in the same District 4 in Bucharest after the removal of the mayor Lutzu Marin. We plan to analyze: if something changed for the better for those 300.000 inhabitants from this district in the new legislature (2001-2004) now have a new mayor representing the new government party (PSD-Social Democratic Party); if this mayor has learned something from the mistakes of the previous one; and if his program aims Primaria's democratization and modernization. Now the research field will move to the citizens and Primaria as a state institution.

The primary questions in our research project are:

- What are the citizens doing now?
- After the removal of corrupt mayor has the new mayor really tried to "empower" the population or not?

The strategic researchable questions in the center of our work **are:**

- Do the citizens participate more than before in the exercise of power? It must be researched. This can be or not confirmed by the facts: We will submit to the "tyranny" of facts.

- Have the employees of Primaria become more accountable and responsive to the citizens petitions?

- Have the mayor and his employees enlarged the space for democracy inside and outside of Primaria?

- Is this democratic space used fruitfully in favor of citizens?

From the methodological point of view another range of questions are posed:

- What kinds of activities by citizens and employees are susceptible to empirical measurements?

- How could these measurements made operational in the research process?

Among other subjects, we must also ask the mayor about his new work strategy after the corrupt ex-mayor was unmasked and eliminated from the top, in other words, we must assess if there is a new "empowerment strategy", at work, although we know that this concept and its complex meanings are not known in the socio-political practice in Romania.

Some questions could be:

- What were the first measures taken by the new Mayor, coming after a corrupt Mayor?

- What did he do to promote people's participation inside and outside of Primaria?

- How did he act in the case of petty bribery if it happened?

The final conclusion and the core of our whole research program consist in finding out the answers of these questions:

- Are the citizens being "put first"?

- Are they being gradually empowered now?

Of course, the answers could not be a simple "yes" or "no". They have to derive from many other insights gained from research. If the citizens are being put first, if they are empowered we can learn from the strategy to inform them, to include them in important decision-making, to make the power representatives accountable, to help citizens to organize and mobilize in the discovery of corrupt employees and officials, as well as in public utility, sanitizing actions of the district.

Empowered citizens are better informed and, consequently, they are better equipped to take advantage of opportunities access to services, to education, to health care, to exercise their rights and hold state and non-state actors accountable.

"Civil liberties in the form of citizen-voice based on information, participation and public accountability can enhance the effectiveness of government action", write Narayan et al. in their work. So, increased civic trust in the Primaria staff and in its development program expressed through actual participation, would indicate that the climate and situation have changed

radically in the Primaria of the District 4 in Bucharest. These are, of course, working hypotheses, which must be verified empirically in the field.

It is easy to see that this possible research project is built on the idea of Deepa Narayan et al. from "Voices of the Poor". It aims to be a positive replica in a case of successful fighting corruption. The framework of "Voices of the Empowered" is also inspired from the model of Narayan in "Voices of the Poor".

Like poverty, empowerment is a multidimensional phenomenon and it is complex and institutionally rooted. It demands state reform for creating conditions in which citizens could inform, participate, associate and make decisions. All these lead to improved development outcomes including better local and national governance, access to justice, provision of public services and pro-poor market development. Empowerment has also positive effects on the civil society cohesion, strengthened citizens' organizations, and on people's assets and freedom of choice. Empowerment patterns vary from country to country and are different in terms of social history, social groups, level of economic development and democratic traditions. Even in every institution different patterns of empowerment could be found.

According to the four key elements (information, inclusion/participation, accountability and local organizational capacity), the empowerment process has many dimensions. Focusing on dimensions is a proper way to define indicators and measure them. In our conception, empowerment has these dimensions: cultural-informative, political, social, economic, institutional, judicial and moral. They are intertwined, meaning that some indicators are common to 2-3 dimensions. But every dimension has its strong indicators which define it and could be measurable by quantitative and qualitative methods.

Multidimensional operational character of *Empowerment*

We must mention that the concept "Empowerment" in Romanian language could not be translated by a single word. To be well understood it must be explained in context. This concept offers a new pattern of analysis and social action, it reveals the latent potential of poor people and gives them the awareness of their inner powers to organize, work together and mobilize for the benefit of community. But it also has a high level of idealism and desirability. These derive from the fact that the elements and factors of empowerment appear sometimes to be easily achieved everywhere by people with different experiences and patterns of life. In fact, these social imperative processes are very hard to reach. For instance, in Romania, local organizational capacity, the demand side of governing, bottom-up discussions of budget are less developed aspects of social and political life. Therefore, the authors

consider that empowerment of poor people remains an ideal rather than a reality in most developing countries.

The theoretical pattern should include, in our opinion, the following dimensions:

Cultural - informative dimension

Without information, people remain powerless and voiceless. Information means power. Therefore, giving them information we give them power to express themselves, to demand their rights, to hold responsible the government and state officials, to participate in actions concerning their life. Access to school and education is also a means to form leaders of opinion and action capable to shape peoples' thinking and behavior. The culture of empowerment is an important aspect of this dimension. By it we mean the effort to make understandable to the citizens the rich significances of the term "empowerment" for their life.

The indicators of this dimension could be the "voice" of ordinary citizens in addressing collective needs; the number of initiatives proposed in the community life; the increasing interest in the way in which the budget and local financial resources are spent; protest actions against corrupt acts, the need to have access particularly to financial information to curb corruption; exposure to mass media to hold government officials accountable; the desire to increase cultural and professional information and become well - trained .

In this case we can measure: the number of "voices" and initiatives, the social and economic effects of officials' interpellations concerning the way of spending public money, the concrete measures taken after the protest actions and interviews given in mass media on misused community funds, the number of the young people with high qualification who participate in the successful effort to empower simple citizens through information.

In the empirical investigations of Primaria as an administrative institution the indicators of cultural-informative dimension could be: post-box for the petitions and claims of citizens; posters with actual and urgent information advanced by District Council posed in the key places like crossroads, etc., in front of important institutions, stores and markets; publishing a newspaper; meetings with the citizens to find out their needs and include them in the future budget and development program.

Measurements can be made through quantitative methods like the number of actions, the frequency of some effects and qualitative methods: in-depth interviews, focus group discussions, participatory research method, free discussions.

Political dimension

Citizens become aware of their power to change the status-quo by voting and by participating in decision makings at all levels of society. This develops political capabilities: on the one hand, political consciousness: on the other hand, the capacity of an individual to represent oneself or a group and to participate in the political life of community or even of the country. In this way, the empowerment process produces socio-political benefits. Societies with large political liberties can better combat poverty, corruption and assure economic growth of people. Political dimension of empowerment is a useful tool to improve local and national government, to participate successfully to enlarge the space of democracy actions, to increase the trust in the capabilities of citizens to fight for equality and equitable relations between them, to combat corruption

The political dimension has as indicators freedom of information, the liberty to form associations and unions, free access to press and equal access to justice, freedom to participate and speak at public debates, collective awareness, actions and decision makings concerning rights and entitlements.

Measurement in this case means to pose these indicators in quantitative terms – number, frequency obtained from opinion survey – or in qualitative terms using nuanced and concrete description of "empowered people" about their new "powers" which changed the life of the whole community.

Social dimension

This is expressed in the need of the people to be included, to participate in, associate and build the local organizational capacities with the aim to be better heard by those powerful. World Bank studies show that a higher level of social capital measured by membership in groups with collective interests and powerful ties among people could generate a higher level of satisfactions and even of family incomes.

Social dimension indicators like satisfactions, social cohesion, social capital and strong ties are hard to measure through quantitative methods. So, the best are the qualitative assessments and self-evaluations of participants in the process of empowering.

In the study of all dimensions the main method of research will be participatory Empowerment Assessment – PEA - which means that we will use the perspective of "empowered people" themselves to understand the process of empowerment and their involvement in development programs. To see the world through the eyes of those who became more powerful and voiceful and to describe this world in their own terms is a veritable model of authenticity and scientific validity.

Economic dimension

This is a strong and a crucial dimension of empowerment and is important in our analysis because it constitutes a fundamental cause of structural inequality that affects the quality of life and capacity of decision. Without economic power and material assets it is hard to speak about well-being, access to decisions, and taking control and action to overcome obstacles to reducing social inequalities. A high economic status of a social group consisting of physical and financial assets like: land, housing, livestock, savings and jewelry enhance its security, self-confidence and capacity to negotiate fair deals for that group and decrease its vulnerability. Some researchers consider that to exercise strategic life choices it is necessary to have: access to resources, agency and outcomes. All these assets as well as access to resources, institutions and outcomes could be indicators of economic dimension and, implicitly, of economic empowerment.

These indicators, being predominantly of material and financial nature they could be easier measured. Those of social and institutional nature require another kind of measure, obtained through a distilled qualitative analysis.

Economic empowerment through fighting corruption is obvious in increasing the budget funds for public and social services, education, health care, cultural activities, infrastructure and finally, in quality of life.

Institutional dimension

This dimension of empowerment is an important feature because voicelessness and powerlessness are deeply embedded in the nature of institutional relations. Citizens' empowerment implies changing the nature of institutional relations that reflect the culture of inequality.

We suppose that in Romania the institutional dimension of empowerment could not be really achieved without a strong institutional reform and civil society participation. Otherwise, it remains a simple desire. Only state reform through laws, rules, institutions upheld by the state and changes in the culture, values of system and ethics of institutions creates conditions to enhance the citizens' capabilities to pass from the status of excluded people to that of empowered. Or, such an institutional reform is a long process, requiring deep changes in officials' and people's mentalities, values, and behaviors.

The main indicators of institutional dimension are:

- The Primaria's means to ensure access to information, its dissemination to help citizens to make informed choices; public consultation, studies about citizens' needs and worries;

- The Primaria's facilities to support inclusion and participation: local rules, regulations on people participation, social mechanisms to mediate relation among citizens and Primaria;
- The Primaria's facilities to facilitate local governance through and by citizens: incorporation of citizens' local organizations into district decision making; empowering district committees to review the Mayor's and his councilors' decisions and activities concerning community spending; identification of corruption cases, (if any), among the local government representatives and state employees of Primaria.
- The state efforts to invest in citizens' organizational capacity through direct participation of citizens and their representatives such as research institutes, NGOs, women organizations, parents-teachers organizations, etc.

Measurement of these indicators could be done through quantitative and qualitative methods. For instance, regarding the facilities to disseminate information, indicators could be: setting a center of information in the Primaria to inform citizens with the news from its projects; number of people involved in information dissemination; assessment of people's interest to be well-informed through in-depth interviews, focus group discussions, etc.

The inclusion and participation require from the leaders of Primaria District 4, Bucharest, after the Lutzu "earthquake", first of all, a new code of behavior that could be learned from discussions with citizens and employees, social analysis and participatory empowerment assessment. The satisfaction of citizens for being listened and treated with respect and dignity, to solve their claims is a qualitative indicator. It could be measured through social analysis and participatory methods. In addition, it is necessary a real financial project to form and make workable associations and groups of citizens to help solving community demands. To reach this objective in Romanian's financial condition, in our opinion, is almost impossible. So, the funds, the number of facilitators, types of activities, outcomes to attract citizens in common organizations to be better heard and meet their needs are measurable indicators through quantitative, qualitative and participatory methods.

Accountability, the ability to call public officials of the community to account, requiring that they be answerable for their policies, actions and use of funds, is a top problem in our project because of widespread corruption in the administration institutions, like Primarias. The indicators named previously: citizens organizations, citizens committees with the aim to control and make responsible local public officials for their policies, actions and use of funds are also the indicators of local organizational capacities. We have already mentioned that they are intertwined.

Concerning investments in local organizational capacity, we consider that this task is a new and a big one, for Primarias. In Romania after 1989, there is little preoccupation, if any, in this field. For example, in the problem of fighting

corruption, the rulers themselves were not interested in building new local organizations, since they were first to be involved in corrupt acts. So, related to fighting corruption, in our research project we will have difficulty in examining scientifically the indicators of this key element of empowerment.

Judicial dimension

A functioning judicial system and the rule of law are important characteristics of people empowerment in our country where the corruption infractions became so rampant that they can delay our future development on the way of joining European Union. They are necessary for a better investment climate, protecting poor people and their livelihoods, enhancing the citizens' trust in justice, in the power of truth and of its holders. For example, in the daily newspaper "Curentul", from December 23, 2002, at the question: "Do you believe that the National Prosecution Anticorruption will reach the top of Romanian corruption?" respondents' answer was: 97, 62% "no" and only 2,38% "yes".

The reform of the judicial system, aiming to create the legal environment for making accountable governance and empowering poor people and citizens by increasing their access to justice, is a priority task on the agenda of the Romanian government. Its declared goals are to improve the act of making judicial decisions accountable and affordable to ordinary citizens, to achieve an independent and accountable judicial system, to improve citizens' physical, cultural, and financial access to justice.

Indicators of this dimension are:

- corruption cases of the state officials and magistrates (the number of cases signaled by mass media, NGOs, citizens and self-signaled);
- arrest, penal judgment and punishment – three relative stages depending on political intrusion of the government party (the number of finished and unfinished trials by punishment and its performance);
- protection of poor people with limited access to justice,
- trust in judicial system
- perception (positive/negative) of judicial system
- accountability for unfair penal decisions
- adjournment of trials

Measurements of these indicators could be made through both quantitative and qualitative analysis.

Moral dimension

After 1989, Romania is characterized by a deep and extended moral crisis in all fields of society. The propensity to material accumulation has become a fundamental moral principle The fulfillment of this goal is most often associated with illegal and immoral facts. From an ethical perspective, the point is that people give up values like honesty, rightness, equity to become wealthy through any means. In this context the corruption blossoms at any corner.

Unfortunately, sometimes, poverty itself pushes to break moral norms and rules and this situation brought about the increase of the number of infractions and trials. (Therefore, measure the number of petty and big infractions).

It is immoral that for the petty frauds poor people receive many years of prison, while the corruption at high level is punished with a few years of prison or even forgiven. At the interface zone between justice and morality there are some common indicators like rightness, equity, correctness which could express the report between the size of infraction and the size of punishment.

Specific for moral indicators is their subjective feature, meaning how moral values are "lived", and the inner emotional reactions. They become manifest by happiness, pleasure, gladness on the one hand and by sadness, indignation, revolt on the other.

A specific subjective indicator of moral dimension is satisfaction/dissatisfaction with the role of incentive or impediments in cohesion/fragmentation of community-social life. Its measurement could be achieved by participatory empowerment assessment as well as opinion survey and psycho-sociological analysis.

*Concerning our empowerment framework, after an experience of 13 years of transition in Romania, we consider that the order and components of this schema need to be also seen as part of a change process. We agree with the idea that the first step in changing the status of poor people from being excluded to be included in the mainstream of development activities is the reform of state institutions. But, in our opinion, the state reform itself consists first of all in improved national governance, followed by improved local governance and a deep, extended and real reform of the judiciary system which strongly demands citizens' participation and the building of a veritable communitarian consciousness.

APPENDIX

Corruption cases signaled by the romanian press in which mayors and representatives of local authorities have been involved

1997

- On the pasture in commune Arieseni, county Alba, the mayor Rovin Lazea, grants many permits to local officials for building villas (May, 22).
- Vicemayor of commune Baia de Aries, county Alba was arrested for corruption (June, 14).

1998

- The Prefect officers investigate illegal allotment of lands by the mayor Gheorghe Prunescu in commune Petrachioaia, county Ilfov (January, 15).
- The mayor of commune Tzintesti county Bacau has been arrested because had received 1 million lei bribery (March, 15).
- Ex and present mayors of Targu Mures, county Mures, are accused because they have damaged the state with 4.3 billion lei (April, 16).
- A local advisor in Botosani has been in flagrant for receiving bribery (May, 23).

1999

- The policy asks trial of ex-mayor in town Costesti, county Arges for fraudulent appropriation of 128 million lei (April, 14).
- False certificate for the mayor in commune Siriu, county Buzau (April, 16).
- At Deva, lively quarrels between the mayor and Local Council – manoeuvres to give land to revolutionists (April, 23).
- Public property for sale. The mayor of commune Rucar, county Arges makes the law as he wishes (May, 25).
- The mayor of commune Andrid, county Satu Mare, has been forewarningly arrested, being found guilty for perpetration of infractions of embezzlement and intellectual forgery (May, 29).
- The mayor and vice mayor of commune Frumusitza, county Galatzi, are investigated for corruption (May, 31).
- Brasov. How the property right is respected. Policemen and mayors break the law. Abuses of the mayor of Sacele (April, 27).
- The mayor of Cluj investigated for abuse in service (April, 28).
- At the Primaria in Constanta, the rational use of public money – an optional issue (Mai, 22).
- The mayor of village Atrid, county Harghita perpetrated a fraud by falsification of documents concerning the help of people in need (May 18).
- After they have declared „Baile 1 Mai" as commune property, Primaria's councilmen from commune San Martin used tourist resort as their own property (June, 26).
- Aurica Buda, the mayor of commune Tulca, county Bihor, found that she takes bribery, was no longer trialed. After investigations, Prosecution of county Bihor concluded that the subjective side of infractions is missing (July, 14).
- The mayor of Valcea, Sorin Zamfirescu, involved in embezzlement of funds (July, 15).
- Mircea Ionescu, the mayor of commune Voluntari, has been arrested for taking bribery (July, 25).

- The mayor of Deva, Mircia Muntean, takes advantage with state's land. Revolutionists were appropriated with land in a town where was not any shoot in December, '89 (July 22).

- With legal documents. In the commune Ideciu de Jos, county Mures, thefts from the state's money: a mayor, a firm, and one work – triad of corruption (July, 27).

- Counts Court in Bacau decided an ensuring distraint on the mayors' property and of the local councilmen (July, 29).

- Without any accountability for the citizens' problems in Cluj, the local councilmen appropriate the land for themselves and build their own houses (July, 29).

- Land stolen illegally by the mayor of commune Barcanesti, county Ialomita,(October, 5).

- 12 councilmen accuse: the mayor of town Buhusi, Mihai Gheorghita, has taken from flood victims' helps (October, 29).

- General Prosecution has been notified concerning illegal transactions with thousand of hectares in the town Predeal. Involved in scandal were the ex-prefect of the county Brasov and the mayor of the town (November, 5).

- Plunder at Bistret. The mayor of commune Bistretz, county Dolj, confuses the local budget with his own pocket (October, 8).

- The President of Abuses Commission of Deputies Room asks the Prosecution pronounce in the case of mayor in District 5 of capital, accused of abuse in service and taking bribery (November, 10).

- Dumitru Brank, the mayor of Arad, punished to 1.10 year prison with suspension for abuse in work and intellectual forgery (November, 26).

2000

- The mayor of commune Vidra, county Ilfov, sold 16 machines taken from the army worthing billions lei to a business man (January, 19).

- The mayor of town Bacau – expert in the „financial engineerings" (January, 21).

- World Bank paid private emploees of a mayor in a commune. The money paid by The World Bank to repair the roads in commune Stanceni, county Botosani have been used by the commune's officials for personal interest (January, 26).

- The mayor of Giurgiu has frightened people of the town with his penal business (February, 3).

- Town Pascani is the headquarters of abuses and illegalities in Romania. Wrongdoings perpetrated by the mayor Neculai Ratzoi, related to the application of Land Fond Law have been covered by the prosecutors in Iasi (February, 8).

- As a mayor of town Cluj, Gheorghe Funar made contracts of billions with his son's firms (February, 14).

- The mayor of Pufesti, county Vrancea has been surprised in flagrant taking bribery (February, 17).

- First spectacular arrest of an infractor mayor, Marin Lutzu, the mayor of District 4, Bucharest, for abuse in service against public interests, forgery and use of forgery (February, 25).

- The Public Ministry – an alarming judicial social phenomenon: covering of the penal complaints against the „infractor-mayors of PDSR" (Social Democrat Party of Romania), actually PSD (Social Democrat Party) (March, 25).

- Accused by viceprimar Darabont, the mayor of District 6 of Bucharest, denies his relations with underworld, but he does not deny his friendship with gangster Bucurenciu (April, 8).

- According to an opinion pool of CURS, the most public office workers, including the mayors, in Romania, are corrupt (April, 20).

- The mayor of burglars. The mayor of commune Pantelimon, in collaboration with local infractors, succeeded to establish a real mafia of property's titles for central lands (May, 13).

2001

- After the demagogy about „anticorruption" in the election campaign, attained its goal, the mayor of District 4 goes on the mayor Lutzu's illegal activity (December, 6).

2002

- Corruption in Primaria in Bucharest pushes the government to extreme measures: anticipated elections in Bucharest (January, 11).

- 12 years of thefts in the Primaria of Bucharest (January, 14).

- Basescu, the mayor of Bucharest, continues the big thefts of the ex-mayor Lis (February, 13).

- Prosecution in Gorj decided the arrest of the ex and present mayor of commune Scoarta for taking bribery (February, 13).

- The mayor of Braila, Anton Lungu, has broken numerous laws with the aim that Rosario Raneri, suspected of bonds with mafia organization Cosa Nostra, to get a business of 3 millions USD/ a year (February, 14).

- The mayor of commune Darasti, county Ilfov, has been tried for corruption (February, 21).

- First blow given to markets mafia. Contest Council asks in the court to the Primaria of District 4 to cancel illegal auctions (February, 28).

- The mayor from commune Simian, county Mehedintzi, was arrested for taking bribery and fraud (February, 28).

- 12 mayors in Gorj county are penalty investigated for the way they applied the Law of lands and forests restitution (March, 1st).

- For a qualified abuse in service against public interests, the mayor of Deva, Mircea Muntean, has been penally investigated (March, 25).

- Infractional cases of the mayor in commune Jilava wait for investigation by Prosecution Ilfov (March, 23).

- The mayor of commune Slatina, county Suceava, was punished to work 600 hours in the benefit of the community for forest infractions (March, 24).

- Commune Damuc, „Sicily" of county Neamtz. Ex-mayor of the commune, Ion Frasinaru, has been arrested for illegal business with forest lands (April, 5).

- Encoureged by the first housekeeper, the mayor Klaus Johanis, the vicemayor of Sibiu spends public money helped by his wife (April, 8).

- Ex-mayors of Bucharest became millionaires (May, 13)

- The money from European Union was invested in the houses of Primaria office workers in commune Liesti, county Galatzi. Among beneficiaries: the mayor, vicemayor, his son, the secretary, and Primaria's councilmen (May, 25).

- The mayor of commune Margineni, county Bacau, investigated by prosecutors for false documentation concerning investments (May, 27).

- Mayors investigated by Prosecution for corruption were found clean as taken from the Romanian clean service "Water lily" by the President of PSD – government party Gorj, N. Mischie (June, 5).

- While in District 3 of Bucharest, a quarter of the streets have not water, sewerage, and electricity, the mayor of the District, Plesca, has taken billion lei from public money for his and his PSD colleagues villas facilities (June, 27).

- The woman mayor in commune Denta, county Timis, was imprisoned for taking bribery for 4 years (June, 27).

- Primaria in Tg, Jiu-town, "pays its dues" to the printing house of "the local baron" Nicolae Mischie, the president of PSD Gorj (October 8).

- The mayor of Satu-Mare, Hiorea Anderco, penal sued by Anticorruption National Prosecution for taking bribery and abuse in service (November, 18).

- After has been sequestered the property for misuse of public money, the mayor of Brasov accused „generalized corruption" from the Local Council of Municipality Brasov (November, 28).

- The mayor of Craiova is unmasked on Internet being accused that performs the works on public domain at higher costs from Primaria money (December, 12).

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